# What is Identity Assertion Authorization Grant?

> A draft OAuth grant that lets one app get a token for another app's API through the identity provider both use for single sign-on, so the other app need not ask the user for consent again.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-28. 6 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/id-jag

- What it is: protocol
- Defined by: IETF OAuth WG draft (-04), not yet a standard
- Who it's for: Teams connecting SaaS apps and AI agents

## What is Identity Assertion Authorization Grant?

An Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant, or ID-JAG, is a signed token that an identity provider (IdP, the service that runs single sign-on) issues so that one app can get access to another app's API for a signed-in user [S1 §3]. The pattern is informally called Cross-App Access, or XAA [S1]. It is a draft in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) OAuth working group at revision -04, not yet a standard, and it expires on 22 November 2026 [S1].

The problem it solves is visibility. Today, when one app wants a user's data at another, it runs its own OAuth flow (OAuth is the open standard for granting apps access to APIs), and the IdP that logs the user in to both apps never sees that connection [S1 §1]. The draft moves that decision to the IdP, which both apps already trust for sign-in [S1 §1]. The other app's own authorization server still issues the access token and still applies its own policy [S1 §1].

Think of it like this: Think of a company travel desk that writes a voucher naming one employee and one hotel. The hotel checks the voucher and its own rules before it hands over a room key. The voucher also names the agency that will present it, and the hotel turns away any other agency. The comparison stops at who did the asking: the voucher names the agency, not which of its staff or software made the request.

Not the same as: Not the same as an IdP issuing access tokens straight to the API, as the JSON Web Token (JWT) access token profile does; here the IdP issues only a grant, and the API's own authorization server decides what token to mint [S1 §1].

## How does Identity Assertion Authorization Grant work?

Four parties take part: the client app, the IdP's authorization server in trust domain A, and the resource authorization server and resource server (the API) in trust domain B [S1 §2.1]. The resource server never deals with the IdP directly [S1 §2.1].

[Figure: The client app never gets a token from the other app by asking the user: it trades the sign-in assertion at the IdP for a grant addressed to one authorization server, and only that server mints the token the API accepts.]

1. **The user signs in at the IdP.** The client app sends the user to the IdP with OpenID Connect or SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language). It gets back an identity assertion, such as an ID token or a SAML assertion, and may also get a refresh token [S1 §4.1, §4.2].
2. **The client asks the IdP for an ID-JAG.** The client makes an OAuth token exchange request to the IdP. It sends the assertion as the subject token, asks for the token type id-jag, and names the other app's authorization server as the audience, the server the grant is for [S1 §4.3]. It may also name the resource and the scopes it wants [S1 §4.3].
3. **The IdP checks the request and issues the grant.** The IdP must validate the assertion and check that its audience matches the client that authenticated [S1 §4.3.3]. It then applies the administrator's policy and may grant fewer scopes or resources than were asked for [S1 §4.3.3]. If access is granted, it returns a signed JWT of type oauth-id-jag+jwt that names the user, the target server and the client_id the client uses there [S1 §3.1, §4.3.4].
4. **The client presents the ID-JAG to the other app.** The client sends the ID-JAG to the resource authorization server's token endpoint as a JWT bearer assertion [S1 §4.4]. It authenticates there with its own credentials as registered with that server [S1 §4.4].
5. **The resource authorization server checks it and issues a token.** That server must check that the audience is its own issuer identifier and that the client_id in the grant matches the client that authenticated, and it rejects the grant if either fails [S1 §4.4.1]. It works out which local account the grant names, and may create one from claims such as email when policy allows [S1 §2.2, §3.1]. It applies local policy, may narrow the access again, and returns an access token [S1 §4.4.1, §4.4.2]. It should not return a refresh token; when the access token expires, the client may present the ID-JAG again or go back to the IdP for a new one [S1 §4.4.3].
6. **The client calls the API.** The client makes its API request to the resource server with the access token [S1 §4.1].

## Why does Identity Assertion Authorization Grant matter now?

The pattern is already reaching agent tooling. The Model Context Protocol (MCP), which connects AI clients to tools, now has an opt-in extension in which the client trades an employee's single sign-on ID token for an ID-JAG and hands it to each MCP server's authorization server [BI-FIND-2026-0678](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0678). The IdP checks group, role and conditional-access policy before it issues the grant, and the employee sees one corporate login instead of a consent screen per server [BI-FIND-2026-0678](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0678).

What that removes is the user's consent click, not the decision. The decision moves to an administrator's policy at the IdP, and the app being called still applies its own [BI-FIND-2026-0294](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0294). We read this as handing the decision about which apps and agents reach which data to whoever writes the IdP policy. In the draft's one agent example, the agent is an ordinary OAuth client presenting the user's ID token, and no claim in the resulting grant says an agent was involved [BI-FIND-2026-0295](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0295).

The draft is still moving. We forecast that the draft enters working-group last call, the final review inside the working group, by 30 September 2027 [BI-CALL-2026-0060](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-CALL-2026-0060). A separate workload grant draft takes the mirror-image approach, in which the agent is the subject and acts only for itself [BI-FIND-2026-0523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0523).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains: Identity chaining is the general framework for carrying identity across trust domains, and it leaves many details open on purpose. ID-JAG is a profile of it that fixes the request, the grant's claims and the processing rules [S1 §1].
- Compared with OAuth Token Exchange: Token exchange (RFC 8693) is the request format the client uses to ask the IdP for the grant. ID-JAG adds a new requested token type and pins the meaning of audience and resource [S1 §4.3].
- Compared with JWT Bearer Grant: The JWT bearer grant (RFC 7523) is how the client redeems the ID-JAG at the other app's authorization server. ID-JAG adds checks on top, such as the typ header and client_id matching [S1 §4.4, §4.4.1].
- Compared with Client ID Metadata Documents: Client ID Metadata Documents act as a shared global namespace of client IDs. If clients use them, the IdP no longer has to keep a map of each client registration [S1 §5].

