# What is Dynamic Client Registration?

> Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591) lets an app or agent register itself with an OAuth authorization server at runtime. It sends a description of itself and gets back a client ID, with no admin setting it up by hand.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-28. 7 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/dcr

- What it is: protocol
- Defined by: IETF, RFC 7591 (Standards Track, 2015)
- Who it's for: Teams connecting agents and MCP clients to authorization servers

## What is Dynamic Client Registration?

Before an app can use OAuth, the open standard behind most delegated sign-ins and API permissions, it needs a client identifier at the authorization server, the service that hands out tokens. Traditionally someone creates that identifier by hand [S1 §1]. RFC 7591, published by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) in July 2015, lets it happen over the network instead. The client or its developer sends the server a set of facts about the client, called metadata, and gets back a client ID plus the metadata the server actually registered [S1 Abstract].

It exists because a developer often cannot know, while building the software, which organizations will run the API it talks to, so the software cannot be set up in advance at each of them [S1 §1.2]. The metadata covers the redirect URIs (the addresses the server may send a user back to after sign-in), the client's name and logo, and how it will prove itself at the token endpoint [S1 §2]. The RFC generalizes the registration methods that OpenID Connect and UMA (User-Managed Access) already used, and stays compatible with both [S1 §1].

Think of it like this: Picture a hotel desk where you sign up by filling in a guest form. The desk may ask for a pass first, and it can turn a form away. It treats what you wrote as your own claim, unless an agency the hotel trusts has sent a sealed letter vouching for you. The comparison stops at the face: the server never sees one, so it judges by the paperwork alone.

Not the same as: DCR is not the same as Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD), where the client's ID is a web address pointing to its own description and no prior registration happens [BI-FIND-2026-0704](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0704). With DCR, the server issues the client ID itself, in reply to a registration request [S1 §3.2.1].

## How does Dynamic Client Registration work?

Two parties take part: the client (an app, an agent, or a developer acting for it) and the authorization server's client registration endpoint. An optional token and an optional signed statement can come before the request. How the client learns the endpoint's address is left outside the RFC [S1 §1.2].

[Figure: How a client registers itself with an authorization server and gets a client ID under RFC 7591.]

1. **The server may issue an initial access token.** A server that wants to limit who can register gives the developer or client an initial access token, an OAuth token used to authorize calls to the registration endpoint. Its type and format are up to each service, and the RFC leaves out how it is issued [S1 §1.2]; a common approach is a manual portal where the developer signs up [S1 §1.3, A.1.2]. Without the token, registration is open, and the RFC says the endpoint should accept such requests to support interoperability [S1 §3].
2. **A publisher may sign a software statement.** The client can also carry a software statement. This is a JWT (JSON Web Token) signed by the developer or a third party, asserting facts about the software such as its name and a software ID [S1 §2.3]. It must be signed, or protected with a message authentication code, and it must name its issuer. Each server decides for itself which issuers to trust [S1 §2.3].
3. **The client posts its metadata.** The client or developer sends an HTTP POST to the registration endpoint. The body is a JSON object listing its redirect URIs, name, logo and token-endpoint authentication method, plus the software statement if it has one [S1 §3.1, §3.1.1]. In the RFC's example, an initial access token travels separately, in the request's Authorization header as a bearer token [S1 §3.1]. The endpoint must accept JSON and must sit behind TLS (Transport Layer Security), because credentials travel in clear text inside the request and response [S1 §3, §5].
4. **The server weighs the request.** The server must treat every metadata value as self-asserted, except values inside a software statement it trusts, which override the plain JSON [S1 §5]. It must consider the whole request together: statement, token and metadata [S1 §5]. It may replace requested values with its own, or refuse with an HTTP 400 error such as invalid_redirect_uri or invalid_client_metadata [S1 §3.2.1, §3.2.2].
5. **The server issues the client ID.** On success the server answers 201 Created. The reply carries a client_id, a client secret if the client is confidential, and every metadata value the server registered, including values it filled in itself [S1 §3.2.1]. The client never chooses its own identifier. The RFC forbids that so that one client cannot be tracked across colluding servers [S1 §6].
6. **The client can check the reply, then starts OAuth.** The client or its developer can compare what came back with what it asked for, for example whether the server kept an authentication method the software supports [S1 §3.2.1]. It then uses the new client ID in ordinary OAuth flows with that server [S1 Abstract].

## Why does Dynamic Client Registration matter now?

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), the standard that connects AI assistants to tools, has demoted DCR. Its 2026-07-28 revision deprecated DCR as the way an MCP client obtains a client ID, made CIMD the mechanism servers and clients should support, and kept DCR only for servers that lack CIMD [BI-FIND-2026-0111](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0111). MCP's authorization page now says DCR is retained for backwards compatibility [BI-FIND-2026-0190](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0190). The same revision requires every DCR request to carry an application_type. It also adopted a lifecycle rule that keeps a deprecated feature for at least twelve months before removal [BI-FIND-2026-0395](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0395).

