# What is DID / Verifiable Credentials?

> Decentralized identifiers name entities and point to verification information. Verifiable credentials carry statements an issuer makes about someone or something. Together they let a holder present checkable evidence, while the receiver still decides whom to trust.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-16. 5 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/did-vc

- What it is: standard
- Defined by: W3C: VC Data Model 2.0 and DID Core 1.0 Recommendations
- Who it's for: Teams evaluating portable credentials and agent identity

## What is DID / Verifiable Credentials?

A decentralized identifier, or DID, is an identifier such as did:example:123. Its method, the middle part of the name, determines how software finds its associated DID document. That document can describe verification keys and services. The subject named by a DID and the controller allowed to change its document can be different entities [S2 §1.1] [S2 §1.3].

A verifiable credential, or VC, carries an issuer's statements about a subject in a form whose authorship can be checked cryptographically. A degree, employment record or qualification can travel from an issuer to a holder and then to a verifier. The issuer, holder and verifier perform separate roles; the holder need not be the person the statements describe [S1 §1.1] [S1 §1.2] [S1 §2].

These are separate W3C standards, often discussed together. VC Data Model 2.0 is a Recommendation dated 15 May 2025. DID Core 1.0 is a Recommendation dated 19 July 2022. Credentials do not depend on DIDs: the issuer must have a URL identifier, and a DID is one possible choice. DID Core also allows systems built on centralized or federated infrastructure, so the name does not guarantee a particular governance model [S1 §4.7] [S1 §4.4] [S2 §1].

Think of it like this: Think of a diploma and a way to find the university's authorized signature. The credential carries the university's statement; the DID can help locate verification information. Checking the signature still leaves an employer to decide whether it accepts that university's qualification [S1 §1.1] [S2 §5.3.2].

Not the same as: A DID is not a credential, and a credential does not need a DID. One names an entity and connects it to a document; the other carries an issuer's statements. Neither by itself settles whether a service should authorize an action [S2 §1.3] [S1 §4.4] [BI-FIND-2025-0021](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0021).

## How does DID / Verifiable Credentials work?

Follow a university, a graduate and an employer. This example uses a DID for the issuer; other credential deployments can use different identifiers [S1 §1.1] [S1 §4.7].

[Figure: The graduate carries the credential between issuer and verifier; the employer checks its proof and makes its own trust decision.]

1. **The issuer creates a credential.** An issuer makes statements about a subject, such as a university recording a graduate's degree. The credential identifies its issuer and describes its subject. The issuer must secure conforming credentials with a supported securing mechanism. An embedded proof puts the proof inside the document; an enveloping proof wraps the document. Neither choice requires a DID [S1 §1.2] [S1 §1.3] [S1 §4.7] [S1 §4.12].
2. **The holder keeps the credential.** The issuer sends the credential to a holder, who stores it in a credential repository: software such as a wallet or protected storage vault. The holder may be the subject, but does not have to be. A parent holding a child's credential is the specification's example. Our walk-through uses a graduate holding their own degree credential [S1 §1.2] [S1 §2].
3. **The holder presents the evidence.** The holder generates a presentation from one or more credentials and shares it with a verifier, such as an employer checking a qualification. Some cryptographic schemes let the holder disclose only selected statements or prove a property without revealing the original credential. Those capabilities depend on the scheme; the word 'verifiable' alone does not promise them [S1 §1.1] [S1 §2] [S1 §4.13].
4. **The verifier resolves a DID when used.** In this example the issuer uses a DID. A resolver applies that DID method's read operation to return a DID document. The document can identify public keys and the purposes for which they may be used. For a credential proof, the verifier checks whether the verification method belongs to the document's assertionMethod relationship. A key listed for authentication is not automatically a key for issuing credentials [S2 §7.1] [S2 §5.3] [S2 §5.3.2].
5. **The verifier checks proof and policy.** Verification evaluates whether the credential or presentation is authentic and current. It checks conformance, the securing mechanism and, if present, credential status. The verifier then applies its own business rules before relying on the statements. A valid proof does not establish that the degree is true, that this issuer is worth trusting, or that the presenter should get access [S1 §2] [S1 §1.1] [S1 §5.1].

