Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

FIDO2 / passkeys

passkeys · passkey · WebAuthn · FIDO2

By Boston Identity · Explained · 7 min read

The short answer

A passkey is a sign-in key pair made for one website. Your phone, laptop or security key keeps the private key and signs a challenge from the site, which keeps only the public key to check it.

What it is
A standard
Defined by
W3C, WebAuthn Level 3 (Recommendation, August 2026)
Who it's for
Teams running staff and customer sign-in
In our briefings
66By month of the source: 2025-12: 1, 2026-01: 5, 2026-02: 2, 2026-03: 1, 2026-04: 12, 2026-05: 7, 2026-06: 3, 2026-07: 2, 2026-08: 0, 2026-09: 9, 2026-10: 7, 2026-11: 11by month, last 12
01

What is FIDO2 / passkeys?

A passkey is a sign-in credential built on a key pair: a private key and a matching public key. An authenticator creates the pair for one website, at the site's request and with the user's consent.§1 The authenticator can be built into a phone or laptop, or it can be a separate device such as a USB security key reached over USB, Bluetooth or NFC (near-field communication).§1 The site stores the public key. At each later sign-in, the user proves to the site that they still control the private key.§4

The rules come from the W3C's Web Authentication standard, WebAuthn, which reached Recommendation status at Level 3 in August 2026.S1 It defines the browser interface and what it calls the WebAuthn/FIDO2 protocol between the site's server and the authenticator.§1.1 In its terminology, passkey is another name for a discoverable credential: one the authenticator can find and use even when the site has not first said who the user is.§4 The spec's consumer example calls passkey sign-in phishing-resistant.§1.2.1 Each passkey is scoped to one site, and the authenticator signs the full origin of the requesting page into every response, so a response cannot be replayed against a different origin.§5

Passkeys come in two kinds. A multi-device credential, commonly called a synced passkey, may be backed up to other authenticators, for example by cloud sync.§1.2.1,§4 A single-device credential, commonly called a device-bound passkey, is not eligible for backup.§1.2.2,§4 The authenticator that creates the passkey makes that choice at creation, and it is permanent for that passkey.§4

Passkey, WebAuthn and FIDO2 name parts of one system. In the W3C text, a passkey is a kind of credential, WebAuthn is the browser interface for making and using one, and WebAuthn/FIDO2 is the protocol that carries the request and the signed reply.§1.1,§4

02

How does FIDO2 / passkeys work?

The user, the relying party (the website and its server), the browser and the authenticator all take part.§4 Registration creates the passkey, and authentication uses it at later sign-ins.§1

Figure steps
  1. The site asks for a new passkey
  2. The authenticator makes a key pair
  3. The server stores the public key
  4. The site asks for a sign-in
  5. The user approves and the authenticator signs
  6. The server checks the signature
Fig. 1

A passkey is registered once, then used to sign in at later visits, across four parties.

Drawn from W3C WebAuthn Level 3, sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3

Swipe for the full figure →

  1. The site asks for a new passkey

    A script on the site calls the browser's navigator.credentials.create() with a challenge the server produced, the site's name and the user's account details.§1.3.1 The browser sets the relying party ID, the domain the passkey will belong to, to the page's own domain unless the site names a parent domain.§4 Browsers offer this interface only on secure connections, such as pages loaded over TLS.§5

  2. The authenticator makes a key pair

    The browser finds an authenticator and connects to it, and the authenticator asks the user for an authorization gesture.§1.3.1 That gesture may involve user verification, such as a PIN or a fingerprint, or it may be only a simple test that the user is present, such as a touch.§4 It then generates a key pair scoped to that site. The private key is bound to that authenticator and is expected never to be exposed to any other party, not even to the authenticator's owner.§4

  3. The server stores the public key

    The script sends the new public key to the server, along with attestation, which is evidence about the make and properties of the authenticator.§1.3.1 The server stores the public key and links it to the user's account.§1.3.1 The spec says the site must keep a credential record, and recommends that it hold the credential ID, the public key, a signature counter and the backup flags.§4

  4. The site asks for a sign-in

    At a later visit, the script calls navigator.credentials.get() with a new challenge from the server.§1.3.3 For a passkey, the site may send an empty list of credential IDs, so it does not need to know who the user is before the prompt appears.§4

