# What is JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens?

> RFC 9068 is the IETF's standard layout for an OAuth access token written as a signed JSON Web Token. It fixes the token type, the claims every token carries, and the checks an API must run before trusting it.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-20. 7 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/jwt-access-token-profile

- What it is: standard
- Defined by: IETF, RFC 9068 (Standards Track)
- Who it's for: Teams running OAuth servers and the APIs behind them

## What is JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens?

OAuth 2.0, the framework for issuing access tokens, does not set any format for them [S1 §1]. Many vendors chose the JSON Web Token (JWT) format, a signed bundle of named fields called claims, so that an API could check a token itself without asking the server that issued it [S1 §1]. Their tokens did much the same job but used different claim names and syntax [S1 §1].

RFC 9068 offers one shared profile as an alternative to those private layouts [S1 §1]. It sets the mandatory and optional claims, says how a request's parameters shape the token, and tells the receiving API how to validate it [S1 §1]. The aim is that an authorization server from one vendor and a resource server (the API holding the data) from another can issue and accept the same tokens [S1 Abstract]. It is a published IETF standard, issued in October 2021 [S1].

Think of it like this: Think of a boarding pass printed to one airline-industry layout: any gate agent knows where to find the airline, the flight, the passenger and the expiry, and checks it without phoning the airline. It stops working at one point: a passenger may read their own pass, but the profile says the client must not inspect the token's content, even though an unencrypted token is readable [S1 §6].

Not the same as: Not the same as the JWT bearer grant of RFC 7523, which uses a JWT to ask for an access token; RFC 9068 describes how to write the access token itself as a JWT [S1 §1]. It is also not an OpenID Connect ID token, the login token with a very similar layout, and the profile's explicit type exists so an API can tell the two apart [S1 §5].

## How does JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens work?

Three parties take part: the client (the app or agent that wants access), the authorization server that issues tokens, and the resource server, the API the token is for.

[Figure: The authorization server writes the API's name into the token's audience and signs it, and the API checks type, issuer, audience, signature and expiry against the server's published keys before it decides.]

1. **The client asks for a token.** The client uses any OAuth grant that ends in an access token [S1 §3]. Its request can name the target API in a resource parameter and list the permissions it wants in a scope parameter [S1 §3]. The profile gives the client no way to ask for particular claims; the server decides those from the client, scope and resource [S1 §2.2.2].
2. **The authorization server picks the audience.** The audience, held in the aud claim, names the API the token is for. If the request carried a resource parameter, aud should match it [S1 §3]. If not, the server must use a default resource and should infer it from the scope; when scopes point at different defaults, it should reject the request with invalid_scope [S1 §3]. It must not issue a token whose grant would be ambiguous [S1 §3].
3. **The authorization server signs the token.** The token must be signed, never with the "none" algorithm, and asymmetric keys are recommended [S1 §2.1]. Every conforming server must support the RS256 algorithm [S1 §2.1]. The header must declare the type application/at+jwt, which should be written as at+jwt [S1 §2.1]. Seven claims are required: iss (issuer), exp (expiry), aud, sub (subject), client_id, iat (issue time) and jti (a unique token id) [S1 §2.2]. Every scope string in the token must mean something for the APIs named in aud [S1 §2.2.3]. Scope, roles, groups, entitlements and login details such as acr are optional or conditional [S1 §2.2.1, §2.2.3].
4. **The client passes the token on unread.** The client presents the token to the resource server. It must not inspect the token's content, because the servers may change the format at any time, for example back to opaque tokens [S1 §6]. The profile does not tie the token to the Bearer scheme; other authentication schemes remain possible [S1 §4].
5. **The resource server validates it.** The resource server must reject any token whose typ is not at+jwt or application/at+jwt [S1 §4]. It decrypts the token if encryption was agreed [S1 §4]. It must then check that iss exactly matches the expected issuer, that aud names this resource server, and that the signature verifies with the authorization server's keys, rejecting "none" [S1 §4]. The issuer should publish those keys and its issuer value in its OAuth metadata, through jwks_uri and issuer [S1 §4]. Last, the current time must be before exp, with a few minutes' leeway allowed for clock skew [S1 §4].
6. **The resource server decides.** If any check fails, the error response must carry the code invalid_token [S1 §4]. If the token passes and carries authorization claims such as scope, the resource server should weigh them with any other context it has [S1 §4]. How it makes that decision is outside the profile [S1 §4].

## Why does JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens matter now?

One IETF draft shows a newer token design built on top of the profile. That draft defines selective-disclosure access tokens, where the client reveals some claims to an API and hides others. It keeps the token an RFC 9068 JWT with type at+jwt [BI-FIND-2026-0458](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0458). A resource server that does not implement the draft ignores the new fields and sees only the cleartext claims [BI-FIND-2026-0458](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0458). Its authors kept at+jwt on purpose, against RFC 9901's advice of a distinct type, because RFC 9068 tells servers to reject any other [BI-FIND-2026-0458](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0458).

That draft's motivating case is an agent calling several APIs on a user's behalf [BI-FIND-2026-0459](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0459). What it offers the agent is privacy per request, not delegation: the act claim stays visible, and the client still receives every value [BI-FIND-2026-0459](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0459). It also requires its tokens to be bound to a key with DPoP [BI-FIND-2026-0459](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0459). We read this as a sign that, in this draft at least, an agent's token is an RFC 9068 token with more attached, so the base profile's checks still decide what gets through.

