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Explainers · Glossary

OpenID Foundation

OIDF

The standards body behind OpenID Connect, CIBA, and AuthZEN — where much of the web's login plumbing gets written.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on OpenID Foundation would have you leave with.

  1. Asked which identity and security controls are most likely to break first as agentic systems scale, John Yeoh, CSA's chief scientific officer, names lifecycle management. He cites CircleCI and Microsoft's Midnight Blizzard breach as poor lifecycle management of non-human identities, where keys for secrets were not rotated fast enough, and expects agents to fail faster because people now give them specs that spin up sub-agents. Access reviews that ignore intent and behaviour come next, then logging, in what he calls "a good domino of control collapse". Aizome's Amir Ofek answers the same question differently: applying controls built for non-human identities, which are deterministic rather than dynamic, is what will break first.

    CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to breakBI-FIND-2026-0113

  2. Six voices say that knowing who an agent is and what it may access does not settle whether its next action is right, so the check has to look at what the agent is doing while it runs. Steven Rennick of Ciena says "we might know who the agent is and what it's allowed to do, but we really don't know how it's going to make those decisions," so trust has to become continuous and work at runtime. Sathvik Krishnamurthy, an investor with Security Leadership Capital speaking on Entrust's podcast, says identity and zero trust do not control an agent's behavior, and that a layer on top of them has to. Josh Woodruff of the Cloud Security Alliance and MassiveScale AI says zero trust checks who you are and what you can reach, and agents need one more check on every action: what are you doing right now, and is it allowed? Michael Davis of JPMorganChase says most detective controls only ask whether a tool call is allowed, and wants security to look at the actions themselves, not just the permissions. Sagar Batchu of Speakeasy retells an agent that deleted a production database with a valid full-access token: it "had valid credentials, but it didn't have valid intent." Dror Zelber of Radware wants each action compared with the agent's stated intent and goals, and blocked when they do not match. A seventh voice, Maia Iyer of IBM Research, describes the idea behind one such check, which could flag an outgoing call the user never asked for, and calls checks of this kind a soft layer for defense in depth. They differ on how much intent can carry. Rennick and Zelber would judge each action against the agent's intent. Woodruff says the checkpoint must be able to refuse an action whatever the intent was, because an agent with the right intent can still do damage. Rennick adds that judging actions by their outcomes as well is the desired end state, but he does not think the technology is there yet.

    Knowing who an agent is and what it may reach is not enough, six voices say: check each action as it runsBI-FIND-2026-2330

  3. A person's approved request is not, by itself, authority an agent can be held to, McGuinness argues, and relatively few deployments perform the step that would make it one. That step converts approved intent into a bounded authority artifact an enforcement point can evaluate. By his account, many systems instead fall into one of five patterns: scope enumeration, app-local mapping, LLM-generated requests, broad standing authority with prompt discipline, or a formal policy language. He says the most common land in the third or fourth, and that where nothing makes the conversion, the agent's own judgment becomes the effective policy engine. This is one author's argument, but two production designs we have read fit it. Uber's agent tokens carry the full chain of who asked through every hop, and Sierra's gateway runs interactive agent work as the user, with that person's permissions. In our reading, neither records what the person approved.

    A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that stepBI-FIND-2026-0202

›Cited in 25 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to break

    Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · NHI & AI Identity Summit : The Next 24 Months · Sep 7, 2026

  2. Knowing who an agent is and what it may reach is not enough, six voices say: check each action as it runs

    Field signals · · 14 voices from the field · Dec 2025 to Nov 2026

  3. A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that step

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 17, 2026

  4. Agents and MCP servers get broad standing access because it is quick or easy, three voices say, and three vendors now pitch a gateway in front of MCP

    Field signals · · 9 voices from the field · Sep 2025 to Oct 2026

  5. OpenID experts tell EMVCo an agent's payment can look like the cardholder's, and no one vouches for the agent

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam et al. · Oct 8, 2026

  6. WorkOS's Tobin South, in November 2025: agents will get a new kind of account, not a new identity standard

    Podcast · · CodingCat.dev Podcast · 5.10 - How to Secure AI - Identity Access Management for Agents · Nov 21, 2025

  7. Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  8. Seven hundred agents followed orders that nobody had the authority to give

    Article · · METR · Ryan Greenblatt et al. · Aug 26, 2026

  9. OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025

  10. An OpenID Foundation co-chair says AI agents need modest upgrades to today's identity systems, not a new one

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #390 - Identity Management for Agentic AI with Tobin South · Dec 8, 2025

  11. Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up

    Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026

  12. OpenID's AuthZEN group approves a draft that lets policy tell an agent 'not yet, and here is what is required'

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Jun 15, 2026

  13. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  14. A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them

    Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026

  15. Google DeepMind wants agent authority to narrow at every hand-off, and misreads MCP's scopes on the way

    Paper · · arXiv · Nenad Tomašev et al. · Feb 12, 2026

  16. The OpenID Foundation set 26 February 2026 for verifiable credential self-certification, with issuance tests still SD-JWT only

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Dec 18, 2025

  17. FIDO moves past passkeys to certify identity wallets, so issuers can check a wallet before provisioning to it

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · Dec 4, 2025

  18. FIDO puts passkeys in use at over three billion on its own estimate, and weighs a certification for digital wallets

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #384 - The FIDO Alliance's Next Frontier: Digital Credentials and Wallets · Nov 10, 2025

  19. For US banks to accept mobile driver's licenses, an OpenID Foundation group proposes five trust signals

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Nov 5, 2025

  20. OpenID Foundation finalized Shared Signals, CAEP and RISC in September 2025, naming adopters without evidence

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Sep 16, 2025

  21. Formal proofs find no new flaws in OpenID4VP over the Digital Credentials API, for a March 2025 draft

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Fabian Hauck et al. · Aug 20, 2025

  22. OpenID4VCI's third interop test: 87% of tested pairs passed, on counts the post does not reconcile

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Gail Hodges · Jul 24, 2025

  23. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  24. The 2024 'IDs for AI' paper puts the ID on a chat session, not a model, and leaves trust in its issuer to others

    Paper · · arXiv · Alan Chan et al. · Jun 17, 2024

  25. In draft FAPI, token binding did not make phished tokens useless: the attacker had the bound client spend them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 31, 2019

Related terms

What appears alongside OpenID Foundation in the same briefings.

OpenID FederationAudience injection attackOpenID Foundation AI Identity Management Community Group