  5. The user approves and the authenticator signs

    The authenticator shows the user the accounts it holds for that site and asks for an authorization gesture.§1.3.3 As at registration, the gesture may be user verification or only a test of user presence.§4 When the user picks one, the authenticator signs the site's challenge and other collected data into an authentication assertion, a signed proof of the sign-in.§5.1.4 The full origin of the requesting page is included in what it signs.§5 The site's script never gets the credential itself.§5

  6. The server checks the signature

    The script sends the assertion to the server. The server finds the stored public key by its credential ID and verifies the signature; if it is valid, the account linked to that credential is signed in.§1.3.3 If the server does not recognize the credential ID, the sign-in fails.§1.3.3

03

Why does FIDO2 / passkeys matter now?

In May, Okta and Microsoft both changed their defaults toward passkeys, in generally available releases.1 Okta's WebAuthn authenticator now defaults to passkeys for new orgs, and Microsoft extended system-preferred authentication to the first factor in Microsoft-managed tenants.1

We read FIDO's figures for staff sign-in as slower going.2 In the FIDO Alliance's own State of Passkeys 2026 survey of 1,400 decision-makers, 68% of organizations have deployed or are deploying passkeys for employee sign-in.2 Yet 57% still rely on phishable methods for employees' primary day-to-day sign-in.2 These are survey answers, not sign-in logs.2

Cisco Talos describes the UAT-11985 kit, which relays each Google sign-in step as the victim takes it, covering text codes, authenticator apps and phone prompts.3 The kit can detect a passkey and draw a passkey prompt, and Talos's post describes no relay step after that prompt.3 FIDO and the enterprise agent drafts disagree about agent identity, but both put a passkey at the human end.4 An IETF agent-authentication draft says a user who delegates to an agent should sign in with a phishing-resistant method such as a passkey.5 FIDO's Megan Shamas says the job is to prove the human with a phishing-resistant credential and never let the agent hold a raw credential.4

04

Where does it fit?

Compared withHow FIDO2 / passkeys differs
TOTPThe UAT-11985 phishing kit passes authenticator-app codes through to the real Google sign-in as the victim enters them.3 A passkey's signature covers the requesting origin, so it cannot be replayed against a different origin.§5
CIBAAn OAuth cross-device security draft ranks FIDO's cross-device sign-in first and names CIBA as the fallback when FIDO is not available.6 The draft says FIDO's flow proves the two devices are close with Bluetooth Low Energy, while CIBA is still open to attackers who know or can guess a user's identifier.6
Verifiable digital credential (VDC)A FIDO Alliance white paper gives the two separate jobs: enrol a person with a verifiable digital credential, then accept passkeys for sign-in.7 Its reason is personal data: a passkey discloses none at sign-in, while a credential can pass along more than is needed.7
SPIFFECecchetti's answer for AI agents is SPIFFE, where the platform that started the agent vouches for it and hands it short-lived credentials.8 A passkey needs a person's biometric, PIN or touch, which software cannot supply.8
05

What goes wrong?

  • The spec leaves a lost passkey to the site: the user reports it, and the server deletes the credential.§1.3.5 FIDO's Shikiar says knowledge-based recovery is "a backdoor that's open to attackers" while it stays available.9 Yubico's Sarginson gives the example of a lost security key with a text-message fallback, and calls recovery "a massive attack vector".10 MIXI says recovering accounts where passkeys are unavailable is still a challenge.11
  • User verification tells the site that the same user performed each ceremony; it does not tell the site who that person is.§4 If several people know a device's PIN or enrol fingerprints on it, they look like one user.§4
  • When a passkey reports user verification for the first time, the site must not rely on it as an authentication factor.§4 Turning it on should require another factor of equal strength.§4
  • With attestation set to none, the browser usually replaces the attestation statement with an empty one before the site sees it.§5.1.3 Yubico's Sarginson grants that synced passkeys resist phishing but says they lack attestation of where they come from; Yubico sells hardware keys.12
  • An AI agent cannot sign in with a passkey. Cecchetti notes that FIDO requires a biometric, a PIN or a touch to show a person is present, which software cannot supply.8
06

What should a security leader ask?

