OpenID Federation
OpenID Federation 1.0
An OpenID specification for building trust between organizations through signed statements about who vouches for whom, so parties with no shared identity provider can still verify each other.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on OpenID Federation would have you leave with.
Revision -02 of Shankarlingam's draft says the delay before a disabled agent is refused is "a property of the receiver's configuration, not of the token alone", and that passing the receiver's checks does not show a disabled client is refused within the bound the receiver computes. Raising the maximum token age, DNS caching, caching of issuer metadata and keys, or the clock-skew allowance lengthens the time a disabled client is still accepted, while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check keeps passing. Those checks, the draft says, "establish that a token is authentic; they do not establish that the client is still enabled." A receiver SHOULD recompute the bound before any change to those settings takes effect, and SHOULD test it directly, again after any change to those settings: obtain link tokens for a test client, disable it at a time not known to whoever observes the receiver, keep presenting tokens issued before the disable, and compare the last acceptance with the time the authorization server records the disable. The receiver meets its bound if that gap does not exceed the computed delay. It SHOULD also log the maximum age in effect with each verification result, and the security section says receivers SHOULD treat such changes as security relevant. The draft describes this test and reports no results from running it.
A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how longBI-FIND-2026-2345
Under revision -11 of the bis draft, a JWT that authenticates an OAuth client has exactly one permitted audience. The draft rewrites RFC 7523's rule so that the audience 'MUST use the issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the authorization server as its sole value', 'the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MUST NOT be used as an audience value', and the server 'MUST reject any JWT that does not contain its issuer identifier as its sole audience value'. Unless an application profile says otherwise, the values are compared by Simple String Comparison. The server must have an issuer identifier to use the rule at all, and participants no longer need to agree on audience identifiers for client authentication. Pushed authorization requests (RFC 9126) get the same sole-issuer rule. The draft's reason is that endpoint addresses other than the issuer 'cannot be directly validated' and, sent to a different endpoint, 'can open an attack vector'. It cites the vulnerability University of Stuttgart researchers disclosed to the working group in January 2025, and their paper on audience injection attacks.
The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpointBI-FIND-2026-0350
Uppalapati puts the central problem in the records that agent delegations leave behind. A delegation record kept as evidence cannot be dated by its own signature, and an RFC 3161 timestamp is itself a signature, so an adversary with a quantum computer that breaks classical signatures "can mint a classical timestamp bearing any date it chooses". When that happens, "every delegation record that was never anchored in trusted time becomes repudiable simultaneously". The draft also flags the gap it calls most easily missed: where a verifier fetches a signing key from a key set over TLS, no agent-delegation specification requires a record of the algorithms that bound the key to its trust anchor, so in general there is none, and an online verifier "sees the binding and still writes nothing down". Its seven requirements for specification authors include post-quantum issuance from a transition date each specification states, trust anchors migrated no later than the credentials they certify, algorithm strength visible along the whole chain (OAuth token exchange "alone does not conform"), and retained records anchored in trusted time and renewed on a schedule.
Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forgedBI-FIND-2026-0663
›Cited in 11 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026
- The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026
- Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026
- OAuth tokens prove an agent's rights, not a person's consent; revision 05 adds a day-long grant with spend caps
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 27, 2026
- OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation process
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Roland Hedberg et al. · Feb 17, 2026
- OpenID experts tell EMVCo an agent's payment can look like the cardholder's, and no one vouches for the agent
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam et al. · Oct 8, 2026
- OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025
- OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025
- An OAuth client that never registers: the July 2025 draft makes its URL the identity and leaves most server checks as SHOULDs
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 23, 2025
- OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone else
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Oliver Terbu et al. · Jul 9, 2025
- A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses
Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025
Related terms
What appears alongside OpenID Federation in the same briefings.
Trust ChainOpenID FoundationAudience injection attackSAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization GrantsFAPIOAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across DomainsOAuth Attestation-Based Client AuthenticationClient ID Metadata Documents