# What is SCITT?

> SCITT is an IETF architecture for a tamper-evident record of signed claims about software. A transparency service checks each signed statement, adds it to an append-only log and returns a receipt that proves the statement is there.

Explainer by Boston Identity, 2026-10-17, updated 2026-10-17. 6 min read. https://insights.bostonidentity.com/glossary/scitt

- What it is: architecture
- Defined by: IETF SCITT WG; draft -22, later RFC 9943
- Who it's for: Teams that sign, ship or audit software and agent records

## What is SCITT?

SCITT stands for Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency and Trust. It is the name of an IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) working group and of the architecture that group wrote. We read draft -22 of that architecture, a Standards Track draft from October 2025; the IETF later published it as RFC 9943 [S1].

The problem it solves is accountability for claims about software. A vendor, a build system or an outside reviewer makes a statement about an artifact: a software bill of materials (SBOM), a scan result, a release approval. The draft wants the makers of such statements held to account, so they cannot "hide or shred the evidence when it becomes inconvenient later" [S1 §2.1]. The architecture checks that a statement is signed and that its author can be identified, and it gives everyone the same history of that statement. It leaves the syntax and meaning of each kind of statement to the people who use them [S1 §2.1].

The draft calls itself a generalization of Certificate Transparency, which the draft reads as a transparency architecture for the supply chain of X.509 certificates [S1 §4]. SCITT applies the same idea to any signed statement, and the draft uses the software supply chain as its first example [S1 §1].

Think of it like this: Think of a notary who keeps a bound ledger with numbered pages. The notary checks your signature and records the document, and you leave with a stamped receipt. The comparison stops at content: the notary does not vouch that your document is true, and neither does SCITT.

Not the same as: A SCITT signed statement on its own is not proof of registration. The signature shows who made the statement; only a receipt from a Transparency Service shows the statement was registered there [S1 §4].

## How does SCITT work?

An Issuer signs statements, a Transparency Service keeps the log, and a Relying Party checks the result before it trusts an artifact. A Client, which need not be the Issuer, carries statements to the service.

[Figure: How a signed statement travels from Issuer to log to Relying Party in SCITT.]

1. **The Issuer signs a statement.** The Issuer wraps a statement about an artifact in a COSE signature. The protected header must name the Issuer and the subject, the artifact the statement is about [S1 §6]. A large or sensitive payload can be replaced by its hash, so the full content need not be sent to the service [S1 §6.2].
2. **A Client submits it for registration.** A Client authenticates to the Transparency Service and submits the signed statement. The Client may act for one or more Issuers. How it authenticates, and what it is allowed to do, is left to each implementation [S1 §6.3].
3. **The service checks the signature and its policy.** The Transparency Service must verify the Issuer's signature against a trust anchor it holds, such as a root certificate. It then applies its registration policy, the rules a statement must meet to be accepted [S1 §5.1.1, §6.3]. The policy and trust anchors must themselves be registered in the log, so auditors can see which rules applied at the time [S1 §5.1.1.1].
4. **The service appends it to the log.** The service adds the statement to its verifiable data structure, a log built so that its history can be checked by others. That structure must be append-only, so entries cannot be changed, deleted or reordered. It must also show everyone the same history, which the draft calls non-equivocation [S1 §5.1.3].
5. **The service returns a receipt.** The service must register the statement before it releases a receipt [S1 §6.3]. A receipt is a signed proof that the statement is included in the log, and it must support an inclusion proof [S1 §3]. Anyone can verify it without going online to the service [S1 §4].
6. **The Client attaches the receipt.** The Client adds the receipt to the signed statement, which makes it a Transparent Statement. The same statement may be registered with several services, and all their receipts can travel together [S1 §6.3].
7. **The Relying Party verifies before it trusts.** A Relying Party checks the receipt before it trusts the artifact. It must trust the key of at least one receipt issuer. It may verify a single receipt it accepts and skip the statement's own signature [S1 §7.1]. Auditors go further: they replay the log to check that the service kept it consistent [S1 §5].

## Why does SCITT matter now?

SCITT was written for software supply chains, but the drafts we read this year reach for it to log what AI agents do. In one profile for recording agent actions, the operator signs a record of each consequential action, and an independent custodian running a SCITT transparency service holds the chain append-only [BI-FIND-2026-0972](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0972). Another draft logs an agent's authorization decision on a SCITT log before the action runs [BI-FIND-2026-0865](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0865). A third lets a session hash be anchored with a SCITT transparency service [BI-FIND-2026-0730](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0730).

The agent identity drafts use it too. In one agent naming draft, the highest verification tier adds a lookup in a public transparency log that must operate as a SCITT Transparency Service [BI-FIND-2026-0303](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0303). The authors of a draft on signed agent conversation records say a signature alone does not give non-repudiation, and they name SCITT transparency services as the kind of infrastructure that would [BI-FIND-2026-1056](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1056).

Citing SCITT and conforming to it are separate steps. The agent-action profile's revision -01 does not yet specify its receipts as COSE Receipts, as RFC 9943 requires, and defines no inclusion proof [BI-FIND-2026-0972](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0972). A security leader who hears "logged on SCITT" should ask which parts of the architecture the product implements.

## Where does it fit?

- Compared with RFC 9943 SCITT architecture: RFC 9943 is the published architecture document. SCITT is the wider effort: the working group, its drafts, and the profiles other authors build on the architecture.
- Compared with COSE: COSE is the format SCITT uses for signed statements and receipts. COSE signs one object; SCITT adds the shared log that proves a signed object was registered.
- Compared with JSON Canonicalization Scheme: JSON Canonicalization Scheme fixes the bytes of a JSON document so two parties hash it the same way. SCITT says nothing about JSON layout; it logs signed statements and issues receipts for them.