## Why does DID / Verifiable Credentials matter now?

Agent identity proposals are making these choices concrete. KYA-OS requires decentralized identifiers for agents and support for did:key and did:web [BI-FIND-2026-0640](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0640). Its delegation credentials add rules beyond a general credential: each link must keep the same or narrower scope, and the verifier must check the whole chain [BI-FIND-2026-0641](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0641). The same specification leaves open whose identifiers and issuers a receiver should accept [BI-FIND-2026-0642](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0642).

Other credential work takes a different route. The SD-JWT VC revision we read finds issuer keys through HTTPS metadata or certificate chains, leaves DID mechanisms to profiles and extensions, and explicitly distinguishes its format from the W3C data model [BI-FIND-2026-0636](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0636). OpenID's credential-issuance specification uses OAuth and does not require DIDs either [BI-FIND-2025-0045](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0045). We read those choices as a reason to ask separately which credential format a product supports and how it names its issuers [BI-FIND-2026-0636](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0636) [BI-FIND-2025-0045](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0045).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with KYA-OS: KYA-OS applies DIDs and W3C credentials to agents and defines delegation-chain checks. The core credential model leaves authorization to an accompanying framework [BI-FIND-2026-0641](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0641) [BI-FIND-2025-0021](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0021).
- Compared with SD-JWT: Selective disclosure lets a holder share only some statements. W3C credentials can use selective-disclosure schemes, but support depends on the securing mechanism; it is not guaranteed for every credential [S1 §2] [S1 §4.13].
- Compared with OAuth: OpenID credential issuance uses OAuth to deliver credentials to a wallet. That issuance flow does not require DIDs, and a credential may even be issued without key binding [BI-FIND-2025-0045](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0045).

## What goes wrong?

A proof can verify while the trust decision remains wrong. The W3C model leaves the choice of trusted issuers, and the purposes for which they are trusted, outside its scope. Research prototypes using DIDs for agents have reached the same unresolved question: who designates trusted issuers [S1 §5.1] [BI-FIND-2025-0061](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0061).

Repeated presentations can expose a pattern of use. Our reading of the credential standard found that reused credentials let verifiers link presentations, while revocation checks can let issuers observe use. Its privacy defences depend on the chosen technology and the issuer's cooperation; they are not a benefit every credential automatically supplies [BI-FIND-2025-0023](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0023).

For agents, possession also leaves an authority gap. The credential standard does not establish that a holder is authorized to present what it holds and calls for an accompanying authorization framework when credentials are used for authorization. We would ask the deployment to show that framework before treating a successful credential check as permission to act [BI-FIND-2025-0021](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0021).

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which issuers do we accept, for which statements, and who maintains that list?
2. Which DID methods can we resolve, and who can rotate or recover their keys?
3. How do we establish that this presenter may act for the credential subject?
4. What status checks happen when a credential is presented, and what happens if they fail?
5. Can repeated presentations link a person or agent across services?

