# What is Proof of possession?

> Proof of possession ties a token to a key its holder keeps. To use the token, the holder must also prove it has that key, so a recipient can turn away someone who copied the token but lacks the key.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-30. 6 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/pop

- What it is: pattern
- Defined by: IETF, RFC 7800 (for JWTs)
- Who it's for: Teams issuing or accepting tokens for agents and workloads

## What is Proof of possession?

A bearer credential works for anyone who holds its bytes [BI-FIND-2026-1139](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1139). Proof of possession (PoP) adds a second test: the token names a key, and whoever presents the token has to show it holds that key. RFC 7800, a standards-track document from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) published in April 2016, defines this for a JSON Web Token (JWT), a signed set of claims. It says how a JWT declares that its presenter holds a particular key, and how the recipient can confirm that cryptographically [S1 §1]. The spec notes that this is also called being a holder-of-key [S1 §1].

The declaration lives in one claim, "cnf" (confirmation). By including it, the issuer of the token states that the presenter holds a particular key and that the recipient can check this [S1 §3]. The claim can carry the public key itself, an encrypted symmetric key, a key ID, or a URL for a set of keys [S1 §3.2–3.5]. It must represent only one proof-of-possession key [S1 §3.1].

RFC 7800 leaves the proof itself to other protocols. It says possession is typically shown by signing a value the recipient chose, a nonce or challenge, but it does not say how that value or the signature travels [S1 §3.6].

Think of it like this: A bearer token is like a cash voucher: whoever holds it can spend it. A bound token is closer to a voucher printed with the owner's signature specimen, where the shop asks you to sign in front of them; the comparison breaks down because a key's proof is checked by maths, not by eye.

Not the same as: Not the same as DPoP, a proof-of-possession mechanism for OAuth tokens [BI-FIND-2024-0069](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2024-0069). RFC 7800 only says how a token names its key and leaves the proof to each protocol [S1 §3.6].

## How does Proof of possession work?

RFC 7800 names three parties: the issuer, which creates the JWT and binds the key to it; the presenter, which proves it holds the key; and the recipient, which receives the JWT [S1 §2]. We follow the spec's example with an asymmetric key, a private key paired with a public one [S1 §1].

[Figure: The issuer writes the presenter's public key into the token, so the recipient can ask the presenter to prove it holds the matching private key.]

1. **The presenter makes a key pair.** The presenter generates a public and private key pair and sends the public key to the issuer [S1 §1]. In the spec's symmetric example, either side generates a shared secret key instead and sends it privately to the other [S1 §1].
2. **The issuer binds the key into the token.** The issuer creates a JWT whose cnf claim holds the public key, or an identifier for it [S1 §1]. It signs the whole JWT, which protects it against changes [S1 §1]. At least one of the "sub" (subject) and "iss" (issuer) claims must be present, and the presenter is normally the one they name [S1 §3].
3. **The issuer sends the token to the presenter.** The issuer sends the signed JWT to the presenter [S1 §1]. The presenter now holds the token and the private key that matches the key named inside it [S1 §1].
4. **The presenter shows the token and proves the key.** When the presenter hands the JWT to a recipient, it also has to demonstrate possession of the private key [S1 §1]. The spec gives two examples: use the key in a Transport Layer Security (TLS) exchange with the recipient, or sign a nonce, a one-time value [S1 §1]. Typically the recipient chooses the value to be signed [S1 §3.6].
5. **The recipient checks both.** The recipient first verifies the digital signature on the JWT [S1 §1]. It then takes the public key from the cnf claim and uses it to check the TLS exchange or the signed nonce [S1 §1]. In the spec's words, this lets the recipient verify "that it is interacting with the genuine presenter" [S1 §1].

## Why does Proof of possession matter now?

The agent-credential drafts we read this year split on this point, and several land on bearer tokens. One agent grant draft makes its assertion a bearer credential and lists proof of possession as an open issue [BI-FIND-2026-0522](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0522). Another agent-credential draft defines no proof-of-possession binding, so its credentials work as bearer tokens valid for up to 24 hours [BI-FIND-2026-1027](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1027). A paper on one agent runtime says it also uses bearer tokens with no proof of possession [BI-FIND-2026-1240](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1240).

An IETF draft on workload practices is firmer. Its version 08 says that where proof of possession is not supported, deployments must apply compensating controls such as short-lived tokens, narrow audiences or network controls [BI-FIND-2026-0508](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0508). One agent payment protocol puts a shopping agent's public key in a cnf claim inside a mandate the person signs, and the agent later signs with that key [BI-FIND-2026-0415](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0415). Hardt, who says he is working on OAuth 2.1, says it does not make proof of possession a required piece either [BI-FIND-2026-1523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1523).