  1. 01

    Which of our sign-in and recovery paths still fall back to a text-message code or security questions when a passkey is lost?

  2. 02

    For staff accounts, do we accept synced passkeys or only device-bound ones, and do our servers record and check the backup flags?

  3. 03

    How many of our employees still use a phishable method for their main daily sign-in?

  4. 04

    When an AI agent acts for one of our users, where does that person prove who they are, and is it with a passkey?

  5. 05

    Do we request attestation when a passkey is registered, and what do we do with it?

07

Sources

›Evidence: 12 claims from 11 briefings
  1. 1BI-FIND-2026-1185 · Three vendors put MCP controls in three different places in May, and only Auth0's was GAOkta and Microsoft both changed defaults toward passkeys in May, both in GA releases. Okta's WebAuthn authenticator now defaults to passkeys for new orgs and to preferred user verification for all orgs, and it was renamed Passkey (FIDO2 WebAuthn) with its own Sign in with a passkey button. Microsoft extended system-preferred authentication to the first factor in Microsoft-managed tenants, so users with passkeys might sign in without a password, with the rollout due to finish by the end of June. Its registration campaigns can now also nudge users to register passkeys.
  2. 2BI-FIND-2026-1268 · FIDO estimates 5 billion passkeys, but 57% of organizations it surveyed still rely on phishable staff sign-inThe FIDO Alliance's World Passkey Day release leads with an estimate of 5 billion passkeys in use, which it says it calculated from public data and its own internal deployment data; the release does not show how. We read the workforce numbers in its own State of Passkeys 2026 survey as slower going. Among 1,400 decision-makers at organizations of 500 or more employees, 68% of organizations have deployed or are actively deploying passkeys for employee sign-in, yet 57% of organizations "continue to rely on phishable authentication methods for employees’ primary day-to-day sign-in". Among those not yet fully passwordless, 16% say passwords plus MFA are currently sufficient and 24% are waiting for technologies and standards to mature. Every one of these is an answer to a survey FIDO commissioned, and none comes from sign-in logs.
  3. 3BI-FIND-2026-0874 · A phishing kit aimed at Taiwan researchers relays each Google sign-in step and gives the attacker the sessionThe UAT-11985 kit sits between the victim and the real Google sign-in and passes each step through as it happens: the email address, then the password, then whichever second factor Google asks for. The attacker's server tells the victim's browser which challenge screen to show over a standing WebSocket connection. Its menu covers text and email codes, authenticator apps, phone prompts, backup codes and recovery email, and Talos's own sequence diagram ends with the operator holding the victim's live Google session cookie. The kit also checks whether the account uses a passkey and can draw a passkey prompt, and the post describes no relay step after that prompt.
  4. 4BI-FIND-2026-0247 · FIDO says there is no such thing as agent identity, and asks the industry to wait for its specFIDO's public position is that an agent has no identity of its own worth standardizing. Megan Shamas says she does not care who the agent is, only who the person behind it is: prove the human with a phishing-resistant credential, prove the agent acts for that human, and never let the agent hold a raw credential. That is a different starting point from the enterprise work in this corpus, where the IETF agent-authentication draft requires every agent to carry its own identifier and practitioners say an agent must never borrow its user's. The two camps agree on one thing, the passkey at the human end.
  5. 5BI-FIND-2026-0181 · Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reachThe draft takes its authorization model from OAuth's existing grants. A user delegates through the authorization code grant and SHOULD sign in with a phishing-resistant method such as a passkey; an agent acting for itself can use client credentials or a JWT authorization grant. Where an LLM, Tool or Agent is built from several microservices, the Agent, LLM or Tools can exchange the access token they received for a transaction token, which is bound to one transaction and passed along the internal call chain. For human approval the draft points to CIBA and says "the agent MUST NOT treat local UI confirmation alone as sufficient authorization", then notes that CIBA only accounts for client initiation and maps poorly to confirmation needed mid-execution. A Tool forwarding the access token it got from the Agent is called an anti-pattern in a note, with no MUST NOT. Our briefing on the MCP authorization specification found that spec states its rule against passing tokens on as a MUST NOT.
