# What is AuthZEN?

> AuthZEN is the OpenID Foundation's standard API for asking a separate policy service "may this user do this to that?" and getting back a yes or no, so applications stop hard-coding their own access rules.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-11-01, updated 2026-11-06. 5 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/authzen

- What it is: standard
- Defined by: OpenID Foundation, Authorization API 1.0 (Final)
- Who it's for: Teams moving access rules out of apps

## What is AuthZEN?

Authorization API 1.0 is the specification from the OpenID Foundation's AuthZEN working group, published as Final on 11 January 2026 [S1]. It defines how a Policy Decision Point (PDP), the service that decides, and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the application that asks and then acts, talk to each other without knowing each other's inner workings [S1 Abstract]. The point is that one vendor's application can ask another vendor's decision service, with neither tied to a single implementation [S1 §1].

The spec fixes the shape of the question and the answer, not the rules behind them. How a PDP writes and stores its policy is out of scope [S1 §2]. The core call asks one question, such as whether Alice can view document 123 [S1 §3]. A batch call asks several at once, and three search calls ask the reverse: which documents Alice can view, or who can view document 123 [S1 §3].

Think of it like this: It works like a shop till calling the card network: the till does not know the bank's rules, it sends a standard request and gets approve or decline. The comparison stops at trust, because the spec assumes the decision service trusts what the application tells it.

Not the same as: AuthZEN is not a policy language or a policy engine. It is the interface in front of one, and it says nothing about how the engine decides [S1 §2].

## How does AuthZEN work?

Two actors take part: the application that needs an answer (the PEP) and the decision service that gives it (the PDP). The walk-through follows a single access question over the HTTPS binding, the one transport every compliant PDP must support [S1 §10].

[Figure: The application asks the decision service one subject-action-resource question over HTTPS and must stop on a false answer; the policy behind the answer stays inside the decision service.]

1. **The application finds the decision service.** A PDP is recommended to publish metadata about itself at a well-known address, formed by inserting /.well-known/authzen-configuration between the host and any path [S1 §9, §9.2]. The metadata must name the PDP and the URL of its single-evaluation endpoint, and the other endpoints are optional [S1 §9.1.1]. The application must discard the metadata if the PDP identifier inside it does not match the address it fetched from [S1 §9.2.3].
2. **The application builds the question.** A single access question carries a subject (the user or machine the question is about), an action (what is to be done) and a resource (what it is done to), and may add a context such as the time of day [S1 §6.1]. Subjects and resources each need a type and an id, and any of them can carry extra properties, such as a department or an IP address [S1 §5.1, §5.2].
3. **The application sends it to the decision service.** The application posts the request as JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) over HTTPS, to the endpoint the metadata names or, failing that, the default path /access/v1/evaluation [S1 §10.1]. The connection must be secured, for example with TLS (Transport Layer Security) [S1 §11.1]. The PDP should authenticate the caller, and the spec leaves the method open, naming mutual TLS, OAuth or an API key as options [S1 §11.2]. The spec recommends support for OAuth 2.0 [S1 §2].
4. **The decision service answers yes or no.** The PDP returns a decision, a required true or false, and may add a context object carrying reasons or hints such as a request for stronger login [S1 §5.5, §5.5.2.3]. A deny comes back as an ordinary success with "decision": false, while HTTP error codes such as 401 mean the request itself failed [S1 §10.1.2].
5. **The application enforces the answer.** On false, the action must not go ahead [S1 §5.5]. On true, it may go ahead, though the application may still reject the decision if it does not understand the context that came with it [S1 §5.5].

## Why does AuthZEN matter now?

Ping Identity has already committed to AuthZEN in PingOne Authorize, and on that and other signs we forecast that by March 2028 at least two of Okta, Microsoft Entra and Ping will sell per-action authorization for AI agents as a generally available product [BI-CALL-2026-0049](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-CALL-2026-0049). Raut argues an enterprise has to assemble agent controls from several pieces, with OpenID AuthZEN supplying the policy decision [BI-FIND-2026-0241](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0241).

The working group is also building on top of the API. On 15 June 2026 it announced two approved working-group drafts: one for policy that answers "not yet, here is what is required", such as a manager's approval, and one that maps other request formats, starting with tools in the Model Context Protocol (MCP), onto AuthZEN's subject, action, resource and context [BI-FIND-2026-1013](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1013). McGuinness cautions that AuthZEN cannot help with agent intent until there is a shared vocabulary of agent purposes, and that work has not been done [BI-FIND-2026-0206](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0206).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with XACML: AuthZEN uses the PDP and PEP split that XACML defines [S1 §1]. It standardizes the request, response and discovery between the two, and leaves the PDP's policy language out of scope [S1 §2, §9].
- Compared with Open Policy Agent: We read Open Policy Agent as something that could sit on the PDP side of the call. AuthZEN leaves a PDP's policy language, architecture and state management out of scope [S1 §2], so it governs the question and answer, not how the engine reaches its answer.