Vendors still ship it. Okta and Ping Identity released CIMD in September and changed their DCR support in the same releases, so neither has dropped it. CyberArk's September MCP feature relies on DCR [BI-FIND-2026-0704](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0704). Cisco Duo's MCP integration, in beta, lets agents register by DCR and does not yet support CIMD [BI-FIND-2026-1194](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1194). A view recorded in November 2025 held that DCR in MCP would persist even after client ID metadata arrived, because so much was already built on it [BI-FIND-2025-0085](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0085).

A paper on agent identity says DCR "creates a large number of anonymous clients" [BI-FIND-2025-0057](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0057). One study tested 119 remote MCP servers that register clients dynamically, and 114 of them accepted any redirect address from an anonymous registrant [BI-FIND-2026-0944](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0944). That rate describes only the servers open to outside registration.

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with Client ID Metadata Documents: With CIMD the client ID is a web address the client controls, and nothing is registered in advance [BI-FIND-2026-0704](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0704). MCP now prefers it and keeps DCR for servers that cannot do CIMD [BI-FIND-2026-0190](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0190).
- Compared with OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata: Protected resource metadata is how an MCP server names the authorization server that guards it, and MCP requires every server to publish it [BI-FIND-2026-0190](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0190). Getting a client ID at that server is a separate step, done by CIMD, pre-registration or DCR [BI-FIND-2026-0190](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0190).
- Compared with OpenID Connect: OpenID Connect had its own dynamic registration spec first. RFC 7591 generalizes it to OAuth uses beyond sign-in and stays compatible with it [S1 §1].

## What goes wrong?

- Everything a client says about itself is self-asserted. A rogue client can send a real app's name and logo, or reuse its software ID, to pass as that app [S1 §5]. The RFC asks servers to check that the logo and policy links share a host with the redirect URIs, and suggests warning users about newly registered clients [S1 §5]. When a client is not meant to have several instances, a server should treat as suspect, and reject, a new registration that reuses an existing client's software ID and version [S1 §5].
- The RFC makes redirect URIs mandatory for redirect-based flows, to stop an impostor intercepting a registered client's code [S1 §5]. In our reading, that rule cannot help when the attacker is the one registering. In the MCP study, an anonymous registrant could name their own callback, get a victim to click a genuine sign-in link and collect the code; that flaw sat behind seven of the nine CVEs (published vulnerability records) the authors obtained [BI-FIND-2026-0944](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0944).
- A software statement is signed, yet the RFC still counts it as self-asserted, because the client presents it. In most cases it is not enough on its own to fully identify the software [S1 §5].
- A client ID is public and can be used to impersonate the client at the authorization endpoint. A server that gives one client ID to many instances has to be careful about when it does so, and it should not give them the same client secret [S1 §5].
- Open registration can be flooded. The RFC lets servers rate-limit registration against denial of service [S1 §3]. It also notes that browser apps without storage may re-register on every page load, leaving dead client IDs the server may expire [S1 §5].
- CIMD leaves part of this gap open. In our reading of the CIMD draft, an attacker can host a document naming their own callback, and at least 62 of the 119 consent pages in the MCP study did not show where the code would go [BI-FIND-2026-0947](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0947).

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which of our authorization servers accept client registrations with no initial access token, and who reviews the clients created that way?
2. Do our servers accept any redirect URI from a dynamically registered client, or only ones on a host tied to that client?
3. Which of our MCP connections still depend on DCR, and what is the plan for each before MCP removes it?
4. What access does a self-registered agent get by default, and who must approve anything more?
5. For each identity vendor we use, is CIMD supported today, or DCR only?