  6. 6BI-FIND-2026-1079 · OAuth's cross-device guidance ranks FIDO first, then CIBA backchannel login, and the device-code flow lastThe draft's protocol-selection summary ranks three options. FIDO cross-device authentication, the CTAP 2.2 "hybrid transports" flow that lets a phone act as the authenticator for signing in on another device, "provides the best protection against attacks on the unauthenticated channel". It proves the two devices are close with Bluetooth Low Energy advertisements, while an authorization server, the draft notes, "cannot independently measure or enforce proximity on its own." FIDO2/WebAuthn SHOULD be used whenever the devices are capable and the device being signed in to has no suitable FIDO credential of its own. If FIDO is not available, CIBA is the alternative, though it is still open to attackers who know or can guess a user's identifier. The OAuth device authorization grant (RFC 8628) comes last: it is RECOMMENDED only with additional mitigations, and the draft's guidance is to use it only when other protocols are not viable and to avoid it where the protected resources are "sensitive, high value, or business critical."
  7. 7BI-FIND-2025-0296 · FIDO pairs passkeys with digital ID credentials but spells out steps only for moderate assuranceThe FIDO Alliance paper gives passkeys and verifiable digital credentials (VDCs) separate jobs. In most cases, it says, relying parties should enrol a person with a VDC, accept passkeys after that, ask for more VDC attributes on a high-risk transaction, and use a VDC to recover a passkey and a passkey to open the VDC. Its case for using VDCs for attributes and passkeys for login rests on personal data: a passkey discloses none at sign-in, while a VDC can pass along more than is needed when a relying party asks and the holder agrees, and a fake identity-verification portal could capture it. Signatures, the editors write, "do not address contextual misuse, highlighting a gap in current standards."
  8. 8BI-FIND-2026-0254 · Two ways to give an AI agent an OAuth identity clashed in April; by June the drafts had partly reconciled themPasskeys cannot authenticate an agent, by design, so agent authentication falls to workload attestation. FIDO requires a biometric, a PIN or a touch to show a person is present, which is exactly what software cannot supply; Cecchetti's answer is SPIFFE, where you trust the platform that started the agent to vouch for it and hand it short-lived credentials. In April she said the agent protocols had not adopted it: the Model Context Protocol used ordinary OAuth client IDs and OpenClaw a shared secret on the local machine. FIDO's own marketing chief made the same division two months later from the other side, saying its job is the human behind the agent.
  9. 9BI-FIND-2025-0206 · FIDO puts passkeys in use at over three billion on its own estimate, and weighs a certification for digital walletsShikiar and host Jim McDonald both put the weak point at account recovery. Shikiar lists removing knowledge-based credentials from account recovery as a FIDO imperative for 2026, next to passkey UX and workforce use: "as long as they're readily accessible for recovery, there is a backdoor that's open to attackers." McDonald suggests identity verification as the way to unlock a lost passkey. Shikiar ties that to FIDO's identity verification certification, which he says supports possession-based onboarding and recovery. Both speak from opinion and give no data.
  10. 10BI-FIND-2025-0286 · A Yubico product manager grants that synced passkeys resist phishing and sells hardware keys on attestationSarginson says day-to-day use is "probably the least part of the problem these days" in a security-key rollout. The risk he names is recovery: in his example a user drops the key down a drain and the fallback is SMS, and he calls recovery mechanisms "a massive attack vector these days." His rollout advice is phased, with internal evangelists helping first and executives and admins protected before the rest of the staff. He cites no incident or figure for the recovery risk.
  11. 11BI-FIND-2026-1200 · Over a quarter of MIXI ID users registered a passkey; MIXI says recovering accounts without one is still hardMIXI added FIDO2 passkeys to its MIXI ID accounts in 2024, after email one-time codes proved weak against real-time phishing, and according to the FIDO Alliance's case study more than 25% of MIXI ID users have registered one. Help-desk queries about late, resent or mistyped codes have fallen, though the study gives no user count, measurement date or size for either result. MIXI held the rollout until Passkey Autofill had matured across the major operating systems, to avoid the "Passkey not found" errors seen in other early deployments. MIXI's Ryo Ito says account recovery "from environments where passkeys are unavailable" is still a challenge.
  12. 12BI-FIND-2025-0285 · A Yubico product manager grants that synced passkeys resist phishing and sells hardware keys on attestationNic Sarginson, Yubico's principal product manager for the YubiKey, grants that platform and synced passkeys resist phishing. What he says they lack is "the attestation of where it's coming from": depending on how it was created, he says, a passkey in an Android or iCloud vault could be shared with anyone in the room who has AirDrop, while a YubiKey credential is created and used on the key and needs both the key and its PIN. For the highest assurance level, he says, guidance from NIST and other bodies always recommends an external hardware device, a smart card or a FIDO token. He describes US federal rules as accepting only smart cards and hardware FIDO keys as phishing-resistant, while a UK government advisory body, he says, recommends a FIDO and passkey strategy.