## Sources

- [S1] [Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/) (W3C, Recommendation, 15 May 2025)
- [S2] [Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0](https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/) (W3C, Recommendation, 19 July 2022)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2025-0021](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0021): The W3C credential standard leaves out the two answers an agent deployment needs. Which issuers a verifier should trust is, in its words, out of scope for this recommendation, and trust is direct, never inherited along a chain. It also has no mechanism to establish that a holder is authorized to present what it holds, and says using credentials for authorization needs an accompanying authorization framework. Its only examples of a holder who is not the subject are a parent and a pet owner; software holders and presenting on someone else's behalf do not appear. The DID-based agent schemes built on it, KYA-OS and the TU Berlin prototype, both stop at the same issuer-trust question. (from "The W3C credential standard leaves out what agents need most: which issuers to trust, and who may present")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0640](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0640): KYA-OS names AI agents by decentralized identifiers and nothing else. Implementations must support did:key and did:web; no DNS name, OAuth client id or other identifier counts as an agent's identity, and the agent generates its own key, which no registry or verifier may ever hold. That is narrower than DIF described it in April 2026, when the first conformance level was to use existing OIDC and JWT identifiers; the v1.0 conformance document's Level 1 begins by deriving a did:key. It puts the Decentralized Identity Foundation's agent spec on the opposite side from the IETF's Agent Name Service, which moved from DIDs to domain names in its April 2026 revision. (from "DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0641](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0641): KYA-OS writes narrowing into the verifier's duties, which the Delegate SD-JWT draft does not. Each delegation is a W3C credential whose issuer must be the previous credential's subject; scopes must be equal to or narrower than the parent's at every link, the chain must end at an accountable root it calls the Responsible Party, and the verifier must check the whole chain rather than the last credential. The newer Entity Card profile fails closed on any hop that does not attenuate, with action sets as subsets and amount and time caveats that may only tighten. The rule binds only KYA-OS's own scope language, and revocation, which cascades from any ancestor, is required only at the top conformance level. (from "DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0642](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0642): The specification proves which DID signed and what it was delegated, and leaves open whose DIDs to accept. It defines delegation, credential and trust registries without naming anyone to run them, makes a trust registry's rejection advisory, and puts federation between directories out of scope. A TU Berlin prototype of agents with DIDs stopped at the same point, calling the choice of trusted issuers unresolved, so for DID-named agents the open question is who runs the list of agents worth believing. (from "DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0636](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0636): SD-JWT VC is one step from approval and names exactly two ways for a verifier to find the issuer's key: a metadata document at a well-known path under the issuer's HTTPS identifier, or an X.509 certificate chain in the credential's header. The OAuth working group has submitted revision 19 to the IESG, where it waits on area director Deb Cooley's go-ahead with the security directorate's Last Call review marked 'has issues'. Decentralized identifiers appear nowhere in the body; an early revision's change log says a DID mechanism is left to profiles and extensions, and a later one adds that the format is not the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model. The IETF's credential format, in other words, anchors trust in the web's names and certificates. (from "SD-JWT VC is one step from an RFC, and it gives verifiers two ways to find an issuer's key, neither of them a DID")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0045](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0045): OpenID4VCI puts credential issuance on ordinary OAuth: the wallet is an OAuth client, the credential endpoint is a protected resource, and the hardening is the kit the desk has followed for agents, with pushed authorization requests and PKCE recommended, DPoP recommended for native wallets, and any access token living longer than five minutes required to be sender-constrained. The issuer is always an HTTPS URL. A credential's key may be named by a DID, and issuer metadata may list did methods as binding options, but nothing requires one; binding is by key, and an issuer may even issue unbound credentials. An organization that already runs an OAuth authorization server is most of the way to issuing credentials. (from "OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0061](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0061): The design proves which agent holds a key and leaves open whom to believe. Cross-domain trust rests on two assumptions the authors state: both sides trust the ledger, and each trusts the other domain's credential issuer. How trustworthy issuers are identified and designated, they write, remains unresolved; they suggest something like the EU's eIDAS trusted lists adapted for agents. A 2024 paper on IDs for AI systems stopped at the same step, so two research groups building agent identity from opposite ends have both left the trust decision to a list nobody yet runs. (from "Left to run a decentralized-ID check, AI agents finished as few as 4 runs in 100; one pair agreed to skip half")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0023](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0023): An agent that presents the same credential again and again is the correlation case the standard warns about: repeated presentation lets one verifier, or several colluding, link every use to one holder, and revocation lookups let the issuer watch too. The defences it names, unlinkable BBS signatures, single-use credentials and Oblivious HTTP, are advice rather than requirements and depend on the issuer's cooperation. OpenID4VCI's batch issuance of same-content credentials with different keys is the one deployed mechanism in our corpus that does this. (from "The W3C credential standard leaves out what agents need most: which issuers to trust, and who may present")

---

© 2026 Boston Identity LLC. All rights reserved. Published by Boston Identity LLC.
Quote up to 100 words with the credit "Boston Identity, IAM Insights" and a link to https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/did-vc. Claim numbers may be cited freely. Training, fine-tuning and text-and-data-mining use of this page is permitted.
Terms: https://insights.bostonidentity.com/terms · How to cite: https://insights.bostonidentity.com/cite
