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Explainers · Glossary

TLS

Transport Layer Security, the protocol that encrypts traffic between two systems and lets each check the other's certificate. Mutual TLS (mTLS) makes both sides prove who they are, which is how many workload identity schemes authenticate services.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on TLS would have you leave with.

  1. OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.

    OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687

  2. Revision -09 reverses -08 on passport results. Revision -08 let an attester cache a verifier's signed results and use them "for any number of subsequent TLS handshakes" while its freshness policy allowed. Revision -09 says results "from a previous TLS handshake MUST NOT be presented in a subsequent handshake, even if their validity period has not expired." The attester must fetch them after ServerHello and before its Certificate message, the verifier must sign the attested TLS identity key and this handshake's binder into them, and the relying party must check both. Revision -08 had said a passport topology was the equivalent of OCSP stapling (where a server presents a status response it fetched earlier); -09 says the passport model now differs from stapling, because the verifier is contacted on every handshake. The change log in Appendix A.1 describes this as binding results to the current handshake and does not say that -08's caching allowance is withdrawn.

    The attested-TLS draft drops cached verifier results, so the verifier now sits inside each handshakeBI-FIND-2026-2184

  3. Rosomakho and Kasselman both treat an AI agent as a workload, so the identity standards built for workloads apply to it. Kasselman describes an agent as an algorithm in software "that runs on a processor somewhere", and says testing that idea was part of the thinking behind the AIMS draft the WIMSE group adopted, which "will not introduce any new work". The existing standards get you, in his words, "I'd say 80 90 95%" of the way. When people tell him the standards do not work, he says, they usually mean their vendor's product is not flexible enough to configure the fine-grained rules they need, or believe they need. The gaps Rosomakho names are particular flows, such as a sequence of agents passing context along, and he says they are no reason to start over. The host said he did not know that everybody accepts agents as workloads.

    Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the jobBI-FIND-2026-2132

›Cited in 88 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens

    Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026

  2. The attested-TLS draft drops cached verifier results, so the verifier now sits inside each handshake

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · Oct 14, 2026

  3. Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the job

    Video · · Identerati Office Hours · Nov 6, 2026

  4. An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026

  5. An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026

  6. An unadopted AGTP draft would let gateways refuse an agent's out-of-scope requests from its TLS certificate

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  7. AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026

  8. Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026

  9. Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apart

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Oct 28, 2026

  10. Datadog keeps tokens out of its AI agents' sandboxes: each holds an identity only the gateway accepts

    Video · · fwd:cloudsec · Uploaded September 25, 2026

  11. Apps staff build with AI app builders leave a trail in certificate logs and DNS, a Cerebras security lead says

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 21, 2026

  12. AAuth carries the signals an agent's approval needs, Hardt says; the brain that decides does not exist yet

    Podcast · · Collateral Dialogue · Self-Driving Software: What OAuth Can’t Do for AI Agents | Dick Hardt, Hello · Sep 2, 2026

  13. The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  14. Orange researchers would drop certificates from agent handshakes by putting post-quantum keys on a ledger

    Paper · · arXiv · Karol Budzyn et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  15. An IETF draft ties attestation evidence to the certificate key, but only for the moment of the check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Aug 15, 2026

  16. Cloudflare's new OHTTP gateway will refuse traffic from its own Workers, so it never sees both the user and the request

    Article · · Cloudflare Blog · Lara Schull · Oct 2, 2026

  17. OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Omri Gazitt et al. · Jan 11, 2026

  18. An end-to-end encrypted draft would hide an AI agent's task from the broker, but not who sent it or to whom

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora, Imara Labs · Sep 21, 2026

  19. A post-quantum agent certificate draft warns that its own declared scopes are not proof of behaviour

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Reuben Burls · Jul 21, 2026

  20. A Windows credential stealer lets four commercial AI models vote on its next move, choosing from four options

    Article · · Cisco Talos · Ryan Fetterman · Sep 22, 2026

  21. A2A 1.0 connects agents across companies and leaves out the person they act for

    Article · · A2A Protocol (Linux Foundation) · A2A Protocol project et al. · May 28, 2026

  22. Stripe and Tempo propose paying for an HTTP request the way you log in to one, and leave the agent out

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brendan Ryan et al. · Sep 9, 2026

  23. WIMSE mutual TLS -03 ties certificate acceptance to trust-domain anchors

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  24. The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  25. The IETF's workload-identity architecture gives AI agents one subsection, calling an agent a delegated workload

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  26. July TLS-attestation draft withdraws itself and leaves key safeguards outside the protocol

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jul 23, 2026

  27. A June draft moves workload attestation out of TLS into HTTP headers so it survives a TLS-ending proxy

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Jun 7, 2026

  28. China Mobile's agent-revocation draft adds security rules but still never says how it finds the sub-agents

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Apr 27, 2026

  29. An Imperial and Oxford protocol would give AI agents one approved use of a secret, never the secret itself

    Paper · · arXiv · Xiaohang Yu et al. · Apr 27, 2026

  30. AITH claims 4.7 million agent checks a second, but the test simulated its post-quantum signatures

    Paper · · arXiv · Zhaoliang Chen · Apr 9, 2026

  31. Checking each agent call against the user's own task stopped all 634 off-task calls the authors wrote

    Paper · · arXiv · Reshabh K Sharma et al. · Mar 17, 2026

  32. An MCP signing draft shows a client who wrote a tool, and admits a poisoned tool can still be validly signed

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Mar 14, 2026

  33. Auth0's guide ties sessions to TLS fingerprints, including JA3, which Chrome changes on each new connection

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Antonio Ortells · Mar 5, 2026

