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IANA

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority: the body that keeps the official registries of protocol names and numbers, so that two standards do not use the same label for different things.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on IANA would have you leave with.

  1. The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized. Version 1.1 gives, as an example, DIDs based on identifiers registered in "federated or centralized identity management systems", lists "databases of any kind" among its examples of a registry a DID can be recorded on, and does not require or suggest any specific type of registry. A method specification only SHOULD be registered in the DID Extensions list, and the spec notes that no central authority mandates which specification goes with a given method name. Mapping human-friendly names, a domain name among them, to DIDs is out of scope. We read this as making decentralization, like revocation and recovery, a property of each DID method.

    The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each methodBI-FIND-2026-0649

  2. Revision -02 of Shankarlingam's draft says the delay before a disabled agent is refused is "a property of the receiver's configuration, not of the token alone", and that passing the receiver's checks does not show a disabled client is refused within the bound the receiver computes. Raising the maximum token age, DNS caching, caching of issuer metadata and keys, or the clock-skew allowance lengthens the time a disabled client is still accepted, while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check keeps passing. Those checks, the draft says, "establish that a token is authentic; they do not establish that the client is still enabled." A receiver SHOULD recompute the bound before any change to those settings takes effect, and SHOULD test it directly, again after any change to those settings: obtain link tokens for a test client, disable it at a time not known to whoever observes the receiver, keep presenting tokens issued before the disable, and compare the last acceptance with the time the authorization server records the disable. The receiver meets its bound if that gap does not exceed the computed delay. It SHOULD also log the maximum age in effect with each verification result, and the security section says receivers SHOULD treat such changes as security relevant. The draft describes this test and reports no results from running it.

    A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how longBI-FIND-2026-2345

  3. Token Status List puts the status of many tokens in a signed, compressed bit array per list, which the authors size for up to millions of tokens, and an issuer may run several lists. Each token carries an index and the list's URI. A verifier fetches the list, validates it and reads the token's 1, 2, 4 or 8 bits for VALID, INVALID, SUSPENDED or an application-specific value. Because many tokens share one list, the issuer does not learn which token a verifier is asking about, which the authors call herd privacy. With OAuth introspection, by contrast, the verifier contacts the issuer about each token. The draft warns that an issuer could defeat this with a unique list or list URI per token, which relying parties that verify many tokens can spot by comparing the number and size of lists with the tokens they see. The uri and index pair is unique to each token, so the draft also warns that a relying party may track one token's status over time and that colluding parties may link two transactions involving the same token; it recommends batches of one-time-use tokens. A revocation reaches a verifier when it next fetches the list, and the issuer can signal how long a copy may be cached through the list's exp and ttl.

    OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checkedBI-FIND-2026-0632

›Cited in 117 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each method

    Article · · W3C · W3C Decentralized Identifier Working Group · Mar 5, 2026

  2. A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026

  3. OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026

  4. The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026

  5. OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026

  6. The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026

  7. A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026

  8. W3C's JOSE and COSE rules for credentials admit there is no standard way yet to fetch a JWK from a DID URL

    Article · · W3C · Michael Jones et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  9. A draft rebuilds agent session records on vCon, where software without the extension ignores the tool calls

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Nov 2, 2026

  10. An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026

  11. An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026

  12. An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026

  13. In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026

  14. Register a platform's identity provider once, not each agent: trust rests on its issuer, with no revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Carleton et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  15. An OAuth draft lets the API, not the agent, describe the approval, and now name the key the token is bound to

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Jun 25, 2026

  16. OAuth's SPIFFE draft opens metadata URLs to all three credentials and says what a self-served key cannot prove

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jun 15, 2026

  17. Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026

  18. A SCITT draft tells verifiers not to guess how a hash was made; its interop proof is the authors' own record

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih et al. · Oct 26, 2026

  19. An agent can act with permission on a quarantined belief; a Glyphzero draft lets the action record show it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Jul 4, 2026

  20. An unadopted AGTP draft would let gateways refuse an agent's out-of-scope requests from its TLS certificate

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  21. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  22. A draft has each company sign its own half when one company's agent acts at another's request, refusals included

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih, Action State Group · Oct 29, 2026

  23. A China Mobile draft lets agents skip the user for pre-approved services but doesn't say how an agent proves who it is

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Zongpeng Du, China Mobile · Oct 27, 2026

