IANA
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority: the body that keeps the official registries of protocol names and numbers, so that two standards do not use the same label for different things.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on IANA would have you leave with.
The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized. Version 1.1 gives, as an example, DIDs based on identifiers registered in "federated or centralized identity management systems", lists "databases of any kind" among its examples of a registry a DID can be recorded on, and does not require or suggest any specific type of registry. A method specification only SHOULD be registered in the DID Extensions list, and the spec notes that no central authority mandates which specification goes with a given method name. Mapping human-friendly names, a domain name among them, to DIDs is out of scope. We read this as making decentralization, like revocation and recovery, a property of each DID method.
The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each methodBI-FIND-2026-0649
Revision -02 of Shankarlingam's draft says the delay before a disabled agent is refused is "a property of the receiver's configuration, not of the token alone", and that passing the receiver's checks does not show a disabled client is refused within the bound the receiver computes. Raising the maximum token age, DNS caching, caching of issuer metadata and keys, or the clock-skew allowance lengthens the time a disabled client is still accepted, while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check keeps passing. Those checks, the draft says, "establish that a token is authentic; they do not establish that the client is still enabled." A receiver SHOULD recompute the bound before any change to those settings takes effect, and SHOULD test it directly, again after any change to those settings: obtain link tokens for a test client, disable it at a time not known to whoever observes the receiver, keep presenting tokens issued before the disable, and compare the last acceptance with the time the authorization server records the disable. The receiver meets its bound if that gap does not exceed the computed delay. It SHOULD also log the maximum age in effect with each verification result, and the security section says receivers SHOULD treat such changes as security relevant. The draft describes this test and reports no results from running it.
A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how longBI-FIND-2026-2345
Token Status List puts the status of many tokens in a signed, compressed bit array per list, which the authors size for up to millions of tokens, and an issuer may run several lists. Each token carries an index and the list's URI. A verifier fetches the list, validates it and reads the token's 1, 2, 4 or 8 bits for VALID, INVALID, SUSPENDED or an application-specific value. Because many tokens share one list, the issuer does not learn which token a verifier is asking about, which the authors call herd privacy. With OAuth introspection, by contrast, the verifier contacts the issuer about each token. The draft warns that an issuer could defeat this with a unique list or list URI per token, which relying parties that verify many tokens can spot by comparing the number and size of lists with the tokens they see. The uri and index pair is unique to each token, so the draft also warns that a relying party may track one token's status over time and that colluding parties may link two transactions involving the same token; it recommends batches of one-time-use tokens. A revocation reaches a verifier when it next fetches the list, and the issuer can signal how long a copy may be cached through the list's exp and ttl.
OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checkedBI-FIND-2026-0632
›Cited in 117 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each method
Article · · W3C · W3C Decentralized Identifier Working Group · Mar 5, 2026
- A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026
- OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026
- The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026
- OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent
Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026
- The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026
- A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026
- W3C's JOSE and COSE rules for credentials admit there is no standard way yet to fetch a JWK from a DID URL
Article · · W3C · Michael Jones et al. · Oct 13, 2026
- A draft rebuilds agent session records on vCon, where software without the extension ignores the tool calls
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Nov 2, 2026
- An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026
- An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026
- In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026
- Register a platform's identity provider once, not each agent: trust rests on its issuer, with no revocation
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Carleton et al. · Sep 22, 2026
- An OAuth draft lets the API, not the agent, describe the approval, and now name the key the token is bound to
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Jun 25, 2026
- OAuth's SPIFFE draft opens metadata URLs to all three credentials and says what a self-served key cannot prove
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jun 15, 2026
- Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026
- A SCITT draft tells verifiers not to guess how a hash was made; its interop proof is the authors' own record
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih et al. · Oct 26, 2026
- An agent can act with permission on a quarantined belief; a Glyphzero draft lets the action record show it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Jul 4, 2026
- An unadopted AGTP draft would let gateways refuse an agent's out-of-scope requests from its TLS certificate
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026
- OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026
- A draft has each company sign its own half when one company's agent acts at another's request, refusals included
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih, Action State Group · Oct 29, 2026
- A China Mobile draft lets agents skip the user for pre-approved services but doesn't say how an agent proves who it is
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Zongpeng Du, China Mobile · Oct 27, 2026
