RFC
Request for Comments · RFCs
Request for Comments: the numbered document series in which the Internet Engineering Task Force publishes internet specifications, from standards such as RFC 8693 to informational notes. A draft is not an RFC.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on RFC would have you leave with.
An MCP Events subscription inherits none of the limits on the access token that created it, which is short-lived, narrow in scope and checked on every request. The draft's design sketch keys a webhook subscription on the principal, the delivery URL, the event name and its arguments; the token, its scopes and its expiry are not part of that key. The principal MUST be authenticated and authorized at subscribe time, and after that the sketch says the server 'SHOULD periodically re-verify permissions'. WorkOS's Maria Paktiti: "There is no interval, no MUST, and no conformance test behind it." The lifetime is negotiable up to no expiry: ttlMs: null requests a subscription that never expires, and a server that grants it returns refreshBefore: null, so no refresh comes. Hence her line that 'the TTL you grant is your revocation window'. In her worked example, IT revokes a departing employee's access to a customer-contracts folder on Monday morning and the 24-hour subscription's next refresh lands Tuesday morning; a server that checked only at subscribe time, which is all the draft strictly requires, delivers every contract edit in between [figure 2].
ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check scheduleBI-FIND-2026-0401
Token Status List puts the status of many tokens in a signed, compressed bit array per list, which the authors size for up to millions of tokens, and an issuer may run several lists. Each token carries an index and the list's URI. A verifier fetches the list, validates it and reads the token's 1, 2, 4 or 8 bits for VALID, INVALID, SUSPENDED or an application-specific value. Because many tokens share one list, the issuer does not learn which token a verifier is asking about, which the authors call herd privacy. With OAuth introspection, by contrast, the verifier contacts the issuer about each token. The draft warns that an issuer could defeat this with a unique list or list URI per token, which relying parties that verify many tokens can spot by comparing the number and size of lists with the tokens they see. The uri and index pair is unique to each token, so the draft also warns that a relying party may track one token's status over time and that colluding parties may link two transactions involving the same token; it recommends batches of one-time-use tokens. A revocation reaches a verifier when it next fetches the list, and the issuer can signal how long a copy may be cached through the list's exp and ttl.
OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checkedBI-FIND-2026-0632
In the draft's main flow, a transaction token is minted once, at the edge of a trust domain, and passed on unchanged. The external-facing endpoint exchanges the inbound access token at the transaction token service (TTS) for a short-lived signed JWT. Its sub claim names the transaction's principal, the user or workload it is for, and its txn claim is a unique transaction identifier. Each workload that receives it must check the signature, audience and expiry, and must pass it downstream 'as it was received', in a dedicated Txn-Token header on HTTP calls. No claim is defined as a list of the hops along the way. req_wl is 'A string value that identifies the workload that requested' the token, and although a change-log entry says the authors 'Clarified how multiple workloads are represented in the req_wl claim', the definition says no more. It does allow replacement tokens, while warning that replacing them 'potentially negates the primary purpose of having Txn-Tokens', and a replacement must keep the call chain of the workloads that requested the replaced token, by a mechanism the draft leaves 'out of scope'. We read this as a token that names who a transaction is for and leaves the record of each hop to something else.
