TLS
Transport Layer Security, the protocol that encrypts traffic between two systems and lets each check the other's certificate. Mutual TLS (mTLS) makes both sides prove who they are, which is how many workload identity schemes authenticate services.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on TLS would have you leave with.
OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.
OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687
Revision -09 reverses -08 on passport results. Revision -08 let an attester cache a verifier's signed results and use them "for any number of subsequent TLS handshakes" while its freshness policy allowed. Revision -09 says results "from a previous TLS handshake MUST NOT be presented in a subsequent handshake, even if their validity period has not expired." The attester must fetch them after ServerHello and before its Certificate message, the verifier must sign the attested TLS identity key and this handshake's binder into them, and the relying party must check both. Revision -08 had said a passport topology was the equivalent of OCSP stapling (where a server presents a status response it fetched earlier); -09 says the passport model now differs from stapling, because the verifier is contacted on every handshake. The change log in Appendix A.1 describes this as binding results to the current handshake and does not say that -08's caching allowance is withdrawn.
The attested-TLS draft drops cached verifier results, so the verifier now sits inside each handshakeBI-FIND-2026-2184
Rosomakho and Kasselman both treat an AI agent as a workload, so the identity standards built for workloads apply to it. Kasselman describes an agent as an algorithm in software "that runs on a processor somewhere", and says testing that idea was part of the thinking behind the AIMS draft the WIMSE group adopted, which "will not introduce any new work". The existing standards get you, in his words, "I'd say 80 90 95%" of the way. When people tell him the standards do not work, he says, they usually mean their vendor's product is not flexible enough to configure the fine-grained rules they need, or believe they need. The gaps Rosomakho names are particular flows, such as a sequence of agents passing context along, and he says they are no reason to start over. The host said he did not know that everybody accepts agents as workloads.
Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the jobBI-FIND-2026-2132
›Cited in 88 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens
Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026
- The attested-TLS draft drops cached verifier results, so the verifier now sits inside each handshake
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · Oct 14, 2026
- Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the job
Video · · Identerati Office Hours · Nov 6, 2026
- An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026
- An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026
- An unadopted AGTP draft would let gateways refuse an agent's out-of-scope requests from its TLS certificate
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026
- AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026
- Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026
- Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apart
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Oct 28, 2026
- Datadog keeps tokens out of its AI agents' sandboxes: each holds an identity only the gateway accepts
Video · · fwd:cloudsec · Uploaded September 25, 2026
- Apps staff build with AI app builders leave a trail in certificate logs and DNS, a Cerebras security lead says
Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 21, 2026
- AAuth carries the signals an agent's approval needs, Hardt says; the brain that decides does not exist yet
Podcast · · Collateral Dialogue · Self-Driving Software: What OAuth Can’t Do for AI Agents | Dick Hardt, Hello · Sep 2, 2026
- The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optional
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Oct 20, 2026
- Orange researchers would drop certificates from agent handshakes by putting post-quantum keys on a ledger
Paper · · arXiv · Karol Budzyn et al. · Oct 16, 2026
- An IETF draft ties attestation evidence to the certificate key, but only for the moment of the check
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Aug 15, 2026
- Cloudflare's new OHTTP gateway will refuse traffic from its own Workers, so it never sees both the user and the request
Article · · Cloudflare Blog · Lara Schull · Oct 2, 2026
- OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Omri Gazitt et al. · Jan 11, 2026
- An end-to-end encrypted draft would hide an AI agent's task from the broker, but not who sent it or to whom
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora, Imara Labs · Sep 21, 2026
- A post-quantum agent certificate draft warns that its own declared scopes are not proof of behaviour
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Reuben Burls · Jul 21, 2026
- A Windows credential stealer lets four commercial AI models vote on its next move, choosing from four options
Article · · Cisco Talos · Ryan Fetterman · Sep 22, 2026
- A2A 1.0 connects agents across companies and leaves out the person they act for
Article · · A2A Protocol (Linux Foundation) · A2A Protocol project et al. · May 28, 2026
- Stripe and Tempo propose paying for an HTTP request the way you log in to one, and leave the agent out
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brendan Ryan et al. · Sep 9, 2026
- WIMSE mutual TLS -03 ties certificate acceptance to trust-domain anchors
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026
- The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026
- The IETF's workload-identity architecture gives AI agents one subsection, calling an agent a delegated workload
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026
- July TLS-attestation draft withdraws itself and leaves key safeguards outside the protocol
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Jul 23, 2026
- A June draft moves workload attestation out of TLS into HTTP headers so it survives a TLS-ending proxy
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Jun 7, 2026
- China Mobile's agent-revocation draft adds security rules but still never says how it finds the sub-agents
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Apr 27, 2026
- An Imperial and Oxford protocol would give AI agents one approved use of a secret, never the secret itself
Paper · · arXiv · Xiaohang Yu et al. · Apr 27, 2026
- AITH claims 4.7 million agent checks a second, but the test simulated its post-quantum signatures
Paper · · arXiv · Zhaoliang Chen · Apr 9, 2026
- Checking each agent call against the user's own task stopped all 634 off-task calls the authors wrote
Paper · · arXiv · Reshabh K Sharma et al. · Mar 17, 2026
- An MCP signing draft shows a client who wrote a tool, and admits a poisoned tool can still be validly signed
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Mar 14, 2026
- Auth0's guide ties sessions to TLS fingerprints, including JA3, which Chrome changes on each new connection