›In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on FIDO2 / passkeys would have you leave with.

  1. Visa's Eddie Onaga says that in the Visa Intelligent Commerce program an agent has to onboard through a registration process before it can interact within Visa's systems. He compares it to how Visa onboarded token requesters and mobile payment providers: there are rules to follow and data to provide. Visa can then identify those agents and audit their performance, fraud rates among other things, to hold them accountable. For merchants, whose bot screening and CDNs may block agents, he points to the Trusted Agent Protocol that Visa announced last fall with Cloudflare, through which "agents can provide their information directly to the merchants through existing rails". He describes both and shows neither.

    Visa says AI agents must register to use its agent-payment program; Stripe says its tokens can cap their spendBI-FIND-2026-2395

  2. Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.

    Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477

  3. Auth0 Agent Gateway, badged 'Beta Now' on its slide, is one hub between an organisation's agents and the MCP servers they call. Auth0 says it can handle access policies, credential injection, audit logging and organisation boundaries, and the slide adds a kill switch. The console in the demo already lists Asana, Atlassian, BambooHR, GitHub, Notion, Salesforce, Sentry, Slack and Workday as servers, counts '31 of 200 tools max', and labels MCP Servers beta and a separate Agents section preview. One HR agent, with the same code and one deployment, reaches Workday and Slack for one customer tenant and BambooHR and Slack for another, because the gateway handles the token exchanges and routes the agent to the right tool for each customer. Our briefing on WorkOS's account of Sierra's internal gateway found that access control and audit held up that rollout, and we read Agent Gateway as a product for that layer. The keynote does not mention Ping Identity, but our briefing on Ping's March 2026 launch video covers a Ping product also called Agent Gateway.

    Auth0 ships an agent gateway in beta and moves the identity form into the chat so the agent never sees the cardBI-FIND-2026-0214

›Cited in 66 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Visa says AI agents must register to use its agent-payment program; Stripe says its tokens can cap their spend

    Podcast · · Voice of MPE · Agentic commerce and payments - Is this the next commerce frontier? · Apr 7, 2026

  2. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  3. Auth0 ships an agent gateway in beta and moves the identity form into the chat so the agent never sees the card

    Video · · Okta · Uploaded September 24, 2026

  4. Microsoft wants AI agents governed like employees, each with a human sponsor

    Article · · Microsoft Security Blog · Joy Chik · Jan 20, 2026

  5. FIDO's marketing chief calls agent identity 'not a thing' and asks the industry to hang on for a standard

    Podcast · · Authentic Talks - An HID Podcast · What FIDO Alliance Sees Next: Passkeys, AI Agents, and the Future of Identity? · Jun 23, 2026

  6. When the shopper is an AI agent, who gets the 3-D Secure challenge?

    Podcast · · ARCOT INTELLIGENCE | 3-D Secure in the AI Era · AI Agents, Cyber Resilience, and the Future of 3-D Secure and Payment Authentication · Sep 23, 2026

  7. Google's AP2 v0.2 ties an agent's purchase to the merchant's own signed checkout by hash

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  8. Digital Credentials API: W3C group defers much of issuance to level two, Heather Flanagan reports

    Podcast · · A Digital Identity Digest · The DC API and the Problem of Shared Responsibility · Nov 10, 2026

  9. Okta and Google tie an agent's calls to the user, while GitHub's shared Copilot automations now act as Copilot

    Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Oct 2026

  10. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  11. Drake's revised draft: an agent identity outlives its operator but is never reissued once its last key is gone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  12. One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  13. Microsoft's Entra Suite demo blocks a planted prompt injection and an unsanctioned MCP server but gives no catch rate