Transaction Tokens carry who started a request through internal services and define no list of the hops in betweenBI-FIND-2026-0171
›Cited in 93 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check schedule
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 1, 2026
- OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026
- Transaction Tokens carry who started a request through internal services and define no list of the hops in between
Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Atul Tulshibagwale et al. · Jul 30, 2026
- OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent
Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026
- The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026
- EMVCo's agent card-payment draft binds no one yet and points to a spec FIDO maintains for proof of consent
Article · · EMVCo · Aug 27, 2026
- An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026
- RFC 9207's issuer check stops at the redirect, and n8n's token-exchange flaw sat just past it
Article · · WorkOS · Maria Paktiti · Jul 20, 2026
- WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026
- A COSE Receipt signs a Merkle root, not the entry, and RFC 9942 recommends checking signature and proof as one result
Article · · RFC Editor · Orie Steele et al. · Jun 30, 2026
- RFC 9943 makes a log prove who signed a statement, not that it is true or that nothing was left out
Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jun 30, 2026
- The SD-JWT standard that agent drafts build on never mentions agents and leaves key binding to each verifier
Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Daniel Fett et al. · Nov 20, 2025
- TPX replaces an app's embedded AI provider key with a capped, metered grant the user approves at their provider
Article · · tokenpony.dev · Alex Polvi · Jul 20, 2026
- Transaction tokens are nearly a standard, and there is still no agreed place in them for the agent
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #449 - Decoded - Transaction Tokens with George Fletcher · Sep 21, 2026
- A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials alone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Wahl et al. · Jun 5, 2026
- In OpenAI and Stripe's agent checkout, the cardholder completes 3-D Secure inside the agent's own window
Article · · Agentic Commerce Protocol (GitHub) · OpenAI et al. · Jan 28, 2026
- The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Scott Courtney et al. · Apr 13, 2026
- Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up
Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026
- One implementer found a transaction-token rule that let any scope through; the OAuth group fixed it in weeks
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dhruv Agnihotri · Jun 23, 2026
- RFC 9964 fixes ML-DSA private keys at a 32-byte seed in JOSE and COSE
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael Prorock et al. · May 19, 2026
- RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026
- A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026
- A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them
Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026
- ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026
- A SCIM draft lets apps publish the roles and entitlements they accept, and never says who may read the list
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Danny Zollner et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no access
Article · · RFC Editor · Matt Peterson et al. · Oct 9, 2025
- RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- OpenAI and Stripe's agent checkout stores a card for one capped purchase, and no one issues the caller's token
Article · · Agentic Commerce Protocol (GitHub) · OpenAI et al. · Sep 29, 2025
- Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025
- CMP adds KEM authentication with fresh secrets for each certificate-management operation
Article · · RFC Editor · Hendrik Brockhaus et al. · Jul 29, 2025
- IETF draft -02 gives each kind of AI use a yes or no; the draft makes honoring it optional, but local law may not
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Keller et al. · Jul 21, 2025
- Arm's PSA attestation RFC trusts two device states, and its Table 1 labels one as root-of-trust debug
Article · · RFC Editor · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jun 13, 2025
- RFC 9711 standardizes the attestation token and sets no security floor for the device that signs it
Article · · RFC Editor · Laurence Lundblade et al. · Apr 2025
- RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025
- RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD
Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025
- RFC 9679 lets a CBOR token name its holder's key by thumbprint alone, and leaves finding the key to the verifier
Article · · RFC Editor · Kohei Isobe et al. · Dec 20, 2024
- In GNAP (RFC 9635), a client is known by its key, and tokens stay key-bound unless the server flags them bearer
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 1, 2024
- RFC 9651 keeps the last duplicate dictionary or parameter value
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Mark Nottingham et al. · Sep 1, 2024
- In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection
Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Jun 17, 2024
- Privacy Pass authorizes HTTP requests while separating redemption from issuance
Article · · RFC Editor · Tommy Pauly et al. · Jun 13, 2024
- In Privacy Pass, one compromised Attester can taint an Issuer's tokens, and privacy rests on parties not colluding
Article · · RFC Editor · Alex Davidson et al. · Jun 13, 2024
- RFC 9597 exposes token claims in COSE headers without giving them extra trust
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Tobias Looker et al. · Jun 1, 2024
- A Content-Digest header can show a body arrived intact, not who sent it; RFC 9530 points to TLS or a signature for that
Article · · RFC Editor · Roberto Polli et al. · Feb 1, 2024
- A valid RFC 9421 signature does not prove who signed; key and algorithm checks are left to each profile
Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Feb 1, 2024
- TLS clients must match a service they chose independently of the certificate
Article · · RFC Editor · Peter Saint-Andre et al. · Nov 8, 2023