  24. A draft makes an AI system's refusals auditable in a SCITT log, but only for requests the system logged

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tokachi Kamimura, VeritasChain Standards Organization · Oct 24, 2026

  25. Drake's agent registry adds an opt-in brake: a registrar can block a transfer or key change until it releases it, never make one

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  26. A 'human approved' field is not evidence, says Schrock's draft; only a bound, signed approval counts

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Jul 3, 2026

  27. WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026

  28. AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026

  29. Lee's draft would hold an agent's action at the boundary until a receipt for that exact action passes every check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yong Bok Lee, Meridian Verity Group · Jun 5, 2026

  30. Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  31. An agent audit log now names whom the agent acted for, but at low trust levels the agent may write that itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 26, 2026

  32. Drake's revised draft: an agent identity outlives its operator but is never reissued once its last key is gone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  33. Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026

  34. Drake's agent-mail draft puts hardware-maker proof on hold, but its abstract still offers it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  35. One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  36. A routing-policy draft requires authenticated links before hop checks can prove a chain

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sumit P. Ahuja, Main Labs · Oct 21, 2026

  37. The SCITT API heading to RFC leaves who may register a statement to each operator

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jun 26, 2026

  38. An IETF draft caps each attestation verdict at its worst check and leaves the unchecked parts to the relying party

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · May 26, 2026

  39. The IETF names workloads with a URI on the owner's domain; revision -04 pins down how two names are compared

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Oct 23, 2026

  40. A COSE Receipt signs a Merkle root, not the entry, and RFC 9942 recommends checking signature and proof as one result

    Article · · RFC Editor · Orie Steele et al. · Jun 30, 2026

  41. Agents would show a signed user goal with each OAuth scope request; the draft leaves open how the server checks it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 19, 2026

  42. The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  43. An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  44. An IETF draft ties attestation evidence to the certificate key, but only for the moment of the check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Aug 15, 2026

  45. An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cut

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Angel Cruz · Feb 7, 2026

  46. Schrock's action identifier would let permits and receipts name the same agent action, and it authorizes nothing

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Oct 2, 2026

  47. A draft records every AI agent verdict, refusals too, and won't let a dispatched action pass as confirmed

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih, Action State Group · Sep 27, 2026

  48. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  49. In Huawei's reworked OAuth draft, evidence signed by the token's subject can narrow access but never widen it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Cheng-Kang Chu et al. · Sep 1, 2026

  50. The PEDIGREE draft has verifiers re-check every ancestor of an agent's token, without saying how to fetch them

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Apr 25, 2026

  51. OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026

  52. A2A 1.0 connects agents across companies and leaves out the person they act for

    Article · · A2A Protocol (Linux Foundation) · A2A Protocol project et al. · May 28, 2026

  53. Sharif's profile writes an AI agent's rights to pay and delete into an identity certificate valid up to a year

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 2, 2026

  54. A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026

  55. An agent audit record that shows when a 'deny' went through anyway

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sankalp Gilda · Oct 5, 2026

  56. AAuth's R3 lets an agent ask for an API's named operations, and a person approve one exact call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  57. Hardt's AAuth Budgets caps what an agent may spend at each resource, and hides the person's real limit from it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  58. A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Wahl et al. · Jun 5, 2026

  59. The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  60. The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Scott Courtney et al. · Apr 13, 2026

  61. CAID requires executors to check the action they will actually invoke

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 28, 2026

  62. July TLS-attestation draft withdraws itself and leaves key safeguards outside the protocol

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jul 23, 2026

  63. Batch delegation assigns each permission to an agent, then filters at token exchange

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuan Ni et al. · Jul 3, 2026

  64. Atlassian's first draft for offline delegation banned bearer handles; revision 05 just recommends sender binding

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Larry Zhu et al. · May 22, 2026

  65. RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026

  66. Protocol 427 offers agents a reusable spending allowance, then ties each signed proof to one request

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · John Paul McGraw et al. · May 6, 2026

  67. China Mobile's agent-revocation draft adds security rules but still never says how it finds the sub-agents

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Apr 27, 2026

  68. A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026

  69. An OAuth draft for AI agents' step-up login finishes the one-time-code path but leaves passkeys unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Martin Besozzi · Apr 3, 2026

  70. An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  71. A draft binds workload credentials to their host via a local agent, and leaves that agent's compromise undecided

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ram Krishnan et al. · Feb 26, 2026

  72. IETF draft bars CAs from using attestation as proof about a key without a validated binding

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mike Ounsworth et al. · Feb 11, 2026

