JWKS
JSON Web Key Set
JSON Web Key Set: a published list of public keys that lets anyone check signatures made by the matching private keys.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on JWKS would have you leave with.
Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.
Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477
AAuth's premise is that an OAuth client or an API key has no identity of its own and that SPIFFE and WIMSE stop at one trust domain, so it gives each agent one: an identifier of the form aauth:local@domain issued by an Agent Provider and bound to the agent's own signing key by a short-lived agent token (the draft recommends Ed25519, which every party must support), so that 'every agent has its own cryptographic identity' and 'the first API call to a resource is the registration'. No credential in the protocol is a bearer credential; every request is signed, and a resource can challenge for more at any time. In its lightest mode the draft pitches this as a drop-in for API keys: 'this replaces API keys with cryptographic identity.' What an agent token attests about the software behind the key is left to companion specifications.
AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purposeBI-FIND-2026-0365
An agent's identifier is the HTTPS URL where it publishes its keys, sent in the Signature-Agent header. The URL becomes an identifier once the verifier resolves it and finds a key that verifies the request; until then, the draft says, "verifiers MUST NOT attach policy to it." A valid signature then shows that a holder of a key the URL publishes signed the message, and the draft says it "says nothing about who operates the Agent, whether the Agent is benign, or whether the request is authorized," leaving those to the origin's policy. Nothing stops an agent from dropping a URL and standing up another. Origins can log, rate limit, allowlist or block the URL the way they treat IP addresses and User-Agent strings today.
Web Bot Auth's working-group draft names a bot by its key URL and defines no revocationBI-FIND-2026-1784
›Cited in 12 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it
Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026
- AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026
- Web Bot Auth's working-group draft names a bot by its key URL and defines no revocation
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thibault Meunier et al. · Oct 29, 2026
- The signing-key draft under AAuth offers eight ways to trust a key, and only one says who the agent works for
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 13, 2026
- NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph
Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026
- MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up
Article · · Model Context Protocol (modelcontextprotocol.io) · MCP project et al. · Jun 18, 2026
- AAuth's bootstrap guide makes device attestation optional and lets a new key mean a new agent
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 28, 2026
- Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up
Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026
- xChk ships human OIDC portfolios and a separate agent approval API
Paper · · arXiv · Sean MacGuire · Jul 15, 2026
- WorkOS hands a personal AI agent a key its user owns, then contradicts itself on whether the key can be narrower
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · May 15, 2026
- A KubeCon demo moves MCP servers' OAuth checks into a gateway, safe only if nothing can reach a server directly
Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded March 24, 2026
- FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025