## What goes wrong?

- Revocation is not immediate. MCP's documentation says cutting someone off at the IdP takes effect at once, but its spec has no revocation text, and an access token already at the server keeps working until it expires, unless that server checks back on its own [BI-FIND-2026-0679](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0679). Its example pairs a five-minute ID-JAG with a 24-hour access token [BI-FIND-2026-0679](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0679). The draft also lets an IdP accept a refresh token in place of a new sign-in assertion, so a client can get fresh grants without the user signing in again [S1 §4.3, §4.3.2].
- The agent's role is left open. The grant may carry an optional act claim naming an actor, but the draft defines no processing for an actor token in the request [S1 §3.1, §4.3], and it warns that the client's identity is not a substitute for an actor's identity [S1 §9.7].
- Several protections are optional. Support should be offered only to confidential clients, the ones that can keep a secret [S1 §9.1]. Binding the grant to a key with DPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) is optional, though once a grant carries a key binding the receiving server must enforce it [S1 §9.8.1, §9.8.1.2.2].
- It covers one hop. The IdP must not issue access tokens against an ID-JAG it issued itself in the same domain, and the same ID-JAG must not be reused at a different downstream server [S1 §9.3].
- The grant can leak identifiers. The client sees the ID-JAG, so an extra subject identifier such as an email-address NameID can reach it; the IdP should include only what the resource authorization server needs [S1 §9.6].
- The step-up section still carries an open TBD note [S1 §9.2].

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which of our IdP policies decide what an app or agent can reach through Cross-App Access, and who reviews them?
2. When we revoke an employee at the IdP, how long do the access tokens already issued through this flow keep working at each connected app?
3. Do our vendors bind the ID-JAG and the access token to a key with DPoP, or do they issue plain bearer tokens?
4. Which of the clients using this grant are public clients that cannot keep a secret?
5. When an AI agent uses this flow, what record shows that an agent, and not the user, made the request?

## Sources

- [S1] [Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant) (IETF OAuth Working Group, Internet-Draft, revision -04, 21 May 2026; expires 22 November 2026)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-0678](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0678): MCP now has a stable way for a company's identity provider to stand between an employee's AI client and every MCP server. The client trades the employee's single sign-on ID token at the IdP for an ID-JAG, using OAuth token exchange, and hands that to the MCP server's own authorization server as a JWT assertion; the IdP checks group, role and conditional-access policy before issuing, and the employee sees one corporate login instead of a consent screen per server. The ID-JAG must be addressed to that authorization server, and when the client names a resource the access token must be restricted to it. The extension is opt-in: a server signals support in its authorization-server metadata. (from "MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0294](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0294): The identity assertion grant removes the consent screen by moving the decision, not by dropping it. The draft defines a grant that gives a client 'delegated access to a resource in another trust domain on behalf of a user without a direct user-approval step at the authorization server'. The identity provider that signed the user in issues a short-lived assertion under the administrator's policy, and may narrow the scope; the application being called 'still applies local policy' and may narrow it again. It SHOULD NOT hand back a refresh token, because the assertion 'replaces the use of Refresh Token', which sends the client back to the identity provider each time. (from "The Cross App Access draft swaps the user's consent click for an admin's policy, and leaves agents for later")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0295](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0295): In the draft an AI agent is an OAuth client and nothing more. Its one agent example, an appendix on an agent using external tools, shows the agent as the client presenting the user's ID token; no claim in the resulting assertion says an agent was involved. The fields that could say so exist and are switched off: 'This specification does not define normative processing requirements for actor_token or whether an act claim is included', and the text adds that 'the authenticated client identity is also not a substitute for actor identity'. Okta's product chief describes Cross App Access as giving an agent the overlap of its user's permissions and its own. The draft does not define that calculation. (from "The Cross App Access draft swaps the user's consent click for an admin's policy, and leaves agents for later")
- [BI-CALL-2026-0060](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-CALL-2026-0060): By 30 September 2027 draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant enters working-group last call in the IETF OAuth working group, visible on the datatracker as 'In WG Last Call' or a later state. It has had five working-group revisions since September 2025, authors from Okta and Ping Identity, and commercial products already built on it; what settles it wrong is the draft still sitting in 'WG Document' or expired on that date. (from "The Cross App Access draft swaps the user's consent click for an admin's policy, and leaves agents for later")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0523): In this draft the agent is the subject and acts only for itself. Access on a user's behalf is out of scope, there is no act claim or actor token, and token exchange and identity chaining are not mentioned; the authors say only that the grant "is intended to compose with delegation mechanisms in which the workload is the actor". That is the mirror image of ID-JAG, where the user is the subject and the agent is just the client, and on the OAuth list ID-JAG's co-author Karl McGuinness said an open ID-JAG issue already proposes letting the workload or agent be the subject. (from "Authors from Anthropic, OpenAI, Okta and Ping want the agent platform registered once, not every agent")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0679](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0679): The documentation says revoking an employee's access at the IdP "takes effect immediately across all MCP clients". The normative spec has no revocation or logout text at all. Its example issues a five-minute ID-JAG and a 24-hour access token, and its security section says the IdP's view ends once the token is issued and does not reach traffic between client and server. Cutting someone off at the IdP stops the next exchange; an access token already at the MCP server keeps working until it expires, unless that server checks back on its own. The page and spec also disagree on which IdP endpoint issues the ID-JAG and on how a client signals support. (from "MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up")

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