Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

Ed25519

EdDSA Ed25519

A digital-signature scheme on an elliptic curve, used to sign messages and tokens in Secure Shell (SSH), Transport Layer Security (TLS) and identity protocols.

In our briefings

What our briefings say about Ed25519 itself, with the most direct claims first.

  1. What a verifier gets from OpenA2A's protocol is proof that the agent holds an Ed25519 key, by a challenge-response with five ordered checks, and, at the federated Level 3, an identifier its provider issues under a did:web address, a form the draft's own reference resolver does not yet serve. Nothing in the identity says which person or company the agent acts for, and there is no delegation chain: one agent delegating to another signs an assertion and holds a capability string. The post-quantum half of its signatures is a SHOULD, checked only when a credential declares it, and the live challenge never uses it; the transparency log is a single paragraph, kept by the same registry that issues the credentials, and the draft does not say how or when a verifier checks it.

    OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works forBI-FIND-2026-0731

  2. In Uppalapati's survey, the WIMSE AI identity management draft names no signature algorithm and does not discuss post-quantum cryptography; the WIMSE workload credentials draft, a working group document, requires general-purpose implementations to support ES256; and Atakora's delegation-chain draft is Ed25519 only. Individual drafts that do provide for post-quantum issuance address issuance alone, the draft says. The encoding work is further along, with ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE already published as RFC 9964. Executive Order 14412 (June 2026) sets the dates: it directs guidance moving federal high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. CNSA 2.0 expects newly acquired national-security systems to comply from 1 January 2027. The draft sets no transition date of its own. It uses these policy dates as the ceiling for the date each specification must state, a bound on how long classical algorithms stay permitted and not a prediction of when a quantum computer appears, and it invites discussion of how that date should be chosen.

    Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forgedBI-FIND-2026-0664

›Cited in 38 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Qwixl's agent-messaging draft makes data misuse attributable to a key, not preventable

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Luke Daniel Chapman, Qwixl · Nov 16, 2026

  2. From trust level L2 up, an agent audit draft no longer lets the agent vouch for itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 26, 2026

  3. AGTP's agent identity document is tamper-evident only with its optional issuer signature

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  4. AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026

  5. Asor's agent-chain draft now says a chain keeps verifying after its principal leaves, until expiry or revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rafael Asor · Oct 28, 2026

  6. The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026

  7. Google's AP2 v0.2 ties an agent's purchase to the merchant's own signed checkout by hash

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  8. Sello has the services an AI agent calls sign its receipts; the agent can't fake them, but it can go around them

    Paper · · arXiv · Juan Figuera · Jun 2, 2026

  9. Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026

  10. Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026

  11. NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026

  12. UCAN 1.0 drops the authorization server, and its editors admit a delegator cannot see later hand-offs

    Article · · GitHub (ucan-wg) · Brooklyn Zelenka et al. · Oct 2, 2026

  13. Human Delegation Provenance is now an audit record only, and one that cannot prove it is complete

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Oct 6, 2026

  14. An end-to-end encrypted draft would hide an AI agent's task from the broker, but not who sent it or to whom

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora, Imara Labs · Sep 21, 2026

  15. A post-quantum agent certificate draft warns that its own declared scopes are not proof of behaviour

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Reuben Burls · Jul 21, 2026

  16. Schrock's receipts prove a named key approved one exact agent action, and the draft lists at length what they cannot prove

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 12, 2026

  17. Munoz's agent Permit is signed before the action runs, but the profile does not make the action wait for it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christian Munoz, Keel API, Inc. · Jul 19, 2026

  18. OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026

  19. OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026

  20. TPX replaces an app's embedded AI provider key with a capped, metered grant the user approves at their provider

    Article · · tokenpony.dev · Alex Polvi · Jul 20, 2026

  21. A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026

  22. DIF's KYA-OS names every AI agent by a DID and makes the verifier check every delegation hop

    Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation (KYA-OS) · Dylan Hobbs et al. · Jul 29, 2026

  23. Coetzee's agent token is good for one declared call, and the hard part is hashing that call the same way twice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rudolf Jacobus Coetzee · Jul 19, 2026

  24. Agents meant to be isolated met in a package cache, and about 700 joined an attack on Hugging Face

    Article · · METR · Ryan Greenblatt et al. · Aug 26, 2026

  25. IPC passes a delegation chain between services; its signature proves only the last signer

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ravi Kant Sharma, Ericsson · Jul 23, 2026

  26. An AI agent's refused action can be approved only by someone its mandate names, says a revised draft

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Lars Kersten Kroehl, CryptoKRI GmbH · May 21, 2026

  27. A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026

  28. A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them

    Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026

  29. AIP puts an agent's delegation chain in the token; its perfect score against attacks tests rules only AIP has

    Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 25, 2026

  30. An agent identity draft signs every tool call, but never finished saying whom the agent answers to

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · James Cao et al. · Mar 16, 2026

  31. A proposed agent:// name survives a move between clouds but not a change of job

    Paper · · arXiv · Roland R. Rodriguez et al. · Jan 21, 2026

  32. A Biscuit holder can narrow a token offline, and widening it takes an explicit trust rule

    Article · · Eclipse Biscuit · Eclipse Biscuit project · Oct 21, 2025

  33. RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025

  34. Left to run a decentralized-ID check, AI agents finished as few as 4 runs in 100; one pair agreed to skip half

    Paper · · arXiv · Sandro Rodriguez Garzon et al. · Oct 1, 2025

  35. A proposed A2A audit chain checks every agent signature but assumes who holds each key

    Paper · · arXiv · Sumana Malkapuram et al. · Sep 22, 2025

  36. Agentic JWT binds an agent's token to its task and its own code, but it is one author's draft, not a standard

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2509.13597) · Abhishek Goswami · Sep 16, 2025

  37. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  38. A valid RFC 9421 signature does not prove who signed; key and algorithm checks are left to each profile

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Feb 1, 2024

Related terms

What appears alongside Ed25519 in the same briefings.

Attenuating Authorization Token