- RFC 9470 lets an API demand a fresher or stronger sign-in, with no shared scale for 'stronger'
Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci et al. · Sep 8, 2023
- DPoP token binding depends on checks at the resource server
Article · · RFC Editor · Daniel Fett et al. · Sep 2023
- Rich Authorization Requests need API-specific permission rules
Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · May 1, 2023
- COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application
Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023
- RATS keeps device-state appraisal separate from the decision to grant access
Article · · RFC Editor · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jan 2023
- The 2022 TLS BCP makes peer identity and session controls part of secure deployment
Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Nov 1, 2022
- RFC 9053 allows identity inputs in COSE key derivation to be omitted
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Aug 1, 2022
- RFC 9207 has OAuth servers name themselves in each response; clients must refuse a missing name only where they expect one
Article · · RFC Editor · Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen et al. · Mar 1, 2022
- HPKE’s Auth mode proves key possession; applications handle identity binding
Article · · RFC Editor · Richard L. Barnes et al. · Feb 24, 2022
- Certificate Transparency 2.0 lets clients refuse unlogged certificates and leaves logged misissued ones for monitors to find
Article · · RFC Editor · Ben Laurie et al. · Dec 1, 2021
- RFC 9068 makes resource servers check a JWT access token's type and audience, and warns a client could pose as a user
Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci, Okta · Oct 1, 2021
- Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021
- TLS 1.0 and 1.1 become forbidden, while ClientHello record compatibility stays
Article · · RFC Editor · Kathleen Moriarty et al. · Mar 23, 2021
- Signed Agent Cards and agent receipts rest on RFC 8785, an Informational RFC that shows how a parser can change the bytes
Article · · RFC Editor · Anders Rundgren et al. · Jun 1, 2020
- RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer
Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020
- OAuth's resource indicators RFC says servers should bind tokens to a resource, but requires it of neither side
Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 1, 2020
- RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned
Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020
- The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions
Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020
- The OAuth device grant names remote phishing as its risk and leaves the defence mostly to what the approval screen tells the user
Article · · RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Aug 1, 2019
- RFC 8485 makes assurance values meaningful only within a named trust framework
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 12, 2018
- TLS 1.3 requires applications to choose which early data is safe to replay
Article · · RFC Editor · Eric Rescorla, Mozilla · Aug 10, 2018
- Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018
- RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018
- RFC 8176 reports authentication methods separately from assurance classes
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2017
- RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016
- Cryptographic agility needs deployment and retirement work beyond algorithm identifiers
Article · · RFC Editor · Russ Housley, Vigil Security · Nov 18, 2015
- SCIM leaves the meaning of active status and group access to each provider
Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- A JWK thumbprint identifies a known key, and RFC 7638 warns it cannot reliably block one
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- PKCE's 2015 standard let servers accept clients that skip it and treated an omitted method as the weaker plain
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Sep 2015
- RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015
- JWE’s JSON headers can sit outside integrity protection
Article · · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- OAuth's assertion framework is built for bearer assertions, and one can buy fresh tokens until it expires
Article · · RFC Editor · B. Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7518 (2015) required one JWS signing algorithm, the shared-secret HS256, and barred accepting "none" by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7515 lets a signed JSON object name or carry its own key, and leaves trusting that key to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7523 lets a signed JWT authenticate an OAuth client or serve as a grant, and leaves replay checks optional
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7009 requires refresh-token revocation but only recommends it for access tokens, which may outlive a revoke
Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Aug 1, 2013
- RFC 6973 puts authorized identity providers inside the privacy threat model
Article · · RFC Editor · Alissa Cooper et al. · Jul 1, 2013
- RFC 6819 warned in 2013 that servers receiving a token may reuse it, and offered audience binding and client-bound tokens
Article · · RFC Editor · T. Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2013
- RFC 6750 tokens work for whoever holds them; RFC 9700 now urges key binding and bars them from query strings
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2012
- RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023
Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012
- DANE lets a domain vouch for its own TLS keys in DNS, and a bad record locks out every client that checks
Article · · RFC Editor · Paul Hoffman et al. · Aug 7, 2012
- RFC 5280 takes the trust anchor as input before checking a certificate path
Article · · David Cooper et al. · May 1, 2008
- RFC 3161 excludes requester identity from signed time stamps
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Carlisle Adams et al. · Aug 1, 2001
- A 2023 SCIM draft treated a missed deletion as an access problem and proposed a watermark to catch it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Anjali Sehgal et al. · Nov 14, 2023