Agent Identity Management System
AI Identity Management System
Agent Identity Management System: the model an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) draft defines for identifying AI agents, giving them credentials and authorizing them, built on Workload Identity in Multi System Environments (WIMSE).
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on Agent Identity Management System would have you leave with.
Since -01 the draft has reversed which actors in a delegation chain count when a service admits an agent's call. Section 5's seven steps, for a Serving Party "that admits calls from agents only if they are registered and assured", now check the Principal and the current actor, the outermost act claim; -01 checked every Actor in the chain. Citing Section 4.1 of RFC 8693, the draft says prior actors "are informational only and MUST NOT be used to decide admission", and our reading of the RFC's own text agrees. At admission the chain is "the token issuer's asserted history", in the authors' words, neither complete nor evidence that any hop held or narrowed authority. Earlier actors stay in the record as audit history for Linked Verification to check. Showing that authority narrowed at each hop "remains an open issue" of the companion SCITT draft. The change log says the posted -01 had been uploaded from an earlier commit that lacked this change.
An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a callBI-FIND-2026-1390
Revision -01 ties the profile to AI agents without adding any rule for them. A new abstract paragraph calls agentic systems "one class of deployment that depends on this capability" and cites the AI Identity Management System draft, yet the -01 text uses the words agent and AI only there and in that draft's reference entry. The Txn-Token itself never leaves domain A: the workload trades it at its own authorization server for a Txn-Token-JAG (type txn-chain+jwt) carrying the initiating principal mapped to an agreed identifier, the transaction id and an intersected scope. RFC 8693's actor_token is "not used in this profile", and claims that record intermediate workloads or the internal call chain "MUST NOT be included" in the grant's transaction claims. The requesting workload can still reach domain B: with sender-constraining in use, the grant's cnf claim carries its public key, and a workload that starts its own transaction, like the draft's nightly job, crosses as the mapped subject. What stays in domain A is the record of the workloads in between.
A cross-domain transaction-token grant now names AI agents as a use and keeps the call chain at homeBI-FIND-2026-0493
The draft's sharpest rule reads "The Large Language Model MUST NOT have access to an agent's credentials or to credentials that may be needed to access tools and services", which it says keeps prompt injection from getting the model to use, expose or disclose them. Around it sit the identity rules. An agent MUST be assigned exactly one WIMSE identifier and MUST hold credentials cryptographically bound to it; those credentials SHOULD be short-lived and MUST carry an explicit expiry, and static API keys are "an antipattern for agent identity". The draft names WIT, X.509 WIC and SPIFFE SVIDs as formats and leaves the choice to the deployment. Our briefing on Sierra's cloud agent platform found a similar boundary built in: a proxy approves each call and swaps in the credential, so the agent never holds it.
Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reachBI-FIND-2026-0179
Cited in 5 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026
- A cross-domain transaction-token grant now names AI agents as a use and keeps the call chain at home
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · George Fletcher et al. · Sep 10, 2026
- Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach
Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026
- A survey rates only workload identity ready for agents, and argues no standard can tell what an agent intends
Paper · · arXiv · Takumi Otsuka et al. · Apr 25, 2026
- An agent audit record that shows when a 'deny' went through anyway
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sankalp Gilda · Oct 5, 2026
Related terms
What appears alongside Agent Identity Management System in the same briefings.
OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across DomainsTransaction TokensRISC