    Video · · Microsoft Events · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  14. Delegation receipts for AI agents, revision 15: holding a copy of a receipt no longer lets you extend the chain

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ryan Nelson, Authproof · Oct 22, 2026

  15. AAuth carries the signals an agent's approval needs, Hardt says; the brain that decides does not exist yet

    Podcast · · Collateral Dialogue · Self-Driving Software: What OAuth Can’t Do for AI Agents | Dick Hardt, Hello · Sep 2, 2026

  16. In one consultant's experience, Entra's passkey campaign lets SMS users register synced passkeys their policy bars

    Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Phishing-Resistant by Default: What Microsoft's Passkey Shift Means for You with Nathan McNulty (Patriot Consulting) and Eric Woodruff (Semperis) · Oct 13, 2026

  17. In FIDO's passkey survey, most of the 57% with phishable staff sign-in already pair the password with MFA

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · May 7, 2026

  18. Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  19. Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified

    Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026

  20. Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions

    Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026

  21. Schrock's receipts prove a named key approved one exact agent action, and the draft lists at length what they cannot prove

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 12, 2026

  22. A phishing kit aimed at Taiwan researchers relays each Google sign-in step and gives the attacker the session

    Article · · Cisco Talos · Joey Chen · Oct 8, 2026

  23. OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026

  24. Three vendors now route MCP tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's is generally available

    Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Sep 2026

  25. AAuth's bootstrap guide makes device attestation optional and lets a new key mean a new agent

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 28, 2026

  26. A SANS instructor's broker vaults agents' real keys, but its third delivery model breaks the abstract's promise

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kenneth G. Hartman · Mar 29, 2026

  27. An integrator builds agent access on OpenID Connect and OAuth; clients want one view across many MCP gateways

    Podcast · · Identity Unfiltered · CIAM, Agentic AI & the Future of Identity · Oct 5, 2026

  28. McDonald's protects 2.2 million mostly franchise workers with a printed sheet of codes

    Podcast · · Identity Decoded | The Identity Security Podcast · Identity Security on the Frontlines: How McDonald’s Built a Scalable Strategy · Sep 23, 2026

  29. FIDO's agent authentication group is led by Google, OpenAI and a pharmacy chain; card networks lead payments

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · Apr 28, 2026

  30. Google's AP2 lets a verifier trust a credential issuer or the agent's provider, with no trust list or revocation

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  31. Two ways to give an AI agent an OAuth identity clashed in April; a draft now lets them work together

    Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Securing Non-Human Identities in the Age of Agentic AI with Sarah Cecchetti, Director of Product Management at Semperis · Apr 28, 2026

  32. xChk ships human OIDC portfolios and a separate agent approval API

    Paper · · arXiv · Sean MacGuire · Jul 15, 2026

  33. Glide pitches the SIM card's key as the replacement for SMS codes, resting its AAL3 claim on hardware alone

    Podcast · · The Future of Identity · Eran Haggiag – Rebuilding Digital Identity Around SIM Cards for the AI Era · Jun 23, 2026

  34. Google's agent registry went GA in June while Okta, SailPoint and Ping pulled agents into their own lists

    Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Jun 2026

  35. A bank in Venezuela says about 92% of active users authenticate with passkeys, and uses them to clear fraud alerts

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance et al. · May 27, 2026

  36. RSM survey discussion puts 23% at identifying digital identity as “the key”

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #423 - The Middle Market Identity Security Gap with Robert Snodgrass · May 18, 2026

  37. FIDO estimates 5 billion passkeys, but 57% of organizations it surveyed still rely on phishable staff sign-in

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance et al. · May 7, 2026

  38. Three vendors put MCP controls in three different places in May, and only Auth0's was GA

    Release tracker · · 10 vendors' release notes · May 2026

  39. Stripe reports Japan's wider 3DS use alongside fewer fraud disputes

    Podcast · · Payments on Fire™ · Episode 292 - Modern Authentication and the Impact on Payments Cost and Performance, with Amandeep Batra, Stripe and Dewald Nolte, Entersekt · Apr 29, 2026

