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CVE

CVEs · Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures · CVE-2026 · CVE-2025 · CVE

A public catalogue number for a known, specific software or hardware vulnerability, used to track and reference security flaws consistently across vendors and researchers.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on CVE would have you leave with.

  1. Neiderman's case that the identity stack has to be rebuilt for agents starts with history. Identity spent decades as IT plumbing behind the firewall, the cloud made the identity provider the real gatekeeper, and companies answered with point tools: he recalls an average of about 8.3 per company, from a spreadsheet of conversations with, by his estimate, 100 to 200 or more CISOs. Agents, he says, will bring roughly a hundred times more identities working around the clock, and probably 99.9 percent of actions on data and systems will be theirs. In his view a stack built for humans and carrying decades of undocumented connections will not hold that load, while NewCore, starting fresh, can adjust its design as agent protocols are "still being formed". Two less interested voices in other sources we have read make a similar case. The founder of an identity threat detection company Okta had just acquired warned that bolting a bunch of things on will fail over time, and a paper led by Cloud Security Alliance authors lays out a new layered identity architecture for agents.

    Can your identity stack be patched for AI agents, or does it have to be replaced? NewCore's CTO says replacedBI-FIND-2026-0103

  2. Asked which identity and security controls are most likely to break first as agentic systems scale, John Yeoh, CSA's chief scientific officer, names lifecycle management. He cites CircleCI and Microsoft's Midnight Blizzard breach as poor lifecycle management of non-human identities, where keys for secrets were not rotated fast enough, and expects agents to fail faster because people now give them specs that spin up sub-agents. Access reviews that ignore intent and behaviour come next, then logging, in what he calls "a good domino of control collapse". Aizome's Amir Ofek answers the same question differently: applying controls built for non-human identities, which are deterministic rather than dynamic, is what will break first.

    CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to breakBI-FIND-2026-0113

  3. SpecterOps consultant Raj Patel describes two Windows flaws, now patched, that let NTLM relay get through enforced SMB and LDAP signing. In both, the attacker starts with a session whose key it knows, from any low-privilege account (for LDAP, SpecterOps' write-up adds, an anonymous session works where the domain controller accepts one), then coerces a victim and passes the victim's NTLM login through that session. On SMB the server switched to the victim's identity but kept accepting packets signed with the attacker's key. On LDAP the domain controller did require the victim's key for later packets, so the attacker packs its own operation into the same signed packet as the victim's login: the packet passes the check under the attacker's key, and the operation runs with the victim's rights. The write-up says the LDAP technique ran over 389/TCP and fails where that port is blocked. Microsoft closed the SMB path in its September 2026 updates and the LDAP path on October 13, 2026 (CVE-2026-70229, rated critical); per the write-up, the LDAP fix discards the rest of a packet once the identity inside it changes.

    Enforced SMB and LDAP signing did not stop NTLM relay until Microsoft's September and October 2026 patchesBI-FIND-2026-2304

›Cited in 27 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Can your identity stack be patched for AI agents, or does it have to be replaced? NewCore's CTO says replaced

    Podcast · · TechSpective Podcast · Rebuilding Identity Security From Scratch for the Age of AI Agents · Sep 21, 2026

  2. CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to break

    Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · NHI & AI Identity Summit : The Next 24 Months · Sep 7, 2026

  3. Enforced SMB and LDAP signing did not stop NTLM relay until Microsoft's September and October 2026 patches

    Podcast · · Risky Business · #859 · Nov 11, 2026

  4. An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026

  5. RFC 9207's issuer check stops at the redirect, and n8n's token-exchange flaw sat just past it

    Article · · WorkOS · Maria Paktiti · Jul 20, 2026

  6. AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026

  7. Anthropic's Osmani: Claude reviews a change first, people check its evidence, and a named owner stays on the hook

    Video · · AI Engineer · Uploaded October 28, 2026

  8. Approving a local MCP tool call does not limit the files it can reach, and researchers confirmed 150 cases

    Paper · · arXiv · Zeqian Huang et al. · Oct 15, 2026

  9. ERNW broke Kubernetes namespace tenancy three ways, using resources tenants are allowed to create

    Video · · TROOPERS IT Security Conference · Uploaded August 12, 2026

  10. Mozilla's AI bug hunting got past hallucinated reports once a harness checked each finding mechanically

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 21, 2026

  11. The OWASP MCP Top 10 lead says few security teams can find the MCP servers developers run on their own machines

    Podcast · · The Application Security Podcast · Shadow MCP Servers: The AI Security Risk Hiding on Your Developers' Laptops · Oct 12, 2026

  12. Mythos also reports bugs that are not there, says Trend AI's CISO, so the work is in checking them

    Podcast · · Cloud Security Podcast · Mythos Hype vs. Reality: Why You Need an Agentic Harness · Oct 21, 2026

  13. Sysdig's AI-run ransomware case used old tricks: default logins, stored keys, a root password of unknown origin

    Article · · Sysdig · Michael Clark · Jul 1, 2026

  14. A coding agent tricked into writing one file lets the editor's language server send your keys out

    Video · · Black Hat · Aug 18, 2026

  15. A robot dog run by Google's Gemini obeyed a spoken role-play prompt and a QR code; no one touched the robot

    Video · · Black Hat · Aug 7, 2026

  16. Registering an MCP server on Bifrost ran its command, and the admin API that allowed it shipped with no password

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026

  17. Three MCP auth flaws in a month, and the spec had already written the rule the SDKs skipped

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 2, 2026

  18. OpenAI's full report names every credential the agents took, and an alert dismissed two weeks before the breach

    Article · · OpenAI · OpenAI · Aug 26, 2026

  19. 114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sent

    Paper · · arXiv · Huijun Zhou et al. · May 21, 2026

  20. MACAW Security's trust layer signs every agent call, but what stopped its prompt-injection test was a policy

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohan Rajagopalan et al. · Feb 11, 2026

  21. The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026

  22. No app, no developer: least privilege for an AI agent has to come from the task, six security researchers argue

    Paper · · arXiv · Mihai Christodorescu et al. · Dec 1, 2025

  23. One shared MCP token makes a whole company one identity in the logs; this paper wants per-user OAuth at a gateway

    Paper · · arXiv · Herman Errico et al. · Nov 25, 2025

  24. In a test harness, two of three MCP hosts refused a prompt asking for credentials; none refused a poisoned tool

    Paper · · arXiv · Yixuan Yang et al. · Aug 17, 2025

  25. An MCP privilege study says obscure servers are riskier; its own table points the other way

    Paper · · arXiv · Zhihao Li et al. · Jul 5, 2025

  26. A survey of MCP and A2A attacks pairs each identity threat with a fix, and tests none of them

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohamed Amine Ferrag et al. · Jun 29, 2025

  27. RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020