- A draft makes an AI system's refusals auditable in a SCITT log, but only for requests the system logged
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tokachi Kamimura, VeritasChain Standards Organization · Oct 24, 2026
- Drake's agent registry adds an opt-in brake: a registrar can block a transfer or key change until it releases it, never make one
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026
- A 'human approved' field is not evidence, says Schrock's draft; only a bound, signed approval counts
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Jul 3, 2026
- WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026
- AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026
- Lee's draft would hold an agent's action at the boundary until a receipt for that exact action passes every check
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yong Bok Lee, Meridian Verity Group · Jun 5, 2026
- Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026
- An agent audit log now names whom the agent acted for, but at low trust levels the agent may write that itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 26, 2026
- Drake's revised draft: an agent identity outlives its operator but is never reissued once its last key is gone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026
- Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026
- Drake's agent-mail draft puts hardware-maker proof on hold, but its abstract still offers it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026
- One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026
- A routing-policy draft requires authenticated links before hop checks can prove a chain
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sumit P. Ahuja, Main Labs · Oct 21, 2026
- The SCITT API heading to RFC leaves who may register a statement to each operator
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jun 26, 2026
- An IETF draft caps each attestation verdict at its worst check and leaves the unchecked parts to the relying party
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · May 26, 2026
- The IETF names workloads with a URI on the owner's domain; revision -04 pins down how two names are compared
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Oct 23, 2026
- A COSE Receipt signs a Merkle root, not the entry, and RFC 9942 recommends checking signature and proof as one result
Article · · RFC Editor · Orie Steele et al. · Jun 30, 2026
- Agents would show a signed user goal with each OAuth scope request; the draft leaves open how the server checks it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optional
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Oct 20, 2026
- An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026
- An IETF draft ties attestation evidence to the certificate key, but only for the moment of the check
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Aug 15, 2026
- An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cut
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Angel Cruz · Feb 7, 2026
- Schrock's action identifier would let permits and receipts name the same agent action, and it authorizes nothing
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Oct 2, 2026
- A draft records every AI agent verdict, refusals too, and won't let a dispatched action pass as confirmed
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih, Action State Group · Sep 27, 2026
- An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026
- In Huawei's reworked OAuth draft, evidence signed by the token's subject can narrow access but never widen it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Cheng-Kang Chu et al. · Sep 1, 2026
- The PEDIGREE draft has verifiers re-check every ancestor of an agent's token, without saying how to fetch them
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Apr 25, 2026
- OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026
- A2A 1.0 connects agents across companies and leaves out the person they act for
Article · · A2A Protocol (Linux Foundation) · A2A Protocol project et al. · May 28, 2026
- Sharif's profile writes an AI agent's rights to pay and delete into an identity certificate valid up to a year
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 2, 2026
- A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026
- An agent audit record that shows when a 'deny' went through anyway
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sankalp Gilda · Oct 5, 2026
- AAuth's R3 lets an agent ask for an API's named operations, and a person approve one exact call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026
- Hardt's AAuth Budgets caps what an agent may spend at each resource, and hides the person's real limit from it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026
- A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials alone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Wahl et al. · Jun 5, 2026
- The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026
- The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Scott Courtney et al. · Apr 13, 2026
- CAID requires executors to check the action they will actually invoke
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 28, 2026
- July TLS-attestation draft withdraws itself and leaves key safeguards outside the protocol
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jul 23, 2026
- Batch delegation assigns each permission to an agent, then filters at token exchange
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuan Ni et al. · Jul 3, 2026
- Atlassian's first draft for offline delegation banned bearer handles; revision 05 just recommends sender binding
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Larry Zhu et al. · May 22, 2026
- RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026
- Protocol 427 offers agents a reusable spending allowance, then ties each signed proof to one request
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · John Paul McGraw et al. · May 6, 2026
- China Mobile's agent-revocation draft adds security rules but still never says how it finds the sub-agents
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Apr 27, 2026
- A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026
- An OAuth draft for AI agents' step-up login finishes the one-time-code path but leaves passkeys unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Martin Besozzi · Apr 3, 2026