  40. AgentDID checks an AI agent's identity and readiness in 13.5 seconds, but was tested on at most 50 agent pairs

    Paper · · arXiv · Minghui Xu et al. · Apr 28, 2026

  41. An Imperial and Oxford protocol would give AI agents one approved use of a secret, never the secret itself

    Paper · · arXiv · Xiaohang Yu et al. · Apr 27, 2026

  42. A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026

  43. An OAuth draft for AI agents' step-up login finishes the one-time-code path but leaves passkeys unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Martin Besozzi · Apr 3, 2026

  44. Microsoft and Google made AI agent identity generally available in April; Okta's notes put its GA in May

    Release tracker · · 8 vendors' release notes · Apr 2026

  45. OAuth's in-app login draft lets a native app collect the password itself, and leaves each server to vet the app

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  46. In February Okta let AI agents reach its management APIs over MCP; Cloudflare added controls on MCP connections

    Release tracker · · 7 vendors' release notes · Feb 2026

  47. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  48. OAuth's cross-device guidance ranks FIDO first, then CIBA backchannel login, and the device-code flow last

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jan 23, 2026

  49. Over a quarter of MIXI ID users registered a passkey; MIXI says recovering accounts without one is still hard

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance et al. · Jan 21, 2026

  50. In January Okta's agent product was in early access; Auth0 and Microsoft made machine-to-machine features GA

    Release tracker · · 7 vendors' release notes · Jan 2026

  51. FIDO moves past passkeys to certify identity wallets, so issuers can check a wallet before provisioning to it

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · FIDO Alliance · Dec 4, 2025

  52. FIDO puts passkeys in use at over three billion on its own estimate, and weighs a certification for digital wallets

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #384 - The FIDO Alliance's Next Frontier: Digital Credentials and Wallets · Nov 10, 2025

  53. Apple pairs passkey adoption APIs with a way to retire saved passwords

    Video · · FIDO Alliance · Oct 31, 2025

  54. FIDO’s consumer tests found passkey wording could raise fears of account lockout

    Video · · FIDO Alliance · Oct 23, 2025

  55. RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025

  56. OpenAI and Stripe's agent checkout stores a card for one capped purchase, and no one issues the caller's token

    Article · · Agentic Commerce Protocol (GitHub) · OpenAI et al. · Sep 29, 2025

  57. FIDO pairs passkeys with digital ID credentials but spells out steps only for moderate assurance

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · Christine Owen et al. · Sep 22, 2025

  58. A Yubico product manager grants that synced passkeys resist phishing and sells hardware keys on attestation

    Podcast · · The Security Strategist · Phishing-Resistant Authentication: A Strategic Imperative for CISOs · Sep 4, 2025

  59. CAEP 1.0 tells apps what changed after login and leaves almost every response to the receiver

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tim Cappalli et al. · Aug 29, 2025

  60. FIDO plans an automotive working group and develops an in-car biometric testing profile

    Article · · FIDO Alliance · Conor White et al. · Jul 15, 2025

  61. W3C's Controlled Identifiers 1.0 lets an HTTPS URL publish its keys, and whoever can edit that document is its controller

    Article · · W3C · Manu Sporny et al. · May 15, 2025

  62. A 2025 post-quantum passkey draft lets the private key sit encrypted on flash or disk, for want of ML-DSA hardware

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft · Aditya Mitra et al. · Apr 2, 2025

  63. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  64. In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Jun 17, 2024

  65. Microsoft's 2023 keynote: workload standards should carry identity across service calls first, policy later

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Recorded May 31, 2023 · Uploaded June 17, 2024

  66. Badge's 2023 answer to passkey recovery: re-derive the key from your face on the new phone and store nothing

    Video · · FIDO Alliance · Recorded October 17, 2023 · Uploaded February 16, 2024

In our columns

  1. No one has shown a selfie check beats AI fakes, so trust the chip, not the camera

    Column · Oct 22, 2026

  2. Stop reporting MFA coverage: relay kits pass every code a person can type

    Column · Oct 14, 2026

  3. Let customers' AI agents in as linked logins that never see the password or the card

    Column · Sep 29, 2026

Related terms

What appears alongside FIDO2 / passkeys in the same briefings.

Passkey syncOAuthFIDO AllianceWells FargoSelective disclosureDevice-bound passkeyAppleGoogle

Was this explainer useful?

Share this explainer

Pass it on. Every claim has a permanent number, so what you share today still points at the same words next year.