## What goes wrong?

- The decision service trusts the application. The spec says the model "assumes the PDP must trust the PEP" [S1 §11.4], so a subject, property or context value the application sends is taken as true [BI-FIND-2026-0867](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0867).
- Caller authentication is only a should. The PDP should authenticate the application, and the method is out of scope [S1 §11.2]. Without it, an attacker can flood the PDP or probe it with many requests to learn its policies [S1 §11.2].
- There is no way to say an agent acts for a person. A subject is one user or machine, so "agent X for user Y" has to be packed into properties or context keys the standard does not name, and two PDPs need not read them the same way [BI-FIND-2026-0867](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0867).
- "AuthZEN support" can mean little. Only the single-evaluation endpoint is required, and the meaning of the context in a decision is left to each implementation [S1 §5.5.2, §9.1.1]. The spec names no conformance test [BI-FIND-2026-0868](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0868). The working group announced vendor interoperability results in May 2024, before the final spec [S2], and it says it is developing a conformance certification program [S3].
- TLS covers one hop. It protects one point-to-point hop, so a PDP may sign its decisions to let the application check them across gateways [S1 §11.6].
- Search results are not a promise. A subject, resource or action a search returns should come back true when evaluated, but the spec says that outcome is not guaranteed [S1 §8.1].

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which of our applications send AuthZEN requests, and how does each one prove its identity to the decision service?
2. When an agent acts for a person, which property or context keys carry that, and does every decision service we use read them the same way?
3. Does our vendor's AuthZEN support go beyond the single-evaluation endpoint, what does its decision context contain, and what interoperability results or certification can it show for the final spec?
4. Which applications treat a decision with context they do not understand as a deny?
5. If the decision service is down or slow, do our applications fail closed?

## Sources

- [S1] [Authorization API 1.0](https://openid.net/specs/authorization-api-1_0-final.html) (OpenID Foundation, AuthZEN Working Group, Final, 11 January 2026)
- [S2] [AuthZEN Work Group Announces Authorization Interop Results](https://openid.net/authorization-interop-results/) (OpenID Foundation, Published 29 May 2024)
- [S3] [AuthZEN Working Group overview](https://openid.net/wg/authzen/) (OpenID Foundation, Working group page, read 5 November 2026)

## Evidence

- [BI-CALL-2026-0049](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-CALL-2026-0049): By March 2028, at least two of Okta, Microsoft Entra and Ping Identity will sell per-action authorization for AI agents, a policy decision evaluated at each tool or API call rather than at sign-in, as a generally available product. Mattson's 'complete separation of concerns', a security layer distinct from the agent layer, is his company's roadmap and would be discounted on its own; what makes the call is that Ping has already committed to AuthZEN in PingOne Authorize, Uber and Sierra built the layer themselves because nothing sold it, and WorkOS argues authorization has to live outside the gateway. One vendor or none by that date settles this wrong. (from "When the model cannot be trusted, control what the agent can reach, checked on every action")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0241](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0241): No standard covers the control an agent most needs: asking for more authority in the middle of a task. Raut's point is that an agent given a goal works out its own path and permissions as it goes, so least privilege set in advance does not hold. Step-up authentication has protocols; step-up authorization has almost none, and there is no single standard for what he calls least agency. An enterprise has to assemble it from SPIFFE for workload identity, transaction tokens for context, OpenID AuthZEN for the policy decision and an agent-control standard he says is coming and does not name. (from "Keeping an agent's delegation chain is optional, and room in the HTTP header decides whether it survives")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1013](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1013): The OpenID Foundation's AuthZEN working group has approved two working-group drafts, announced on 15 June 2026. AARP defines common patterns for requesting, tracking, satisfying and re-evaluating what policy needs before it can authorize an action, such as approval, consent, delegated authority or an attestation; in the post's example, an agent's payment above a threshold comes back flagged as approvable along with what is needed, and it goes ahead only after a manager approves and policy is evaluated again. The foundation likens AARP to CIBA: an asynchronous, out-of-band step that a person or an automated governance system can satisfy. COAZ maps other information models into AuthZEN's subject-action-resource-context request so gateways and other enforcement points can call a compatible decision service, and its first target is letting MCP tools expose the authorization checks a call needs. (from "OpenID's AuthZEN group approves a draft that lets policy tell an agent 'not yet, and here is what is required'")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0206](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0206): No shared vocabulary of agent purposes exists, so every implementation invents its own, and McGuinness says AuthZEN, the OpenID Foundation's externalized-authorization standard, needs that upstream work done before it can help. The harder part is the approver: a human signing off on a compiled authority model cannot verify what it grants, a gap he compares to the difference between informed consent and a terms-of-service checkbox, and one that widens as template libraries grow. One author's diagnosis, uncorroborated, and the reason the intent question stays open on our agenda. (from "A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that step")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0867](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0867): AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 has no way to say that an agent is acting for a person. The words agent, delegation and on-behalf-of do not appear; a subject is one user or machine with a type, an id and free-form properties, so an application can only encode "agent X for user Y" in property or context keys the standard does not name, and two decision services need not read them the same way. Whatever the application sends is taken on trust: the spec says "the PDP must trust the PEP" (the policy service trusts the enforcing application), leaves authenticating the caller out of scope, and only says the service SHOULD authenticate it. A delegation claim passed through AuthZEN is the calling application's word, with no token or chain to check. (from "OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0868](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0868): "AuthZEN support" can mean very little. A compliant decision service must implement the HTTPS and JSON binding. Its discovery metadata requires the single-evaluation endpoint and makes the batch-evaluation and three search endpoint URLs optional; publishing that metadata is only recommended. A decision is a required yes or no plus an optional context whose format is left to each implementation; the spec only suggests borrowing keys such as HTTP status codes, so reasons, obligations and step-up hints are not guaranteed to mean the same thing across products. The text names no conformance test or implementation, so a vendor's claim of support guarantees little beyond the HTTPS binding and the single evaluation call. (from "OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends")

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