RFC 9068's own warning about sub now also appears in the security guidance it pointed to. RFC 9700, the OAuth security best practice, repeats that sub should name the user when one is involved and the client when none is [BI-FIND-2025-0354](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0354). A malicious client that can pick its own client_id may pick a user's identifier and, if the API cannot tell the two kinds of token apart, reach that user's resources [BI-FIND-2025-0354](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0354). Where client and user identifiers share a namespace, RFC 9700 says authorization servers should not let clients influence them, and must otherwise give APIs another way to tell the two apart [BI-FIND-2025-0354](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0354).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0: Resource Indicators (RFC 8707) defines the resource parameter a client uses to name its target API. RFC 9068 consumes it: the token's aud claim should carry the same value [S1 §3].
- Compared with OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata: OAuth Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414) is the published document listing a server's endpoints. RFC 9068 says issuers should use it to advertise their signing keys and issuer value, so APIs know what to check against [S1 §4].
- Compared with OAuth Token Exchange: Token Exchange (RFC 8693) trades one token for another. RFC 9068 takes its client_id and scope claims from it [S1 §2.2, §2.2.3], and says the login details in a token stay fixed across such exchanges [S1 §2.2.1].
- Compared with DPoP: DPoP is a separate mechanism for binding a token to a key the client holds. RFC 9068 does not require it but leaves room for schemes other than Bearer [S1 §4], and the selective-disclosure draft sends its tokens under DPoP [BI-FIND-2026-0458](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0458).

## What goes wrong?

- Token swaps between login and access. An OpenID Connect ID token looks almost the same, so an API that skips the type check can accept one as an access token [S1 §5]. The required at+jwt type is the defence [S1 §4].
- A client posing as a user. If a server uses client_id as sub for machine grants and lets clients pick their own client_id, a malicious client can choose a high-privilege user's sub [S1 §5]. RFC 9700 carries the same warning forward [BI-FIND-2025-0354](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0354).
- Tokens replayed across APIs. Servers must give each distinct resource its own aud value to prevent cross-JWT confusion, where a token meant for one API is accepted by another [S1 §5].
- Ambiguous scopes. When a request names several resources, each scope in the token should map to exactly one of them, and the profile leaves the method to each deployment [S1 §5].
- Any key can sign. An API cannot tell which published key is meant for access tokens, so an attacker who steals any one of them can mint tokens it will accept [S1 §5].
- Data on show. Unencrypted tokens can be read by the client and sometimes the end user, and a stable sub lets APIs correlate a person's activity [S1 §6].

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which of our APIs reject a token whose typ header is not at+jwt, and would any accept an OpenID Connect ID token instead?
2. Can any client, including an AI agent we register, choose its own client_id, and could that value collide with a user's sub?
3. Does every API we run have its own audience value, and do we test that a token for one is refused by another?
4. How many signing keys does our authorization server publish, and who can reach the private half of each?
5. Which personal attributes do we put in unencrypted access tokens, and which clients can read them?

## Sources

- [S1] [JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens (RFC 9068)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068) (IETF, Standards Track RFC, October 2021)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-0458](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0458): The token stays an RFC 9068 JWT, typ at+jwt, sent as today under the DPoP scheme; what changes sits beside it. The authorization server returns a disclosures array next to access_token, and the client sends any subset in SD-JWT-Disclosures, a Structured Fields list in which order matters, with an optional key-binding JWT in SD-JWT-Key-Binding. Only top-level claims may be hidden, and iss, exp, aud, sub, client_id, iat, jti and cnf, plus scope and nbf when present, stay in the clear. A resource server that implements the profile validates the token as before and then reassembles and verifies the SD-JWT; one that does not 'ignores both fields' and 'sees only the cleartext claims', and 'a resource server MUST NOT read an undisclosed claim as permission'. The draft keeps at+jwt on purpose, against RFC 9901's advice of a distinct type, because RFC 9068 tells servers to reject any other. (from "A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visible")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0459](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0459): The motivating case is an agent calling several resource servers on a user's behalf, and the example client is 'agent-7f3a', but what the profile offers an agent is attribute privacy per request, not delegation. The act claim and everything nested in it must remain in the clear, there is no rule for forwarding disclosures to a next hop, and the client 'does receive every value'; where it must not, 'encryption remains the only answer'. Unlinkability is not claimed, since jti, sub and the digests repeat on every call. Tokens 'MUST be DPoP-bound', the key-binding JWT exists to detect an intermediary stripping disclosures, and both fields are to be kept out of logs and caches like the Authorization header. The appendix's own open questions are whether that key-binding JWT is redundant beside DPoP, whether keeping at+jwt is acceptable, and how a server asks for a disclosure it needs: 'no existing error code fits valid Token, required claim not disclosed'. (from "A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visible")
- [BI-FIND-2025-0354](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2025-0354): Section 4.15 warns that a resource server can mistake a client for a user. Under the JWT access token profile (RFC 9068), sub should name the resource owner when a user is involved, and the client application under grants with no user, such as client credentials. So if a client can choose its own client_id at registration, a malicious client may pick a user's identifier and, if the resource server cannot tell the two kinds of token apart, reach that user's resources. Where client IDs and user identifiers share a namespace, authorization servers should not let clients influence their client_id or any claim that could be confused with a real user's. Where that cannot be avoided, they must give resource servers some other way to distinguish the two. (from "RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD")

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