## What goes wrong?

- Registering a statement only proves that the Issuer produced it. Issuers can make false statements, on purpose or by mistake [S1 §9.2].
- Beyond the mandatory checks, a service's registration policy may add no further checks, even one that allows all authenticated submissions [S1 §5.1.1]. A receipt alone says little about how a statement was vetted.
- An Issuer can refuse to register a statement, or submit some and not others. The draft says it is important for relying parties not to accept a signed statement unless they can find a receipt from a service they trust [S1 §9.3].
- Unless the service's policy says so, a relying party cannot assume the log's order matches the order in which statements were signed [S1 §9.1].
- A service whose receipt signing key is compromised can roll its log back to a point before the compromise and issue fresh receipts with new credentials [S1 §9.4.2].
- Independence is up to the deployer. In the agent-action profile, if one entity runs both the operator and custodian roles, the tamper-evidence guarantees are void [BI-FIND-2026-0972](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0972). The authors of the conversation-records draft add that an agent that controls its own recording can omit or falsify entries [BI-FIND-2026-1056](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1056).

## What should a security leader ask?

1. Who runs the transparency service our records go to, and is it independent of the team that writes the records?
2. Do our relying parties refuse a signed statement that comes without a receipt from a service we trust?
3. Does the product that says it logs on SCITT issue COSE receipts with inclusion proofs, or only a hash chain of its own?
4. Whose public key do we trust to check receipts, and how would we learn that it was compromised?
5. Which of our statements, such as SBOMs, scan results or agent action records, carry personal or confidential data a service should not hold?

## Sources

- [S1] [An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains (draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-22)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture) (IETF SCITT Working Group, Internet-Draft -22, October 2025; later published as RFC 9943)

## Evidence

- [BI-FIND-2026-0972](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0972): In Emirdag and Feichtinger's profile the agent's operator signs a record of each consequential action, and an independent Evidence Custodian running a SCITT transparency service holds the chain append-only. Once a record is admitted nobody can alter or reorder it unnoticed, and a gap in the sequence numbers shows a record produced and not registered. "An action that was never recorded leaves no gap", however. The threat model excludes an operator that records an action inaccurately or not at all, and compromise of the agent. Only the admission time on the custodian's receipt comes from outside the operator; the timestamps inside the record are the operator's own. If one entity runs both roles, "the tamper-evidence guarantees are void", and a colluding operator and custodian can alter evidence without detection by relying parties that trust only that custodian's receipts. Revision -01 has not yet specified its receipts as COSE Receipts, as RFC 9943 requires, defines no inclusion proof or non-equivocation proofs, and withdrew -00's claim that the hash chain matches a Merkle inclusion proof. (from "A transparency-log profile for agents exposes edited and dropped records; an action nobody logged leaves no gap")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0865](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0865): Munoz's Permit records an agent's authorization decision before the action, signed and logged on a SCITT transparency log, but the profile does not make the action wait for it. The draft calls the Permit "an evidence artifact" and says it does not stop an agent "reaching a provider by a path the Issuer never sees"; no step requires the tool or service to check a Permit before running. The verifier's checks run after the fact, including a comparison of the Permit's hash with the digest in a closing record of what was sent, and in the reference code that digest is copied from the Permit, not measured from the request. Only the author's own proxy refuses a denied or altered request before sending it. (from "Munoz's agent Permit is signed before the action runs, but the profile does not make the action wait for it")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0730](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0730): Revision 07 adds a section setting the draft beside Gilda's WIMSE agent audit record, and Sharif states the split himself: Gilda's work requires attestation by an observer the agent does not control, while AAT permits self-recording at L0 and L1. That section describes AAT as requiring an independent recorder from L2 up, but the normative text in section 5.2 says SHOULD. It treats Munoz's WIMSE authorization-evidence records as one way to fill the principal's grant reference, lets a session hash or batch root be anchored with a SCITT transparency service, and keeps its own schema rather than OpenTelemetry or CloudEvents, which it says lack its chaining, pre-execution semantics and principal binding, though AAT records may be carried inside them. (from "An agent audit log now names whom the agent acted for, but at low trust levels the agent may write that itself")
- [BI-FIND-2026-0303](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-0303): The draft's bronze, silver and gold are not grades awarded to an agent. 'A tier describes what the client verified, not a property the RA assigned': bronze means the caller checked the certificate, silver adds a DNS-based check that needs DNSSEC, and gold adds a lookup in a public transparency log that 'MUST operate as a SCITT Transparency Service'. If the log cannot be reached the caller drops to silver and records that it did. The authors state the limit themselves: the security property 'does not hold against collusion between the RA and TL operators', and the remedies they name are future work. (from "The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it")
- [BI-FIND-2026-1056](https://insights.bostonidentity.com/ref/BI-FIND-2026-1056): The draft's first goal is to assure that a recorded agent conversation "is the same as the agent conversation that actually occurred." Its security section sets out how far a signed record gets toward that. A valid signature shows who produced the record "but does not guarantee the truthfulness of its contents"; changes made before signing cannot be detected; timestamps are attested by the signer, not checked independently; and the signed envelope alone gives authenticity and integrity, not non-repudiation, which needs more infrastructure, such as SCITT transparency services. The authors say the records mainly support detection rather than prevention, and that "an agent that controls its own recording can omit or falsify entries." Their answer is a recording-agent field that names the recording tool apart from the agent. It holds a name and an optional version, so in our reading it tells a relying party who says they recorded the session without giving it a way to check. (from "A draft format for signed AI agent session records warns a signature does not vouch for what the record says")

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