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Explainers · Glossary

ABAC

PBAC · attribute-based access control · policy-based access control

Access decisions made from attributes of the requester, the resource, and the moment (department, data sensitivity, risk score) rather than from a fixed role. PBAC is the same idea written as policy rules.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on ABAC would have you leave with.

  1. Vajragowni's paper puts fixed numbers on governing non-human identities (NHIs). His lifecycle algorithm treats a credential older than 90 days as stale, rotating API keys and service-account passwords and renewing certificates. It calls an identity unused for more than 180 days dormant and quarantines any NHI with no owner at once, with a ticket to assign an owner or decommission it within 14 days. Identities both orphaned and unused for more than 365 days are decommissioned. His KPI table recommends targets such as under 2% of NHIs with no assigned owner or application, over 98% of credentials rotated within the policy window, and under 4 hours on average from a decommission trigger to revocation. The paper reports no deployment or test of these values and gives no reason for choosing them. Its own dormancy KPI counts identities with no activity in 90 days, where the algorithm waits 180.

    A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind themBI-FIND-2026-0030

  2. AAuth's premise is that an OAuth client or an API key has no identity of its own and that SPIFFE and WIMSE stop at one trust domain, so it gives each agent one: an identifier of the form aauth:local@domain issued by an Agent Provider and bound to the agent's own signing key by a short-lived agent token (the draft recommends Ed25519, which every party must support), so that 'every agent has its own cryptographic identity' and 'the first API call to a resource is the registration'. No credential in the protocol is a bearer credential; every request is signed, and a resource can challenge for more at any time. In its lightest mode the draft pitches this as a drop-in for API keys: 'this replaces API keys with cryptographic identity.' What an agent token attests about the software behind the key is left to companion specifications.

    AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purposeBI-FIND-2026-0365

  3. Anthropic requires a cryptographic identifier for each agent instance at its Foundation tier. "Every agent instance needs a unique, cryptographically rooted identifier that persists across its actions", and "Unique identifiers alone are a labeling exercise". Service tokens should be measured in minutes, and static API keys and shared service-account passwords "are no longer a legitimate entry point, not even at Foundation". Higher tiers add X.509 certificates with rotation and revocation, mutual TLS, then hardware-backed identity with remote attestation, and access control climbs from deny-by-default roles to per-action authorization with immediate revocation. The standards named are OAuth 2.0, X.509, mTLS, FIDO2 and OpenTelemetry; SPIFFE, WIMSE and token exchange do not appear.

    Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecifiedBI-FIND-2026-0596

›Cited in 14 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind them

    Article · · International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research (Vol 8, Issue 3) · Thrinaath Vajragowni · May 23, 2026

  2. AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026

  3. Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified

    Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026

  4. Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions

    Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026

  5. Saviynt's strategy head calls agent discovery a commodity and pitches Zuma for runtime control

    Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · Ep # 14 - Turning an AI Breach into a Case Study · Sep 15, 2026

  6. Registering an MCP server on Bifrost ran its command, and the admin API that allowed it shipped with no password

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026

  7. OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025

  8. Huawei researchers add agent delegation to an existing permission model and prove each action traces to a human

    Paper · · arXiv · Amjad Ibrahim et al. · Jun 2, 2026

  9. Refuse the risky action when its plan relies on untrusted input, a Beihang survey of agent attacks proposes

    Paper · · arXiv · Guanquan Shi et al. · Dec 7, 2025

  10. Ericsson researchers would check every query a telecom network agent sends to its knowledge base

    Paper · · arXiv · Loay Abdelrazek et al. · Oct 22, 2025

  11. SPICE includes software agents as credential issuers, holders and verifiers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brent Zundel et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  12. In a test harness, two of three MCP hosts refused a prompt asking for credentials; none refused a poisoned tool

    Paper · · arXiv · Yixuan Yang et al. · Aug 17, 2025

  13. The first Agent Name Service paper puts capabilities in the name and leaves protocol translation and governance out

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.10609) / OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Ken Huang et al. · May 15, 2025

  14. ATFAA names identity inheritance as an agent threat and answers it with existing cloud policy tools

    Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025