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Explainers · Glossary

W3C

The web's standards body; in identity, home of WebAuthn, Decentralized Identifiers, and Verifiable Credentials.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on W3C would have you leave with.

  1. The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized. Version 1.1 gives, as an example, DIDs based on identifiers registered in "federated or centralized identity management systems", lists "databases of any kind" among its examples of a registry a DID can be recorded on, and does not require or suggest any specific type of registry. A method specification only SHOULD be registered in the DID Extensions list, and the spec notes that no central authority mandates which specification goes with a given method name. Mapping human-friendly names, a domain name among them, to DIDs is out of scope. We read this as making decentralization, like revocation and recovery, a property of each DID method.

    The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each methodBI-FIND-2026-0649

  2. Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.

    Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477

  3. Vajragowni's paper puts fixed numbers on governing non-human identities (NHIs). His lifecycle algorithm treats a credential older than 90 days as stale, rotating API keys and service-account passwords and renewing certificates. It calls an identity unused for more than 180 days dormant and quarantines any NHI with no owner at once, with a ticket to assign an owner or decommission it within 14 days. Identities both orphaned and unused for more than 365 days are decommissioned. His KPI table recommends targets such as under 2% of NHIs with no assigned owner or application, over 98% of credentials rotated within the policy window, and under 4 hours on average from a decommission trigger to revocation. The paper reports no deployment or test of these values and gives no reason for choosing them. Its own dormancy KPI counts identities with no activity in 90 days, where the algorithm waits 180.

    A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind themBI-FIND-2026-0030

›Cited in 35 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. The DID standard does not require a DID to be decentralized, and leaves revocation and recovery to each method

    Article · · W3C · W3C Decentralized Identifier Working Group · Mar 5, 2026

  2. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  3. A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind them

    Article · · International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research (Vol 8, Issue 3) · Thrinaath Vajragowni · May 23, 2026

  4. EMVCo's agent card-payment draft binds no one yet and points to a spec FIDO maintains for proof of consent

    Article · · EMVCo · Aug 27, 2026

  5. Digital Credentials API: W3C group defers much of issuance to level two, Heather Flanagan reports

    Podcast · · A Digital Identity Digest · The DC API and the Problem of Shared Responsibility · Nov 10, 2026

  6. W3C's JOSE and COSE rules for credentials admit there is no standard way yet to fetch a JWK from a DID URL

    Article · · W3C · Michael Jones et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  7. A W3C group's draft counts login with another issuer's credential as an issuer-controlled path to account access

    Article · · W3C Security Interest Group · Simone Onofri et al. · Sep 8, 2026

  8. In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026

  9. A digital ID is worth little until businesses can accept it, five voices say, and four point to bank onboarding

    Field signals · · 14 voices from the field · Jun 2024 to Oct 2026

  10. Human Delegation Provenance is now an audit record only, and one that cannot prove it is complete

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Oct 6, 2026

  11. OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026

  12. GLEIF's credentials vouch for a company and its officers; an AI agent's would carry only the company's assurance

    Podcast · · The Future of Identity · Alexandre Kech – Strengthening Organizational Trust with Verifiable Legal Entity Identifiers · Aug 5, 2026

  13. NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph

    Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  14. DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names

    Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation (KYA-OS) · Dylan Hobbs et al. · Jul 29, 2026

  15. In Accenture's agent-delegation design, no outside party checks the user, and revocation is left open

    Paper · · arXiv · Srikumar K. Subramanian et al. · Sep 25, 2026

  16. AAuth Events gives an agent an inbox, and the subscription tells the resource which agent is listening

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  17. An AI agent's refused action can be approved only by someone its mandate names, says a revised draft

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Lars Kersten Kroehl, CryptoKRI GmbH · May 21, 2026

  18. A preprint cuts off every sub-agent within about 40 seconds of its parent stopping, with no revocation server

    Paper · · arXiv · Saurabh Deochake, SentinelOne · May 20, 2026

  19. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  20. A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026

  21. A proposed consent log for A2A and MCP records the terms an agent accepted, but the agent fills it in itself

    Paper · · arXiv · Ravi Kiran Kadaboina · Apr 16, 2026

  22. An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  23. A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026

  24. SD-CWT requires a key-signed proof for each verifier, yet none of its three prototypes reports interop testing

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael Prorock et al. · Jan 13, 2026

  25. FIDO moves past passkeys to certify identity wallets, so issuers can check a wallet before provisioning to it

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · Dec 4, 2025

  26. Credential wallet draft makes holder binding a MUST; its own SD-JWT profile names no way to provide it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Leif Johansson et al. · Nov 4, 2025

  27. FIDO pairs passkeys with digital ID credentials but spells out steps only for moderate assurance

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · Christine Owen et al. · Sep 22, 2025

  28. Agentic JWT binds an agent's token to its task and its own code, but it is one author's draft, not a standard

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2509.13597) · Abhishek Goswami · Sep 16, 2025

  29. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  30. The Aegis agent-security paper's 2.79-second proof time is a benchmark-based target its simulation reports back

    Paper · · arXiv · Sai Teja Reddy Adapala et al. · Aug 22, 2025

  31. Formal proofs find no new flaws in OpenID4VP over the Digital Credentials API, for a March 2025 draft

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Fabian Hauck et al. · Aug 20, 2025

  32. A Cloud Security Alliance paper wants AI agents on a new identity stack, with OAuth kept for simple cases

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.19301) / Cloud Security Alliance · Ken Huang et al. · May 25, 2025

  33. W3C Data Integrity proofs name their purpose, so a verifier can refuse a credential signature offered as a login

    Article · · W3C · Manu Sporny et al. · May 15, 2025

  34. The W3C credential standard leaves out what agents need most: which issuers to trust, and who may present

    Article · · W3C · Manu Sporny et al. · May 15, 2025

  35. An MIT-led paper has the user sign the agent's delegation token and lets OpenID Connect vouch for both parties

    Paper · · arXiv · Tobin South et al. · Jan 16, 2025

Related terms

What appears alongside W3C in the same briefings.

EMVCoISOEMV Digital Payment CredentialFIDO Alliance