  34. A draft binds workload credentials to their host via a local agent, and leaves that agent's compromise undecided

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ram Krishnan et al. · Feb 26, 2026

  35. Oxford's VET checks an agent's output against its declared setup, and by the 32nd message four of five models cost over 3×

    Paper · · arXiv · Artem Grigor et al. · Dec 17, 2025

  36. A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  37. A short IETF draft wants an AI agent's current model, tools and policy attested inside the live TLS session

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuning Jiang et al. · Nov 13, 2025

  38. CORAL's public agent server rejected forged messages but let a wrong key open the session stream

    Paper · · arXiv · Yedidel Louck et al. · Nov 5, 2025

  39. Attested workload identities need a mapping that survives authorized updates

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Novak et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  40. An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025

  41. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  42. IETF HSM evidence draft: a device may call a key device-bound only if no route, now or later, can export it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean-Pierre Fiset et al. · Oct 10, 2025

  43. OpenAI and Stripe's agent checkout stores a card for one capped purchase, and no one issues the caller's token

    Article · · Agentic Commerce Protocol (GitHub) · OpenAI et al. · Sep 29, 2025

  44. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  45. Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025

  46. A Tsinghua blockchain design for AI agents backs its defense claims with a table and reports no attack run

    Paper · · arXiv · Zhenhua Zou et al. · Aug 2, 2025

  47. SAGA meters agent-to-agent contact through one registry; its speed and 300-million-agent figures are modelled

    Paper · · arXiv · Georgios Syros et al. · Apr 27, 2025

  48. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  49. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  50. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  51. In GNAP (RFC 9635), a client is known by its key, and tokens stay key-bound unless the server flags them bearer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 1, 2024

  52. The 2024 'IDs for AI' paper puts the ID on a chat session, not a model, and leaves trust in its issuer to others

    Paper · · arXiv · Alan Chan et al. · Jun 17, 2024

  53. A Content-Digest header can show a body arrived intact, not who sent it; RFC 9530 points to TLS or a signature for that

    Article · · RFC Editor · Roberto Polli et al. · Feb 1, 2024

  54. A valid RFC 9421 signature does not prove who signed; key and algorithm checks are left to each profile

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Feb 1, 2024

  55. OpenID Connect Core says only issuer plus subject identify a user; email must never be the key

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Nat Sakimura et al. · Dec 15, 2023

  56. JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023

  57. Uber had workload identity on a quarter-million nodes two years before agents; certificates were the easy part

    Article · · Uber Engineering · Andrew Moore et al. · Nov 9, 2023

  58. TLS clients must match a service they chose independently of the certificate

    Article · · RFC Editor · Peter Saint-Andre et al. · Nov 8, 2023

  59. COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023

  60. The 2022 TLS BCP makes peer identity and session controls part of secure deployment

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Nov 1, 2022

  61. RFC 9053 allows identity inputs in COSE key derivation to be omitted

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Aug 1, 2022

  62. Certificate Transparency 2.0 lets clients refuse unlogged certificates and leaves logged misissued ones for monitors to find

    Article · · RFC Editor · Ben Laurie et al. · Dec 1, 2021

  63. Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021

  64. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 become forbidden, while ClientHello record compatibility stays

    Article · · RFC Editor · Kathleen Moriarty et al. · Mar 23, 2021

  65. RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020

  66. A 2020 simulation fit the web's certificate revocations in under 5 MB; OAuth's Token Status List draft cites it

    Article · · NDSS Symposium 2020 · Trevor Smith et al. · Feb 12, 2020

  67. RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020

  68. The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions

    Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020

  69. TLS 1.3 requires applications to choose which early data is safe to replay

    Article · · RFC Editor · Eric Rescorla, Mozilla · Aug 10, 2018

  70. Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018

  71. RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018

  72. A 2017 security proof for OpenID Connect assumes fixes the spec did not yet require

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Apr 27, 2017

  73. RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016

  74. Cryptographic agility needs deployment and retirement work beyond algorithm identifiers

    Article · · RFC Editor · Russ Housley, Vigil Security · Nov 18, 2015

  75. RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015

  76. In 2015, OpenID Connect discovery let an attacker's server choose where a client sent the user's code

    Paper · · arXiv · Christian Mainka et al. · Aug 18, 2015

  77. RFC 7592 defines replacement updates for managed OAuth registrations

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015

  78. RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015

  79. JWE’s JSON headers can sit outside integrity protection

    Article · · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  80. OAuth's assertion framework is built for bearer assertions, and one can buy fresh tokens until it expires

    Article · · RFC Editor · B. Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015

  81. RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  82. RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015

  83. RFC 7515 lets a signed JSON object name or carry its own key, and leaves trusting that key to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  84. RFC 6819 warned in 2013 that servers receiving a token may reuse it, and offered audience binding and client-bound tokens

    Article · · RFC Editor · T. Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2013

  85. RFC 6750 tokens work for whoever holds them; RFC 9700 now urges key binding and bars them from query strings

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2012

  86. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012

  87. DANE lets a domain vouch for its own TLS keys in DNS, and a bad record locks out every client that checks

    Article · · RFC Editor · Paul Hoffman et al. · Aug 7, 2012

  88. Richer's 2023 draft let each service in a call chain add a hash-linked token, but left serialization unfinished

    Draft · · IETF (individual Internet-Draft) · Justin Richer · Sep 15, 2023