  73. A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026

  74. A China Mobile draft would end an agent's token when its task ends, if a webhook says so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Feb 4, 2026

  75. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  76. An IETF draft gives company IDs one standard form, yet a Legal Entity Identifier can be written several ways

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Brent W. Zundel et al. · Jan 28, 2026

  77. Rosenberg and White's AAuth now has the resource server, not the agent, write and sign the approval text

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jonathan Rosenberg et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  78. SPICE includes software agents as credential issuers, holders and verifiers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brent Zundel et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  79. Attested workload identities need a mapping that survives authorized updates

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Novak et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  80. An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025

  81. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  82. A SCIM draft lets apps publish the roles and entitlements they accept, and never says who may read the list

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Danny Zollner et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  83. An October SCIM draft gives agents their own records, with security still unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 11, 2025

  84. RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no access

    Article · · RFC Editor · Matt Peterson et al. · Oct 9, 2025

  85. RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025

  86. OpenID's enterprise login draft adds tenant and session-expiry claims, and its security section is still blank

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 25, 2025

  87. The July 2025 Cross App Access draft lets the IdP decide app-to-app access and treats agents as plain clients

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 2, 2025

  88. China Mobile's agent-identity draft had one MUST, binding each agent to its user, and no mechanism to do it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kehan Yao et al. · Jul 1, 2025

  89. Arm's PSA attestation RFC trusts two device states, and its Table 1 labels one as root-of-trust debug

    Article · · RFC Editor · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jun 13, 2025

  90. A 2025 post-quantum passkey draft lets the private key sit encrypted on flash or disk, for want of ML-DSA hardware

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft · Aditya Mitra et al. · Apr 2, 2025

  91. RFC 9679 lets a CBOR token name its holder's key by thumbprint alone, and leaves finding the key to the verifier

    Article · · RFC Editor · Kohei Isobe et al. · Dec 20, 2024

  92. RFC 9651 keeps the last duplicate dictionary or parameter value

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Mark Nottingham et al. · Sep 1, 2024

  93. In Privacy Pass, one compromised Attester can taint an Issuer's tokens, and privacy rests on parties not colluding

    Article · · RFC Editor · Alex Davidson et al. · Jun 13, 2024

  94. RFC 9597 exposes token claims in COSE headers without giving them extra trust

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Tobias Looker et al. · Jun 1, 2024

  95. A Content-Digest header can show a body arrived intact, not who sent it; RFC 9530 points to TLS or a signature for that

    Article · · RFC Editor · Roberto Polli et al. · Feb 1, 2024

  96. JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023

  97. RFC 9470 lets an API demand a fresher or stronger sign-in, with no shared scale for 'stronger'

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci et al. · Sep 8, 2023

  98. COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023

  99. HPKE’s Auth mode proves key possession; applications handle identity binding

    Article · · RFC Editor · Richard L. Barnes et al. · Feb 24, 2022

  100. Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021

  101. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 become forbidden, while ClientHello record compatibility stays

    Article · · RFC Editor · Kathleen Moriarty et al. · Mar 23, 2021

  102. Signed Agent Cards and agent receipts rest on RFC 8785, an Informational RFC that shows how a parser can change the bytes

    Article · · RFC Editor · Anders Rundgren et al. · Jun 1, 2020

  103. The OAuth device grant names remote phishing as its risk and leaves the defence mostly to what the approval screen tells the user

    Article · · RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Aug 1, 2019

  104. Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018

  105. RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018

  106. CWT leaves required claims to the application, including issuer, audience and expiry

    Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2018

  107. RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016

  108. A JWK thumbprint identifies a known key, and RFC 7638 warns it cannot reliably block one

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Sep 1, 2015

  109. RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015

  110. PKCE's 2015 standard let servers accept clients that skip it and treated an omitted method as the weaker plain

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Sep 2015

  111. RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015

  112. RFC 7522 lets a SAML assertion serve as a grant or authenticate the client independently

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015

  113. RFC 7518 (2015) required one JWS signing algorithm, the shared-secret HS256, and barred accepting "none" by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015

  114. RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015

  115. RFC 7523 lets a signed JWT authenticate an OAuth client or serve as a grant, and leaves replay checks optional

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  116. RFC 7009 requires refresh-token revocation but only recommends it for access tokens, which may outlive a revoke

    Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Aug 1, 2013

  117. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012