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with DPoP: DPoP is one OAuth mechanism built on proof of possession: the client signs a proof when it gets a token and a new proof with the same key when it uses it [BI-FIND-2024-0069](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2024-0069). RFC 7800 defines only how a token names the key [S1 §3].
- Compared with HTTP Message Signatures: RFC 7800 does not sign requests itself: it puts a key in a token and leaves the way the proof travels to each protocol [S1 §3.6]. In AAuth, Hardt says, every HTTP call is signed, so the server knows the caller [BI-FIND-2026-1523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1523).
- Compared with OAuth: Hardt calls OAuth a framework, not a protocol, and says OAuth 2.1 does not make proof of possession a required piece [BI-FIND-2026-1523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1523). RFC 7800 gives a JWT a place to name its holder's key [S1 §3].

## What goes wrong?

- A leaked key defeats the binding. A key is only valuable if it is kept secret, and the spec says appropriate means must be used to keep private and symmetric keys from unintended parties [S1 §4]. Authors of an IETF attestation draft note that an exported key can still produce a valid proof of possession [BI-FIND-2026-1733](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1733).
- It does not replace audience checks. The spec says applications using proof of possession should also use audience restriction, because each blocks something different: the key lets a recipient reject unauthorized senders, the audience lets it reject messages meant for another recipient [S1 §4].
- A recipient may not understand cnf. Without an application rule, confirmation members a recipient does not understand must be ignored [S1 §3.1]. An application that needs the key checked must make sure the recipient implements those parts [S1 §4].
- A symmetric key in a signed token would be exposed. The spec allows one as a plain "jwk" only if the JWT is encrypted; otherwise the key must be encrypted and carried as "jwe" [S1 §3.2].
- Encrypted symmetric secrets can be replayed. A signed nonce that differs for each interaction can avoid this, as can a sub-key derived for that one proof [S1 §4].
- One key used everywhere links the holder. A key shared with many parties can serve as a correlation handle, so the spec recommends a different key for each party [S1 §5].
- Optional binding leaves a bearer token. In one credential draft, MTAC, holder proof of possession is optional, so a credential without it can be presented by anyone holding the bytes [BI-FIND-2026-1139](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1139).

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Which of our access tokens and agent credentials are bearer tokens today, and which are bound to a key?
2. Where are the private keys behind our bound tokens generated and stored, and can they be exported?
3. Do the services that receive our tokens actually check the cnf key, or do they ignore it?
4. Do our bound tokens also carry an audience, and does every recipient check it?
5. Does each client use a different key for each service it talks to?

