Session fixation
session fixation
An attack in which the attacker plants a known session identifier in the victim's browser before login, so the attacker can reuse it once the victim authenticates. The usual fix is issuing a fresh session id at login.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on Session fixation would have you leave with.
OpenID4VP 1.0 leaves the checking to the verifier. A verifier can ask for particular claims, values and trusted issuers, and the wallet must not return a credential that lacks a requested claim. Even so, section 14.9 says the verifier "MUST NOT rely on the Wallet to enforce these constraints" and has to run its own checks on what comes back. Asking only for a credential that holds a given value is, in the spec's words, "a best-effort way to improve user privacy", and verifiers must not rely on it for security checks. For drafts that put an AI agent's wallet in the holder's seat, we read this as a plain rule: whatever the wallet filtered is a courtesy, and every limit the verifier cares about gets checked again on arrival.
OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone elseBI-FIND-2025-0147
Cited in 1 briefing
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone else
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Oliver Terbu et al. · Jul 9, 2025