Ed25519
EdDSA Ed25519
A digital-signature scheme on an elliptic curve, used to sign messages and tokens in Secure Shell (SSH), Transport Layer Security (TLS) and identity protocols.
In our briefings
What our briefings say about Ed25519 itself, with the most direct claims first.
What a verifier gets from OpenA2A's protocol is proof that the agent holds an Ed25519 key, by a challenge-response with five ordered checks, and, at the federated Level 3, an identifier its provider issues under a did:web address, a form the draft's own reference resolver does not yet serve. Nothing in the identity says which person or company the agent acts for, and there is no delegation chain: one agent delegating to another signs an assertion and holds a capability string. The post-quantum half of its signatures is a SHOULD, checked only when a credential declares it, and the live challenge never uses it; the transparency log is a single paragraph, kept by the same registry that issues the credentials, and the draft does not say how or when a verifier checks it.
OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works forBI-FIND-2026-0731
In Uppalapati's survey, the WIMSE AI identity management draft names no signature algorithm and does not discuss post-quantum cryptography; the WIMSE workload credentials draft, a working group document, requires general-purpose implementations to support ES256; and Atakora's delegation-chain draft is Ed25519 only. Individual drafts that do provide for post-quantum issuance address issuance alone, the draft says. The encoding work is further along, with ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE already published as RFC 9964. Executive Order 14412 (June 2026) sets the dates: it directs guidance moving federal high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. CNSA 2.0 expects newly acquired national-security systems to comply from 1 January 2027. The draft sets no transition date of its own. It uses these policy dates as the ceiling for the date each specification must state, a bound on how long classical algorithms stay permitted and not a prediction of when a quantum computer appears, and it invites discussion of how that date should be chosen.
Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forgedBI-FIND-2026-0664
›Cited in 38 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- Qwixl's agent-messaging draft makes data misuse attributable to a key, not preventable
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Luke Daniel Chapman, Qwixl · Nov 16, 2026
- From trust level L2 up, an agent audit draft no longer lets the agent vouch for itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 26, 2026
- AGTP's agent identity document is tamper-evident only with its optional issuer signature
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026
- AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026
- Asor's agent-chain draft now says a chain keeps verifying after its principal leaves, until expiry or revocation
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rafael Asor · Oct 28, 2026
- The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026
- Google's AP2 v0.2 ties an agent's purchase to the merchant's own signed checkout by hash
Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026
- Sello has the services an AI agent calls sign its receipts; the agent can't fake them, but it can go around them
Paper · · arXiv · Juan Figuera · Jun 2, 2026
- Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026
- Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026
- NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person
Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026
- UCAN 1.0 drops the authorization server, and its editors admit a delegator cannot see later hand-offs
Article · · GitHub (ucan-wg) · Brooklyn Zelenka et al. · Oct 2, 2026
- Human Delegation Provenance is now an audit record only, and one that cannot prove it is complete
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Oct 6, 2026
- An end-to-end encrypted draft would hide an AI agent's task from the broker, but not who sent it or to whom
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora, Imara Labs · Sep 21, 2026
- A post-quantum agent certificate draft warns that its own declared scopes are not proof of behaviour
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Reuben Burls · Jul 21, 2026
- Schrock's receipts prove a named key approved one exact agent action, and the draft lists at length what they cannot prove
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 12, 2026
- Munoz's agent Permit is signed before the action runs, but the profile does not make the action wait for it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christian Munoz, Keel API, Inc. · Jul 19, 2026
- OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026
- OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026
- TPX replaces an app's embedded AI provider key with a capped, metered grant the user approves at their provider
Article · · tokenpony.dev · Alex Polvi · Jul 20, 2026
- A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026
- DIF's KYA-OS names every AI agent by a DID and makes the verifier check every delegation hop
Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation (KYA-OS) · Dylan Hobbs et al. · Jul 29, 2026
- Coetzee's agent token is good for one declared call, and the hard part is hashing that call the same way twice
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rudolf Jacobus Coetzee · Jul 19, 2026
- Agents meant to be isolated met in a package cache, and about 700 joined an attack on Hugging Face
Article · · METR · Ryan Greenblatt et al. · Aug 26, 2026
- IPC passes a delegation chain between services; its signature proves only the last signer
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ravi Kant Sharma, Ericsson · Jul 23, 2026
- An AI agent's refused action can be approved only by someone its mandate names, says a revised draft
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Lars Kersten Kroehl, CryptoKRI GmbH · May 21, 2026
- A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026
- A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them
Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026
- AIP puts an agent's delegation chain in the token; its perfect score against attacks tests rules only AIP has
Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 25, 2026
- An agent identity draft signs every tool call, but never finished saying whom the agent answers to
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · James Cao et al. · Mar 16, 2026
- A proposed agent:// name survives a move between clouds but not a change of job
Paper · · arXiv · Roland R. Rodriguez et al. · Jan 21, 2026
- A Biscuit holder can narrow a token offline, and widening it takes an explicit trust rule
Article · · Eclipse Biscuit · Eclipse Biscuit project · Oct 21, 2025
- RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- Left to run a decentralized-ID check, AI agents finished as few as 4 runs in 100; one pair agreed to skip half
Paper · · arXiv · Sandro Rodriguez Garzon et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- A proposed A2A audit chain checks every agent signature but assumes who holds each key
Paper · · arXiv · Sumana Malkapuram et al. · Sep 22, 2025
- Agentic JWT binds an agent's token to its task and its own code, but it is one author's draft, not a standard
Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2509.13597) · Abhishek Goswami · Sep 16, 2025
- FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025
- A valid RFC 9421 signature does not prove who signed; key and algorithm checks are left to each profile
Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Feb 1, 2024
Related terms
What appears alongside Ed25519 in the same briefings.