## Sources

- [S1] [Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800) (IETF, RFC 7800, Proposed Standard, April 2016)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-1139](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1139): Holder proof of possession is optional in MTAC, so a credential without a holder commitment is a bearer credential that anyone holding the bytes can present. The witness co-signature guards against a compromise limited to the CA key and against dropped or truncated batches, but Burls writes that it does "NOT provide non-equivocation", and a CA and witness under one administrative authority give no independence. There is no revocation: the draft specifies none and implements none. His published verifier, aegis-verifier 0.1.3, does not implement the witness or holder checks, and the public record of batch roots is a contract on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet under a dev-grade key. (from "A post-quantum agent certificate draft warns that its own declared scopes are not proof of behaviour")
- [BI-FIND-2024-0069](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2024-0069): Parecki’s May 2023 explanation of DPoP, a proof-of-possession mechanism for OAuth tokens, links token acquisition and use to the same client key. The client includes a signed proof when obtaining an access token, then makes a new proof with the same private key when using it. He described DPoP as OAuth-specific and suitable for browser JavaScript, rather than a general-purpose signing mechanism. His statement that it was near publication belongs to the talk date. (from "In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0522](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0522): The grant identifies the agent and does little to hold it. The assertion is a bearer credential and client authentication is optional, so whoever holds it can redeem it until it expires; proof of possession, an explicit token type and mandatory replay rejection by jti are all listed as open issues. The text never mentions revoking an agent, a platform registration or an issued token. Short lifetimes and no refresh tokens are the only brakes. What the agent may do is the server's local policy, optionally mapped from claims the platform asserts, and is declared out of scope. (from "Authors from Anthropic, OpenAI, Okta and Ping want the agent platform registered once, not every agent")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1027](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1027): The draft says capping a child's expiry at its parent's means revoking a parent "effectively expires all descendants, even without an active revocation lookup." Revocation never changes an expiry time, though, so the cap matters only when the parent runs out naturally. Descendants are revoked by a cascade instead: at revocation time every stored credential whose chain contains the revoked ID goes into a revocation store, and verifiers MUST check that store on every call. The delegation step checks the parent's signature, expiry and algorithm but not the store, while the human-approval path does re-check revocation. We see nothing in the text that stops a revoked but unexpired parent from minting a new child that the cascade never saw and that would pass verification. The draft defines no proof-of-possession binding, so the credentials work as bearer tokens, valid for up to 24 hours. (from "An agent-credential draft carries a hash of the user's instruction that its own verification steps never check")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1240](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1240): The paper specifies more than its own release tests check. At tag v0.1.0 the gate ran 20 unit tests, 80 malformed fuzz requests with no server error, and a core conformance check of 6 required endpoints. The authors' coverage table marks the state-witness check, idempotency replay and audit completeness as future work and end-to-end rate limiting as partial. The state-witness profile addresses the gap a late approval leaves, when the resource has changed since the operator looked, by re-checking state at execution and failing closed, but implementations only MAY support it. The runtime keeps state in memory and uses bearer tokens with no proof of possession, and the authors say the results "do not claim production readiness." (from "OpenPort holds agent writes as drafts for an operator by default; its own tests check less than its spec asks")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0508](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0508): The draft's history says version 07 answered the Area Director by hardening its SHOULD and MUST text; version 08, posted on 30 October after more Area Director feedback, writes the exits into the rules. Section 5.1.1 now says credentials MUST be scoped as narrowly as possible unless the platform issues one credential per workload or does not let the workload influence the audience; version 07 stated the MUST flatly and conceded the exception a paragraph later. When either exception applies, deployments need to treat every party that receives the credential as able to impersonate the workload at every other party that accepts it. Where the platform or the relying party does not support proof of possession, deployments MUST apply compensating controls "such as" short-lived tokens, narrow audiences or network controls, where version 07 required all three. Tokens must not outlive their workload unless the platform cannot tell its lifetime. (from "IETF workload practices draft describes single-audience JWTs in place of stored secrets and discourages token exchange")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0415](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0415): The new human-not-present mode is delegation by key binding. The person signs an open mandate on a Trusted Surface that carries spending constraints and the agent's public key as a cnf claim, with a short expiry recommended; the agent later signs the closed Checkout and Payment Mandates with that key, and it may not present a second open mandate until it holds a rejection receipt for the first. That is the same move as proof-of-possession tokens in workload identity, applied to a shopping agent, and it stops exactly where our corpus's other delegation specs stop: agent-to-agent delegation is out of scope, and any attenuation beyond the constraints the person wrote down is future work. (from "Google's AP2 v0.2 lets a person sign spending limits once and leave; the agent then signs each purchase itself")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1523](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1523): Hardt, who says he is working on OAuth 2.1, says it adds no new features and does not make proof of possession a required piece either. On the web, he says, TLS lets a client know which server it reached, but "the server has no idea who's calling it". He traces the wider problem to OAuth being "a framework as opposed to a protocol", with no conformance on what a client must do to work with a given server. In AAuth every HTTP call is signed, so the server knows the caller, and he says the same signing could give webhooks a standard alternative to the shared secrets they rely on today. (from "AAuth carries the signals an agent's approval needs, Hardt says; the brain that decides does not exist yet")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1733](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1733): Both options rest on a property this draft does not supply: assurance that the workload's key was generated inside the attested environment and cannot leave it. Neither carrying the public key in the Evidence nor certifying it shows that, and the authors note that "an exported key can still produce a valid proof of possession." They hand the property to draft-reddy-rats-key-binding, a draft that Reddy and Mihalcea co-wrote, which conveys the key in the Evidence with attributes asserting that it was locally generated and is non-exportable. This draft then gives two ways those properties can be established: as assertions by an Attesting Environment that can also act as a key store, or as an inference the Verifier may draw from endorsements for the workload's measurements. Their security section adds that a compromised attestation key can sign Evidence for any key and any state, and that no binding at the TLS layer would detect it. Binding the Evidence to the TLS connection, which stops relay, is a separate property they leave to the SEAT solution documents; in their survey, Confidential Space already derives its attestation nonce from the TLS exporter. (from "Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apart")

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