# What is HTTP Message Signatures?

> HTTP Message Signatures let a sender sign selected parts of a web request or response. A recipient can check who holds the signing key and whether those parts changed, even when the message passes through intermediaries.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-16. 5 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/http-message-signatures

- What it is: standard
- Defined by: IETF, RFC 9421 (Standards Track)
- Who it's for: Teams protecting API traffic through gateways

## What is HTTP Message Signatures?

HTTP Message Signatures is the mechanism defined in RFC 9421, published by the Internet Engineering Task Force in February 2024. It signs selected parts of a Hypertext Transfer Protocol message, the request or response that web services exchange. A recipient can check the integrity and authenticity of those parts using a key it trusts for that context [S1 §1].

That matters when Transport Layer Security (TLS), which protects a network connection, ends at a gateway. A fresh connection from the gateway to the service protects that next leg, but TLS alone cannot give the service end-to-end proof of the original message. Signing at the message layer can protect selected values across that path, provided intermediaries leave those values intact [S1 §1] [S1 §7.2.3].

The standard is a toolkit. An application must define its required coverage, acceptable algorithms, key retrieval and verification context. It supports both public-key signatures and message authentication codes, where sender and verifier share a secret. The latter also lets the verifier create a valid signature, so the trust assumptions differ [S1 §1.4] [S1 §7.3.3].

Think of it like this: Think of signing specified lines on a delivery form. Someone can change a line you did not sign without breaking your signature; the recipient must know which lines needed protection [S1 §7.2.1].

Not the same as: A signature does not encrypt the message. Anyone with access to the message can read its signed values; TLS or an equivalent is still needed to protect information in transit [S1 §7.1.2] [S1 §8.2].

## How does HTTP Message Signatures work?

A sender signs a request and a service verifies it. The selected values and policy checks below illustrate the standard’s signing and verification procedures [S1 §3].

[Figure: The verifier reconstructs the signed values from the received request and applies the application’s coverage, key and freshness rules.]

1. **The signer selects its key and coverage.** The sender chooses a signing algorithm and suitable key under the application’s rules. It sets the creation time and, when applicable, an expiry. It chooses an ordered list of message parts to cover. A request signer should cover control data such as the method and destination; the application decides the exact list. Our example covers the method, target address and content digest, a hash of the body [S1 §3.1].
2. **The signer builds the signature base.** Both parties need the same bytes to check a signature. The sender turns the selected values into a standard text form, called the signature base. This process is canonicalization: rules for representing a value consistently despite some harmless HTTP changes. The final line includes the coverage list and signature parameters, binding the signature to its own metadata. The order must stay fixed [S1 §2.5].
3. **The signer attaches the proof.** The sender signs those bytes and adds two fields to the message. Signature-Input records the covered components and parameters. Signature carries the signature value. A shared label, such as sig1, pairs the entries. These fields must contain matching labels. The signature sits beside the message rather than wrapping it in a separate signed object [S1 §3.1] [S1 §4].
4. **The verifier checks the policy and key.** The recipient parses the two fields and selects the signature relevant to its application. It checks required coverage and parameters, then obtains the verification key using configuration or the application’s key lookup rules. It must reject a key it does not know or trust for this request. The algorithm must be allowed and fit the key; conflicting algorithm indications make verification fail [S1 §3.2].
5. **The verifier rebuilds and verifies.** The recipient rebuilds the signature base from the received message and checks the signature with the chosen key and algorithm. If a required signed value has changed, verification fails. When a content digest is covered, the recipient must also check that digest against the actual body: verifying the signed header alone would leave a substituted body undetected [S1 §3.2] [S1 §7.2.8].
6. **The verifier enforces freshness rules.** Any extra application requirements must be enforced during verification. These may include a maximum age, rejecting signatures after expiry, or checking that a nonce, a unique value for one message, has not been used before. A valid cryptographic signature cannot make a failed policy check pass. Which time limits and replay controls apply must come from the application’s rules [S1 §3.2.1].

## Why does HTTP Message Signatures matter now?

The WIMSE workload-signature draft shows why coverage is an architectural choice: it omits the request authority because proxies rewrite it, and binds the recipient through a mandatory audience parameter instead [BI-FIND-2026-0382](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0382). Its response-signing option can also require the client to reject an unsigned reply [BI-FIND-2026-0383](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0383).

Visa’s published Trusted Agent Protocol sample uses RFC 9421 signatures on agent requests, but our reading found no signed consumer mandate or consent record in that sample [BI-FIND-2025-0063](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0063). The Human Continuity draft proposes a separate human-linked signature alongside Web Bot Auth’s agent signature on the same request; the link cannot yet be carried across origins [BI-FIND-2026-1153](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1153). We read these uses as a reason to ask exactly what each signature proves, and whose authority remains outside it [BI-FIND-2025-0063](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0063) [BI-FIND-2026-1153](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1153).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP Signatures: The WIMSE draft applies HTTP Message Signatures to workload requests, choosing the signed components and a recipient-binding parameter. RFC 9421 supplies the general mechanism; that draft supplies workload-specific rules [BI-FIND-2026-0382](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0382) [S1 §1.4].
- Compared with Transaction Tokens: The WIMSE signature profile covers the Txn-Token header when present, along with its other protected request values. A transaction token can therefore be carried under a message signature rather than replacing that signature [BI-FIND-2026-0382](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0382).
- Compared with Structured Field Values for HTTP: RFC 9421 uses Structured Fields to encode its Signature-Input and Signature dictionaries. That grammar tells implementations how to parse the fields; the signature procedure still needs coverage, keys and cryptographic verification [S1 §4] [S1 §3.2].

