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Explainers · Glossary

URI

Uniform Resource Identifier · URIs

Uniform Resource Identifier, the general form of a web address. Identity specs use URIs to name things unambiguously: an issuer, an audience, a resource, or a workload's identity in SPIFFE.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on URI would have you leave with.

  1. Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.

    Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477

  2. Microsoft's Defender researchers report phishing campaigns, aimed at government and public-sector organizations, that use the real Entra ID and Google sign-in endpoints as the redirect hop. The attacker creates an app in a tenant it controls, with its redirect URI on a malicious domain, and mails a link to the provider's authorize endpoint (login.microsoftonline.com for Entra ID) with prompt=none, which allows no sign-in screen, and a request built to fail, for example with an invalid scope. The target still has to click. The silent sign-in then fails without issuing a token (Entra returns error 65001), and the provider redirects the browser to the attacker's registered address. Microsoft says the technique "is not limited to those platforms and can be abused with other OAuth-compliant services."

    Phishing links that start at a real Microsoft or Google sign-in address and end at the attacker'sBI-FIND-2026-2391

  3. None of the authorization changes in MCP's 2026-07-28 revision is listed under Major changes; they sit under Minor changes and Deprecated. SEP-2352 says clients 'MUST key persisted credentials by the issuer identifier, MUST NOT reuse them with a different authorization server, and MUST re-register when the authorization server changes'. Authorization servers should include the RFC 9207 iss (issuer) parameter in authorization responses, and clients must check a present iss against the recorded issuer before redeeming the authorization code (SEP-2468). SEP-837 requires clients to specify an appropriate application_type during Dynamic Client Registration, to avoid OpenID Connect redirect URI conflicts. Dynamic Client Registration itself is deprecated 'as a client registration mechanism in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents' (PR #2858) and remains available for authorization servers that do not support them. The same revision adopts a lifecycle policy with 'a minimum twelve-month deprecation window'; the changelog gives no removal date for Dynamic Client Registration and does not say when its window starts.

    MCP's July spec ties client credentials to the authorization server that issued themBI-FIND-2026-0395

›Cited in 89 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  2. Phishing links that start at a real Microsoft or Google sign-in address and end at the attacker's

    Article · · Microsoft Security Blog · Microsoft Defender Security Research Team · Mar 2, 2026

  3. MCP's July spec ties client credentials to the authorization server that issued them

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026

  4. OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026

  5. The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026

  6. A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026

  7. MCP's November 2025 security guide makes proxy servers ask consent for each client before forwarding a login

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Model Context Protocol project · Nov 25, 2025

  8. An agent-mandate draft checks who may delegate, and now intends to carry its chain in Asor's format

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Claudiu Hulea, Braincap SRL · Oct 24, 2026

  9. An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026

  10. Okta and Google tie an agent's calls to the user, while GitHub's shared Copilot automations now act as Copilot

    Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Oct 2026

  11. An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026

  12. SPIFFE trust domain names have no registrar, and the core spec warns that roles in a credential can go stale

    Article · · SPIFFE project (GitHub) · SPIFFE project · Jul 1, 2026

  13. Register a platform's identity provider once, not each agent: trust rests on its issuer, with no revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Carleton et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  14. OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  15. AGTP's merchant draft has agents check the seller before paying, but the seller's own server runs the swap check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  16. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  17. Sweeney's delegation draft concedes its server is trusted with users' credentials, and drops an interop claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kieran Sweeney · Oct 13, 2026

  18. An agent audit draft makes its first change under its format freeze, ahead of the tests for it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sankalp Gilda · Oct 16, 2026

  19. WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026

  20. AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026

  21. BRICK, a proposed agent manifest, pins down which tools an AI agent may call but not who the agent is

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Samuel Sharaf et al. · Oct 26, 2026

  22. Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  23. MCP's November 2025 authorization spec puts metadata documents ahead of dynamic client registration

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Nov 25, 2025

  24. Drake's agent registry names who may issue an agent's token, and its answer has no signature of its own

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  25. MCP client setup moves from registration to metadata checks in a Spring walkthrough

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Oct 24, 2026

  26. The SCITT API heading to RFC leaves who may register a statement to each operator

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jun 26, 2026

  27. The IETF names workloads with a URI on the owner's domain; revision -04 pins down how two names are compared

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Oct 23, 2026

  28. RATS wraps attestation messages in one envelope and requires composite evidence to be bound together

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Dec 11, 2025

  29. An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  30. An OAuth agent profile has the token server block any widening of scope, and leaves revoking the chain optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sanjeev Kumar, Orchestrum Technologies LLP · Aug 30, 2026

  31. Schrock's action identifier would let permits and receipts name the same agent action, and it authorizes nothing

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Oct 2, 2026

  32. Okta's expired SCIM agent draft recorded certificates and OAuth clients; the joint draft after it dropped both

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  33. The PEDIGREE draft has verifiers re-check every ancestor of an agent's token, without saying how to fetch them

