Runtime authority
agentic runtime authority · runtime identity
Akeyless term: authorise each agent action at execution time, with intent evaluated and a credential minted per request, instead of granting a session-long token.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on Runtime authority would have you leave with.
Neiderman's case that the identity stack has to be rebuilt for agents starts with history. Identity spent decades as IT plumbing behind the firewall, the cloud made the identity provider the real gatekeeper, and companies answered with point tools: he recalls an average of about 8.3 per company, from a spreadsheet of conversations with, by his estimate, 100 to 200 or more CISOs. Agents, he says, will bring roughly a hundred times more identities working around the clock, and probably 99.9 percent of actions on data and systems will be theirs. In his view a stack built for humans and carrying decades of undocumented connections will not hold that load, while NewCore, starting fresh, can adjust its design as agent protocols are "still being formed". Two less interested voices in other sources we have read make a similar case. The founder of an identity threat detection company Okta had just acquired warned that bolting a bunch of things on will fail over time, and a paper led by Cloud Security Alliance authors lays out a new layered identity architecture for agents.
Can your identity stack be patched for AI agents, or does it have to be replaced? NewCore's CTO says replacedBI-FIND-2026-0103
Revision -02 reverses the draft's rule on which agents count when a service admits a call. Revision -01 had the Serving Party check the principal and every actor in the delegation chain, which it said went beyond RFC 8693 token exchange, where earlier actors are informational only. Now the service checks the principal and the current actor, the agent making the call. Earlier actors named in nested act (actor) claims "are informational only, are recorded in actor_chain as audit history, and MUST NOT be used to decide admission," which the draft says Section 4.1 of RFC 8693 requires. The authors call the chain "attribution, not authority": the token issuer's asserted history, which is not complete and is no evidence that any hop held or narrowed authority. They concede that a Serving Party cannot refuse a call because an earlier actor was suspended; linked verification shows after the fact that the work continued. Admission on the whole actor history is an open issue, proposed for discussion at IETF 127 and not defined in the draft. Nor can the receipts show mechanically that authority narrowed at each hop: that would need a common way to represent scopes, another open issue, and the draft defines no mechanism for carrying authority across hops, pointing instead to delegation-chain mechanisms such as the OAuth identity-chaining draft.
Agent-audit draft now admits a call on the principal and the current agent, as RFC 8693 requiresBI-FIND-2026-2152
Since -01 the draft has reversed which actors in a delegation chain count when a service admits an agent's call. Section 5's seven steps, for a Serving Party "that admits calls from agents only if they are registered and assured", now check the Principal and the current actor, the outermost act claim; -01 checked every Actor in the chain. Citing Section 4.1 of RFC 8693, the draft says prior actors "are informational only and MUST NOT be used to decide admission", and our reading of the RFC's own text agrees. At admission the chain is "the token issuer's asserted history", in the authors' words, neither complete nor evidence that any hop held or narrowed authority. Earlier actors stay in the record as audit history for Linked Verification to check. Showing that authority narrowed at each hop "remains an open issue" of the companion SCITT draft. The change log says the posted -01 had been uploaded from an earlier commit that lacked this change.
An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a callBI-FIND-2026-1390
›Cited in 8 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- Can your identity stack be patched for AI agents, or does it have to be replaced? NewCore's CTO says replaced
Podcast · · TechSpective Podcast · Rebuilding Identity Security From Scratch for the Age of AI Agents · Sep 21, 2026
- Agent-audit draft now admits a call on the principal and the current agent, as RFC 8693 requires
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- Ping announces three agent-identity pieces and says the perimeter is now the authorization decision
Video · · Ping Identity TV · Uploaded March 24, 2026
- Give an agent access for the task and take it back afterwards, four voices say, and four say people approving each request cannot keep up
Field signals · · 8 voices from the field · Feb 2026 to Oct 2026
- SailPoint says its agent plan check can deny deletion in a file-creation task
Video · · SailPoint · Oct 16, 2026
- Once people hand their credentials to an AI, the question is whether the account is still human
Podcast · · Nexus: A Claroty Podcast · John Laliberte on AI and Non-Human Identity Controls · Aug 5, 2026
- Putting AIRGuard's policy in an agent's prompt barely cut attacks; enforcing it before each tool call did
Paper · · arXiv · Suliu Qin et al. · May 27, 2026