- An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026
- A draft binds workload credentials to their host via a local agent, and leaves that agent's compromise undecided
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ram Krishnan et al. · Feb 26, 2026
- IETF draft bars CAs from using attestation as proof about a key without a validated binding
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mike Ounsworth et al. · Feb 11, 2026
- A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026
- A China Mobile draft would end an agent's token when its task ends, if a webhook says so
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Feb 4, 2026
- ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026
- An IETF draft gives company IDs one standard form, yet a Legal Entity Identifier can be written several ways
Draft · · IETF datatracker · Brent W. Zundel et al. · Jan 28, 2026
- Rosenberg and White's AAuth now has the resource server, not the agent, write and sign the approval text
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jonathan Rosenberg et al. · Oct 20, 2025
- SPICE includes software agents as credential issuers, holders and verifiers
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brent Zundel et al. · Oct 20, 2025
- Attested workload identities need a mapping that survives authorized updates
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Novak et al. · Oct 20, 2025
- An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025
- WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- A SCIM draft lets apps publish the roles and entitlements they accept, and never says who may read the list
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Danny Zollner et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- An October SCIM draft gives agents their own records, with security still unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 11, 2025
- RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no access
Article · · RFC Editor · Matt Peterson et al. · Oct 9, 2025
- RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- OpenID's enterprise login draft adds tenant and session-expiry claims, and its security section is still blank
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 25, 2025
- The July 2025 Cross App Access draft lets the IdP decide app-to-app access and treats agents as plain clients
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 2, 2025
- China Mobile's agent-identity draft had one MUST, binding each agent to its user, and no mechanism to do it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kehan Yao et al. · Jul 1, 2025
- Arm's PSA attestation RFC trusts two device states, and its Table 1 labels one as root-of-trust debug
Article · · RFC Editor · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jun 13, 2025
- A 2025 post-quantum passkey draft lets the private key sit encrypted on flash or disk, for want of ML-DSA hardware
Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft · Aditya Mitra et al. · Apr 2, 2025
- RFC 9679 lets a CBOR token name its holder's key by thumbprint alone, and leaves finding the key to the verifier
Article · · RFC Editor · Kohei Isobe et al. · Dec 20, 2024
- RFC 9651 keeps the last duplicate dictionary or parameter value
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Mark Nottingham et al. · Sep 1, 2024
- In Privacy Pass, one compromised Attester can taint an Issuer's tokens, and privacy rests on parties not colluding
Article · · RFC Editor · Alex Davidson et al. · Jun 13, 2024
- RFC 9597 exposes token claims in COSE headers without giving them extra trust
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Tobias Looker et al. · Jun 1, 2024
- A Content-Digest header can show a body arrived intact, not who sent it; RFC 9530 points to TLS or a signature for that
Article · · RFC Editor · Roberto Polli et al. · Feb 1, 2024
- JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject
Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023
- RFC 9470 lets an API demand a fresher or stronger sign-in, with no shared scale for 'stronger'
Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci et al. · Sep 8, 2023
- COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application
Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023
- HPKE’s Auth mode proves key possession; applications handle identity binding
Article · · RFC Editor · Richard L. Barnes et al. · Feb 24, 2022
- Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021
- TLS 1.0 and 1.1 become forbidden, while ClientHello record compatibility stays
Article · · RFC Editor · Kathleen Moriarty et al. · Mar 23, 2021
- Signed Agent Cards and agent receipts rest on RFC 8785, an Informational RFC that shows how a parser can change the bytes
Article · · RFC Editor · Anders Rundgren et al. · Jun 1, 2020
- The OAuth device grant names remote phishing as its risk and leaves the defence mostly to what the approval screen tells the user
Article · · RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Aug 1, 2019
- Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018
- RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018
- CWT leaves required claims to the application, including issuer, audience and expiry
Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2018
- RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016
- A JWK thumbprint identifies a known key, and RFC 7638 warns it cannot reliably block one
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- PKCE's 2015 standard let servers accept clients that skip it and treated an omitted method as the weaker plain
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Sep 2015
- RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015
- RFC 7522 lets a SAML assertion serve as a grant or authenticate the client independently
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7518 (2015) required one JWS signing algorithm, the shared-secret HS256, and barred accepting "none" by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7523 lets a signed JWT authenticate an OAuth client or serve as a grant, and leaves replay checks optional
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7009 requires refresh-token revocation but only recommends it for access tokens, which may outlive a revoke
Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Aug 1, 2013
- RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023
Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012