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Apr 25, 2026

  34. OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026

  35. Sharif's profile writes an AI agent's rights to pay and delete into an identity certificate valid up to a year

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 2, 2026

  36. An agent audit record that shows when a 'deny' went through anyway

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sankalp Gilda · Oct 5, 2026

  37. WIMSE mutual TLS -03 ties certificate acceptance to trust-domain anchors

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  38. Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  39. The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  40. MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extension

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026

  41. Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up

    Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026

  42. CAID requires executors to check the action they will actually invoke

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 28, 2026

  43. IPC passes a delegation chain between services; its signature proves only the last signer

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ravi Kant Sharma, Ericsson · Jul 23, 2026

  44. The browser OAuth draft favors a backend that keeps tokens out of JavaScript

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  45. A June OAuth draft logs each hand-off between AI agents, but the per-hop limits the act claim lacks are optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Jun 8, 2026

  46. An AI agent's refused action can be approved only by someone its mandate names, says a revised draft

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Lars Kersten Kroehl, CryptoKRI GmbH · May 21, 2026

  47. RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026

  48. Protocol 427 offers agents a reusable spending allowance, then ties each signed proof to one request

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · John Paul McGraw et al. · May 6, 2026

  49. An agent certificate draft ties access to a trust score set by the issuing CA, usually the agent operator's own

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Apr 10, 2026

  50. OAuth 2.1's October draft bans plain PKCE and adds browser-app rules; 2.1-only clients can fail on older servers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  51. An OAuth client brokering many tools, as agent services do, can let a rogue tool take over a user's other tools

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tim Würtele et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  52. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  53. An IETF draft gives company IDs one standard form, yet a Legal Entity Identifier can be written several ways

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Brent W. Zundel et al. · Jan 28, 2026

  54. A proposed agent:// name survives a move between clouds but not a change of job

    Paper · · arXiv · Roland R. Rodriguez et al. · Jan 21, 2026

  55. A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  56. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  57. RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no access

    Article · · RFC Editor · Matt Peterson et al. · Oct 9, 2025

  58. OpenID4VCI's third interop test: 87% of tested pairs passed, on counts the post does not reconcile

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Gail Hodges · Jul 24, 2025

  59. An OAuth client that never registers: the July 2025 draft makes its URL the identity and leaves most server checks as SHOULDs

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 23, 2025

  60. LPCI paper names instructions planted in agent memory that fire in a later session; its 43% failure rate matches a five-model average

    Paper · · arXiv · Hammad Atta et al. · Jul 14, 2025

  61. OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone else

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Oliver Terbu et al. · Jul 9, 2025

  62. MCP's June 2025 authorization spec: a server accepts only tokens issued for it and passes none upstream

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jun 18, 2025

  63. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  64. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  65. RFC 9679 lets a CBOR token name its holder's key by thumbprint alone, and leaves finding the key to the verifier

    Article · · RFC Editor · Kohei Isobe et al. · Dec 20, 2024

  66. In GNAP (RFC 9635), a client is known by its key, and tokens stay key-bound unless the server flags them bearer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 1, 2024

  67. OpenID Connect Core says only issuer plus subject identify a user; email must never be the key

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Nat Sakimura et al. · Dec 15, 2023

  68. JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023

  69. TLS clients must match a service they chose independently of the certificate

    Article · · RFC Editor · Peter Saint-Andre et al. · Nov 8, 2023

  70. DPoP token binding depends on checks at the resource server

    Article · · RFC Editor · Daniel Fett et al. · Sep 2023

  71. COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023

  72. Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021

  73. OAuth's resource indicators RFC says servers should bind tokens to a resource, but requires it of neither side

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 1, 2020

  74. The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions

    Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020

  75. The OAuth device grant names remote phishing as its risk and leaves the defence mostly to what the approval screen tells the user

    Article · · RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Aug 1, 2019

  76. In draft FAPI, token binding did not make phished tokens useless: the attacker had the bound client spend them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 31, 2019

  77. Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018

  78. RFC 8252 puts native-app OAuth authorization outside the host app’s browser control

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Oct 1, 2017

  79. A 2017 security proof for OpenID Connect assumes fixes the spec did not yet require

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Apr 27, 2017

  80. Trying to prove OAuth 2.0 secure, a 2016 Trier paper found four attacks, the IdP mix-up among them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 6, 2016

  81. SCIM leaves the meaning of active status and group access to each provider

    Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015

  82. PKCE's 2015 standard let servers accept clients that skip it and treated an omitted method as the weaker plain

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Sep 2015

  83. RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015

  84. RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  85. RFC 7515 lets a signed JSON object name or carry its own key, and leaves trusting that key to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  86. RFC 6819 warned in 2013 that servers receiving a token may reuse it, and offered audience binding and client-bound tokens

    Article · · RFC Editor · T. Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2013

  87. RFC 6750 tokens work for whoever holds them; RFC 9700 now urges key binding and bars them from query strings

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2012

  88. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012

  89. RFC 5280 takes the trust anchor as input before checking a certificate path

    Article · · David Cooper et al. · May 1, 2008