JIT
just-in-time access · JEA · Just-Enough-Administration
Granting a permission only for the moment it is needed and withdrawing it afterwards, so no account sits with standing power an attacker could inherit.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on JIT would have you leave with.
Asked whether a review of access every three months still applies to agents, Alexis Moyse, CEO of Clarity Security, says it doesn't really apply: a short-lived agent's task may last 15 seconds, and its lifecycle begins and ends with the request. Moyse's stated goal is "to eliminate access reviews altogether". Moyse says reviews of people stop mattering too once their access is just as short-lived, and describes the ideal as access granted for a task and taken away the moment it is done. Itamar Apelblat of Token Security says the point leaves him asking whether access reviews should exist at all in a world this dynamic. Homayun Yaqub of Digital Hands calls the shift dynamic governance, but describes it as "a conceptual model that we need to explore" and says "I'm not sure we're quite there yet", mostly because what defines an agent's lifecycle is still being learned.
Clarity's CEO says quarterly access reviews don't really apply to 15-second AI agentsBI-FIND-2026-0086
Agnihotri argues that security for highly autonomous agents "cannot be session based". When access is revoked that way, he says, the token can live on for, say, 15 minutes, 30 minutes or an hour, and "an agent can do so much damage during that time", so every agent in the ecosystem needs a kill switch. He names the shared signal framework and continuous access evaluation as technology that "has started to evolve" for this. Roy Akerman plays the attacker who gets in and out before behavioural monitoring connects the dots, and one of the hosts says SOC teams often answer with a mass credential reset because they "don't quite know what went on". Agnihotri's rapid-fire hard truth makes the same point: "the more money your agent makes, the faster you should be ready to kill it." He does not say which tokens, sessions or grants the switch would have to reach.
An AI agent can do its damage within one session, so a practitioner wants a kill switch on its whole identityBI-FIND-2026-0134
Four voices say an AI agent should not keep a standing credential: access should be given when a task needs it and removed afterwards. Martin Sandren of IKEA warns against handing an agent a highly privileged service account to keep forever, and wants just-in-time access set by policy, with SPIFFE to give access when a job starts and remove it. Ev Kontsevoy of Teleport says privileges should follow the task and be "revoked right after the task is completed." Oded Hareven of Akeyless describes just-in-time credentials, ephemeral identities and injected credentials, with a check on each action. Kamil Potrec of Keycard wants credentials held in a vault outside the agent's environment and added to each request by a gateway, which also allows instant revocation. They differ on where the control sits: policy and SPIFFE for Sandren, one inventory of every identity for Kontsevoy, a gateway for Potrec, checks on every action for Hareven. They also name limits. Kontsevoy says identity fragmentation is what stops teams from writing per-task policies, and Potrec says a gateway adds latency, becomes a target and does nothing about the agent's own identity. A fifth voice, Sameer Mehta of Opal Security, describes the habit this answers: engineers under pressure grant an agent standing access and mean to revoke it later.
Give an agent access for the task and take it back afterwards, four voices say, and four say people approving each request cannot keep upBI-FIND-2026-1945
›Cited in 23 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- Clarity's CEO says quarterly access reviews don't really apply to 15-second AI agents
Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · NHI & AI Identity Summit : Where Traditional IAM Breaks · Aug 28, 2026
- An AI agent can do its damage within one session, so a practitioner wants a kill switch on its whole identity
Podcast · · Identity Decoded · Beyond the vault: Why AI agents force us to rethink Privileged Access Management (PAM) · Jul 15, 2026
- Give an agent access for the task and take it back afterwards, four voices say, and four say people approving each request cannot keep up
Field signals · · 8 voices from the field · Feb 2026 to Oct 2026
- OAuth scopes grant agents far more than the task needs, four voices say, and authorization handed from agent to agent has no settled pattern yet
Field signals · · 7 voices from the field · Oct 2025 to Oct 2026
- LinkedIn, Uber and State Farm already run SPIRE for workload identity, and each plans to extend it
Field signals · · 12 voices from the field · Nov 2024 to Oct 2026
- A point-in-time access review can't keep pace with changing access, four voices say, and four vendors now put AI inside the review
Field signals · · 9 voices from the field · Nov 2024 to Aug 2026
- SailPoint’s JIT demo separates approved eligibility from expiring activation
Video · · SailPoint · Oct 16, 2026
- Agents and MCP servers get broad standing access because it is quick or easy, three voices say, and three vendors now pitch a gateway in front of MCP
Field signals · · 9 voices from the field · Sep 2025 to Oct 2026
- Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified
Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026
- Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions
Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026
- OWASP's agent Top 10 blames identity systems built for people, and does not say how it chose or ranked its risks
Article · · OWASP GenAI Security Project · John Sotiropoulos et al. · Dec 9, 2025
- Okta says its agent kill switch revokes all tokens; its product screen says tokens outside the gateway survive
Video · · Okta · Sep 24, 2026
- Opal's access-review AI runs with a person approving by default, and an Opal engineer still reads the rejections
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #448 - Sponsor Spotlight - Opal Security · Sep 17, 2026
- One shared service account turned a one-day password change into three weeks
Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · Securing NHI and Human Identity and Rise of Agentic AI · Jan 7, 2026
- Three vendors say AI systems now create identities on their own; the only survey behind it is one vendor's own
Podcast · · The Data Exchange with Ben Lorica · The Rise of the Machine Identity: Securing the AI Workforce and AI Agents · Jan 29, 2026
- MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extension
Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026
- Ping moved agent identity from roadmap to shipping product, and let AI agents run its admin tools too
Conference · · Ping Identity · Austin · 2-day event (Day 1 / Day 2), 2026
- Google DeepMind wants agent authority to narrow at every hand-off, and misreads MCP's scopes on the way
Paper · · arXiv · Nenad Tomašev et al. · Feb 12, 2026
- StrongDM's chief executive pitches an access gateway that injects credentials into each session as the way to control AI agents
Podcast · · The Security Strategist · Universal Privileged Access Authorization: Securing Humans, Machines, and Agentic AI · Nov 7, 2025
- A 'zero trust' registry against AI tool squatting still has to trust its administrator
Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025
- ATFAA names identity inheritance as an agent threat and answers it with existing cloud policy tools
Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025
- An early MCP security checklist was never tested, and the protocol has since adopted only part of it
Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 11, 2025
- In 2024, KuppingerCole asked for per-task, short-lived agent access without saying how to issue it
Article · · KuppingerCole Analysts · Anne Bailey · Dec 17, 2024
Related terms
What appears alongside JIT in the same briefings.
SailPointService accountLLMIAMLeast privilegeNon-human identityMFASSO