## Sources

- [S1] [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol (RFC 7591)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7591) (IETF, RFC 7591, Standards Track, July 2015)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-0704](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0704): Okta and Ping both shipped client ID metadata documents (CIMD), and CyberArk went the other way. With CIMD, an agent or app names itself with a URL that points to its own metadata, and needs no prior registration. Okta made CIMD a beta for AI agents and GA in preview for OIDC apps on September 16. Ping's Advanced Identity Cloud shipped it on September 29. CyberArk's September MCP feature relies on dynamic client registration (DCR) instead. Okta and Ping also changed their DCR support in the same releases, so neither has dropped it. (from "Three vendors now route MCP tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's is generally available")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0111](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0111): The Model Context Protocol revision of 2026-07-28 deprecated OAuth Dynamic Client Registration as the way an MCP client obtains a client ID and made Client ID Metadata Documents the mechanism authorization servers and clients should support, with DCR kept only for servers that lack CIMD. We checked the changelog, which confirms WorkOS's reading. The same revision still defines no gateway or proxy role and keeps the rule that an MCP server must not accept or pass on tokens issued for anything else, which is the rule a token-passthrough gateway breaks. Anyone building the client-identity layer of a gateway this quarter is building against a moving target with one fixed point. (from "An MCP gateway can be demoed in a week; Sierra's rollout waited on the auth layer underneath it")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0190](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0190): We had this from WorkOS's reading of the changelog; the page confirms it first-hand. Every MCP server MUST publish protected-resource metadata naming its authorization server, and that server MUST expose its own metadata or OpenID discovery. A client obtains its identity by a Client ID Metadata Document, by pre-registration, or by dynamic client registration, and the last is now the fallback: 'Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated and retained for backwards compatibility with authorization servers that do not support Client ID Metadata Documents.' Servers should name the scopes an operation needs in the 401 challenge. ZeroID implements both registration paths; the specification has now chosen between them, and any gateway that onboards agents by dynamic registration is building on the deprecated path. (from "MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extension")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0395](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0395): The identity changes in the 2026-07-28 revision are filed under Minor and Deprecated, and the minor ones are the new ones. Clients 'MUST key persisted credentials by the issuer identifier, MUST NOT reuse them with a different authorization server, and MUST re-register when the authorization server changes' (SEP-2352); clients must validate a present RFC 9207 iss parameter before redeeming a code (SEP-2468); a Dynamic Client Registration request must carry an application_type (SEP-837). Above them, DCR is deprecated 'as a client registration mechanism in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents' (PR #2858) and kept for authorization servers without CIMD, which we had already confirmed first-hand on the authorization page itself; what the changelog adds is the clock, since the same revision adopts a lifecycle policy with a twelve-month minimum before a deprecated feature can be removed. None of it is marked breaking. The CIMD draft the revision points at never mentions MCP; WorkOS and the OpenID whitepaper both read DCR's anonymous client as the risk this closes. (from "MCP's July changelog: a stateless protocol and clients named by web address, but no mention of gateways")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1194](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1194): Cisco Duo added two OAuth standards to a new beta integration for the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and to its OAuth 2.1/OIDC integration, also in beta, to match the MCP specification released on November 25. Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591) lets agents register themselves as OAuth clients, and Duo says admins keep full control over the access level of clients registered that way. Resource indicators (RFC 8707) let an agent name the resource it wants so Duo issues a token valid only there, which Medfisch says ensures a token for one service "cannot be replayed or accepted by another." Client ID metadata documents are not in the beta: Medfisch calls them "the future" and says Duo is building support, with no date. (from "Cisco Duo's MCP beta lets agents register themselves; Duo calls client ID metadata documents the future")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0085](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0085): Asked in November 2025 how an assistant could hand its access to downstream agents, South said on-behalf-of flows and delegated authority existed as proposals "but they're not widely supported". Separately, he told of a developer whose MCP-connected agent, running with his super-admin privileges, took down Netlify's core website, and warned that "just because you as a person are extremely trustworthy, that does not necessarily mean Claude code using your permissions is extremely trustworthy". He also expected dynamic client registration in MCP to persist by path dependency even after client ID metadata arrived. (from "WorkOS's Tobin South, in November 2025: agents will get a new kind of account, not a new identity standard")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0057](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0057): The paper finds every existing way of identifying an agent as a client incomplete. Dynamic client registration 'creates a large number of anonymous clients'. Client ID Metadata Documents fix that and are 'still insufficient as a workload identity'. SPIFFE gives a strong workload identity that depends on controlling the infrastructure, so it does not cross into another organization. Vendor systems such as Microsoft Entra Agent ID and Okta's are named as proprietary, with limited interoperability. In the year since, the Model Context Protocol has made metadata documents its preferred method and an IETF draft has joined them to SPIFFE. (from "OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0944](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0944): Of the 119 remote MCP servers whose OAuth setups Zhou, Zhang and colleagues could test end to end, all of which register clients dynamically, 114 accepted any redirect address from an anonymous registrant. That lets an attacker register a client with a callback of their own, get the victim to click a genuine sign-in link, and collect the authorization code; seven of the nine CVEs the authors obtained trace to this flaw. Every server tested had at least one flaw, 325 in all. The 119 are what was left of 1,118 servers advertising a registration endpoint after the authors dropped duplicates, unreachable hosts and 316 servers behind enterprise access controls, so the rate describes servers open to outside registration, not MCP as a whole. (from "114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sent")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0947](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0947): One of the authors' fixes for open registration is a move to Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD), which they say pin client identity to a "cryptographically verifiable" document, and the MCP specification's 2026-07-28 revision did deprecate dynamic registration in favour of CIMD, keeping it only for authorization servers that lack CIMD support. We think the fix is weaker than the paper makes it sound. In the CIMD draft, which we read separately, a client's identity is control of a web address, its redirect addresses come from the document it publishes, and tying them to the client's own hostname is optional for the server. An attacker can host a document naming their own callback. What is left to stop them is the consent page telling the user who is asking, and in this study at least 62 of the 119 consent pages did not show where the code would go. (from "114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sent")

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