## What goes wrong?

- Unsigned values remain changeable. A signature can verify while an attacker changes an uncovered field that alters the application’s decision. The application should require enough coverage for its purpose, and the verifier should trust only signed components [S1 §7.2.1].
- Fresh does not mean unused. A captured signature can be replayed on a similar request even with sufficient coverage. A nonce lets a verifier detect repeats, and time limits narrow the opportunity. The WIMSE draft requires nonce and time parameters but does not strictly mandate replay protection [S1 §7.2.2] [BI-FIND-2026-0384](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0384).
- Proxies can break legitimate signatures by changing covered values. Test the actual path and choose coverage deliberately; do not simply remove checks when failures appear. The RFC advises comparing the sender’s and verifier’s signature bases to find unexpected changes [S1 §7.2.3] [S1 §7.4.1].
- A stolen signing key lets an attacker sign their own messages. Protect keys, plan rotation, and reject keys or algorithms that are inappropriate for the request. Cryptographic validity alone does not establish that the right party signed [S1 §7.3.2] [S1 §7.3.4].

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which method, destination, headers and body digest must every accepted request cover?
2. How does the recipient decide that a signing key belongs to a party allowed to make this request?
3. Which proxy changes have we tested against the signed values?
4. Where are repeated nonces detected across all receiving servers?
5. Do tests reject an altered body, missing signature and untrusted key?

## Sources

- [S1] [HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421) (Internet Engineering Task Force, Standards Track, February 2024)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-0382](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0382): The profile's most telling rule is a component it refuses to sign. Section 3 leaves the request's authority out of the signature because 'TLS-terminating proxies and load balancers commonly rewrite the authority', and binds the recipient instead through a mandatory wimse-aud parameter the recipient must check against its own configuration. What is signed is the method, path and query, the content digest when there is a body, and the Authorization, Txn-Token and Workload-Identity-Token headers when present, so a proxy can forward and re-address a call but cannot alter what it asks for. The draft still requires server-authenticated TLS on every hop: what it protects is the integrity of the call through the middle, and an intermediary still sees the identity token and the signature in the clear. (from "The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still lets a replay through")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0383](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0383): This is the only proof in the WIMSE set that lets the caller check what came back. Response signing is opportunistic by default, but a request that carries wimse-sign-response set to true turns it into an obligation: section 3.5 says the client 'MUST reject an unsigned response', a signed response must echo the request's nonce in wimse-req-nonce, and a server that must sign but cannot may not return a successful unsigned answer. The proof-token sibling has nothing like it. For a workload calling through a gateway it does not control, this is the difference between knowing the request was delivered intact and knowing the reply was. (from "The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still lets a replay through")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0063](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0063): As published, Trusted Agent Protocol is a README and a five-component sample (agent, merchant front and back end, CDN proxy, agent registry). The agent signs each request with RFC 9421 HTTP message signatures, which the README says are "bound to your domain and the specific operation", and the merchant's proxy checks them against a sample public-key registry; Visa describes no production key directory. Consumer identifiers, payment account references for cards on file, loyalty numbers, email and phone, travel as query parameters "as consented by the consumer", but there is no signed mandate or consent record, no revocation, no agent vetting and no standards route. Mastercard's Verifiable Intent, by contrast, puts the person's signed limits in the credential. (from "Visa's published Trusted Agent Protocol is sample code for signed requests, with no consent record or revocation")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1153](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1153): For AI agents, the draft sets itself beside Web Bot Auth: "Web Bot Auth identifies the agent, and Human Continuity links those requests to the unique human on whose behalf it acts." Both can ride on one request as separate HTTP Message Signatures, each with its own tag. How an agent gets tied to its human is only an example: section 22.7 has a verifier use a separate agent_delegation purpose and keep a table of agent key thumbprints against the person's stored handle, account and an expiry. Delegation across origins is out of scope until a future extension, and an origin MUST NOT make a client obtain or present an artifact for another origin's audience. We read this as letting one site count a person's agents as that one person, with no way yet to carry the link to another site. (from "World's maker proposes a site-scoped handle for each verified human, and bars using it alone to log anyone in")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0384](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0384): The draft requires the ingredients of replay protection and then declines to require the protection. Every signature must carry created, expires and a random nonce, with expiry 'on the order of minutes', and a message outside its window must be rejected; but the recipient 'MAY maintain a replay cache and SHOULD reject' a nonce it has seen, and section 6.4 states that replay protection 'is not strictly mandated because of implementation considerations'. A captured request replayed to a different member of the same cluster inside the window succeeds. The same posture runs through the proof-token draft and the OAuth attestation draft: freshness is the sender's duty, caching is the receiver's choice. (from "The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still lets a replay through")

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