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Explainers · Glossary

OpenID for Verifiable Presentations

OpenID4VP · OID4VP · OIDC4VP

The OpenID Foundation protocol for presenting a digital credential from a wallet to a verifier, with a transaction_data field that lets the holder sign extra information, such as a payment mandate, along with the presentation.

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In our briefings

What our briefings say about OpenID for Verifiable Presentations itself, with the most direct claims first.

  1. Fabian Hauck, Pedram Hosseyni, Ralf Küsters and Tim Würtele of the University of Stuttgart proved three security properties of OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OpenID4VP) run through the W3C Digital Credentials API, and report that "no new vulnerabilities were identified during the verification process." The text they analysed is the OpenID4VP editor's draft of 27 March 2025 (commit b0d6812), which they say matches draft 25 in the parts they modelled, paired with the Digital Credentials editor's draft of 20 February 2025. The report does not mention OpenID4VP 1.0 Final. The properties are verifier authentication, stated for signed requests; wallet authorization, meaning that when an honest verifier accepts a presentation and the wallet holding the credential's key is honest, that wallet made it; and claims unforgeability. Formally, the last one says that when an honest verifier logs a user in, and that user's wallets and the credential's issuer are honest, the verifier accepted a presentation one of those wallets made; if every party near that wallet is also honest, the attacker cannot learn the new session cookie. The model's verifier never looks that session up again, so nothing is proved about how it is used later. The properties hold for that draft, inside a formal model of the web and under its assumptions.

    Formal proofs find no new flaws in OpenID4VP over the Digital Credentials API, for a March 2025 draftBI-FIND-2025-0329

  2. OpenID4VP 1.0 leaves the checking to the verifier. A verifier can ask for particular claims, values and trusted issuers, and the wallet must not return a credential that lacks a requested claim. Even so, section 14.9 says the verifier "MUST NOT rely on the Wallet to enforce these constraints" and has to run its own checks on what comes back. Asking only for a credential that holds a given value is, in the spec's words, "a best-effort way to improve user privacy", and verifiers must not rely on it for security checks. For drafts that put an AI agent's wallet in the holder's seat, we read this as a plain rule: whatever the wallet filtered is a courtesy, and every limit the verifier cares about gets checked again on arrival.

    OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone elseBI-FIND-2025-0147

  3. The draft describes one way to carry a delegation, through OpenID for Verifiable Presentations. A request's transaction_data may use the data type 'delegate', with the format and the delegate payload disclosure required and the delegate's own disclosures optional; the key-binding JWT then carries the delegate payload's digest. Section 7 says other presentation mechanisms that put transaction data in the key-binding JWT can be used, but it describes none of them and gives no example request. Our briefing on AP2 found its verifier told to process the SD-JWT chain according to this draft. For an agent presenting a mandate to a merchant, then, the draft specifies the chain format and leaves open how it travels outside a wallet protocol.

    OAuth adopts Delegate SD-JWT, which traces each hand-off to the issuer but never checks that authority narrowedBI-FIND-2026-0448

›Cited in 15 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  2. Google's AP2 v0.2 ties an agent's purchase to the merchant's own signed checkout by hash

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  3. The W3C's Digital Credentials draft says no single party can solve over-asking for government IDs

    Article · · W3C · Marcos Caceres et al. · Nov 5, 2026

  4. A draft joining four agent records on one hash reports no valid joint run and now claims less about what agents did

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih et al. · Aug 16, 2026

  5. OAuth adopts Delegate SD-JWT, which traces each hand-off to the issuer but never checks that authority narrowed

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Gareth Oliver et al. · Apr 22, 2026

  6. World's maker proposes a site-scoped handle for each verified human, and bars using it alone to log anyone in

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aurélien Brézun, Tools for Humanity · Aug 6, 2026

  7. Google's AP2 authorization companion lets a verifier trust a credential issuer or the agent's provider, and names no trust list or revocation

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  8. Glide pitches the SIM card's key as the replacement for SMS codes, resting its AAL3 claim on hardware alone

    Podcast · · The Future of Identity · Eran Haggiag – Rebuilding Digital Identity Around SIM Cards for the AI Era · Jun 23, 2026

  9. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  10. OAuth's cross-device guidance ranks FIDO first, then CIBA backchannel login, and the device-code flow last

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jan 23, 2026

  11. The OpenID Foundation set 26 February 2026 for verifiable credential self-certification, with issuance tests still SD-JWT only

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Dec 18, 2025

  12. Credential wallet draft makes holder binding a MUST; its own SD-JWT profile names no way to provide it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Leif Johansson et al. · Nov 4, 2025

  13. Formal proofs find no new flaws in OpenID4VP over the Digital Credentials API, for a March 2025 draft

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Fabian Hauck et al. · Aug 20, 2025

  14. OpenID4VCI's third interop test: 87% of tested pairs passed, on counts the post does not reconcile

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Gail Hodges · Jul 24, 2025

  15. OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone else

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Oliver Terbu et al. · Jul 9, 2025

Related terms

What appears alongside OpenID for Verifiable Presentations in the same briefings.

Digital Credentials APIOpenID for Verifiable Credential IssuanceSD-JWTMandate (AP2)High Assurance Interoperability ProfileMATTRmDL / mobile IDsDelegate SD-JWT