EMVCo
The body owned by the big card networks (Visa, Mastercard, American Express and others) that writes the chip-card and 3-D Secure specifications.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on EMVCo would have you leave with.
Visa's Eddie Onaga says that in the Visa Intelligent Commerce program an agent has to onboard through a registration process before it can interact within Visa's systems. He compares it to how Visa onboarded token requesters and mobile payment providers: there are rules to follow and data to provide. Visa can then identify those agents and audit their performance, fraud rates among other things, to hold them accountable. For merchants, whose bot screening and CDNs may block agents, he points to the Trusted Agent Protocol that Visa announced last fall with Cloudflare, through which "agents can provide their information directly to the merchants through existing rails". He describes both and shows neither.
Visa says AI agents must register to use its agent-payment program; Stripe says its tokens can cap their spendBI-FIND-2026-2395
Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.
Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477
Section 6 of EMVCo's framework presents Verifiable Intent v0.1 as one realisation of its three layers and sends reviewers to "the authoritative repository maintained by FIDO" for the current text, which it says continues to evolve. Verifiable Intent is a chain of SD-JWT verifiable credentials. A payment credential provider signs the first, and the named candidate is EMVCo's own Card Digital Payment Credential (DPC). The consumer signs the second through a wallet. In autonomous mode that layer carries the agent's key, and the agent signs a third layer of two credentials, a closed Payment Mandate and a closed checkout mandate, each bound by hash to Layer 2 and both tied to the hash of a merchant-signed checkout; in immediate mode the chain stops at the consumer's layer. Selective disclosure keeps the two apart: the merchant receives the checkout mandate, the payment system the Payment Mandate, and neither can reconstruct disclosures it was not given. A verifier in permissive mode may skip a constraint type it does not recognise, though the framework says security-critical verifiers should treat one as a failure. Section 1.2.2 declares credential-format primitives such as SD-JWT structures out of scope, and section 6.7 then specifies SD-JWT VC as Verifiable Intent's format. We read the consumer and agent layers as the open and closed mandates of Google's AP2, which the framework's text does not name.
EMVCo's agent card-payment draft binds no one yet and points to a spec FIDO maintains for proof of consentBI-FIND-2026-0440
›Cited in 7 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- Visa says AI agents must register to use its agent-payment program; Stripe says its tokens can cap their spend
Podcast · · Voice of MPE · Agentic commerce and payments - Is this the next commerce frontier? · Apr 7, 2026
- Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it
Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026
- EMVCo's agent card-payment draft binds no one yet and points to a spec FIDO maintains for proof of consent
Article · · EMVCo · Aug 27, 2026
- OpenID experts tell EMVCo an agent's payment can look like the cardholder's, and no one vouches for the agent
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam et al. · Oct 8, 2026
- Visa, Mastercard and Ant have begun talks on 'Know Your Agent', not agreed a standard
Article · · Forkast · Sep 10, 2026
- x402 v2 can take payment before delivering, with no identity beyond a wallet address and no way to dispute it
Article · · x402 Foundation (GitHub) · x402 Foundation · Aug 31, 2026
- FIDO moves past passkeys to certify identity wallets, so issuers can check a wallet before provisioning to it
Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · Dec 4, 2025
Related terms
What appears alongside EMVCo in the same briefings.
ISOEMV Digital Payment CredentialW3C