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Antonio Ortells · Mar 5, 2026
- A draft binds workload credentials to their host via a local agent, and leaves that agent's compromise undecided
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ram Krishnan et al. · Feb 26, 2026
- Oxford's VET checks an agent's output against its declared setup, and by the 32nd message four of five models cost over 3×
Paper · · arXiv · Artem Grigor et al. · Dec 17, 2025
- A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet
Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025
- A short IETF draft wants an AI agent's current model, tools and policy attested inside the live TLS session
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuning Jiang et al. · Nov 13, 2025
- CORAL's public agent server rejected forged messages but let a wrong key open the session stream
Paper · · arXiv · Yedidel Louck et al. · Nov 5, 2025
- Attested workload identities need a mapping that survives authorized updates
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Novak et al. · Oct 20, 2025
- An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025
- WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- IETF HSM evidence draft: a device may call a key device-bound only if no route, now or later, can export it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean-Pierre Fiset et al. · Oct 10, 2025
- OpenAI and Stripe's agent checkout stores a card for one capped purchase, and no one issues the caller's token
Article · · Agentic Commerce Protocol (GitHub) · OpenAI et al. · Sep 29, 2025
- OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025
- Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025
- A Tsinghua blockchain design for AI agents backs its defense claims with a table and reports no attack run
Paper · · arXiv · Zhenhua Zou et al. · Aug 2, 2025
- SAGA meters agent-to-agent contact through one registry; its speed and 300-million-agent figures are modelled
Paper · · arXiv · Georgios Syros et al. · Apr 27, 2025
- An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity
Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025
- RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025
- FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025
- In GNAP (RFC 9635), a client is known by its key, and tokens stay key-bound unless the server flags them bearer
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 1, 2024
- The 2024 'IDs for AI' paper puts the ID on a chat session, not a model, and leaves trust in its issuer to others
Paper · · arXiv · Alan Chan et al. · Jun 17, 2024
- A Content-Digest header can show a body arrived intact, not who sent it; RFC 9530 points to TLS or a signature for that
Article · · RFC Editor · Roberto Polli et al. · Feb 1, 2024
- A valid RFC 9421 signature does not prove who signed; key and algorithm checks are left to each profile
Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Feb 1, 2024
- OpenID Connect Core says only issuer plus subject identify a user; email must never be the key
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Nat Sakimura et al. · Dec 15, 2023
- JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject
Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023
- Uber had workload identity on a quarter-million nodes two years before agents; certificates were the easy part
Article · · Uber Engineering · Andrew Moore et al. · Nov 9, 2023
- TLS clients must match a service they chose independently of the certificate
Article · · RFC Editor · Peter Saint-Andre et al. · Nov 8, 2023
- COSE certificate headers leave trust validation with the relying application
Article · · RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Feb 16, 2023
- The 2022 TLS BCP makes peer identity and session controls part of secure deployment
Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Nov 1, 2022
- RFC 9053 allows identity inputs in COSE key derivation to be omitted
Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Jim Schaad · Aug 1, 2022
- Certificate Transparency 2.0 lets clients refuse unlogged certificates and leaves logged misissued ones for monitors to find
Article · · RFC Editor · Ben Laurie et al. · Dec 1, 2021
- Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021
- TLS 1.0 and 1.1 become forbidden, while ClientHello record compatibility stays
Article · · RFC Editor · Kathleen Moriarty et al. · Mar 23, 2021
- RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer
Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020
- A 2020 simulation fit the web's certificate revocations in under 5 MB; OAuth's Token Status List draft cites it
Article · · NDSS Symposium 2020 · Trevor Smith et al. · Feb 12, 2020
- RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned
Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020
- The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions
Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020
- TLS 1.3 requires applications to choose which early data is safe to replay
Article · · RFC Editor · Eric Rescorla, Mozilla · Aug 10, 2018
- Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018
- RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018
- A 2017 security proof for OpenID Connect assumes fixes the spec did not yet require
Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Apr 27, 2017
- RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016
- Cryptographic agility needs deployment and retirement work beyond algorithm identifiers
Article · · RFC Editor · Russ Housley, Vigil Security · Nov 18, 2015
- RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- In 2015, OpenID Connect discovery let an attacker's server choose where a client sent the user's code
Paper · · arXiv · Christian Mainka et al. · Aug 18, 2015
- RFC 7592 defines replacement updates for managed OAuth registrations
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015
- RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted
Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015
- JWE’s JSON headers can sit outside integrity protection
Article · · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- OAuth's assertion framework is built for bearer assertions, and one can buy fresh tokens until it expires
Article · · RFC Editor · B. Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7515 lets a signed JSON object name or carry its own key, and leaves trusting that key to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 6819 warned in 2013 that servers receiving a token may reuse it, and offered audience binding and client-bound tokens
Article · · RFC Editor · T. Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2013
- RFC 6750 tokens work for whoever holds them; RFC 9700 now urges key binding and bars them from query strings
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2012
- RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023
Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012
- DANE lets a domain vouch for its own TLS keys in DNS, and a bad record locks out every client that checks
Article · · RFC Editor · Paul Hoffman et al. · Aug 7, 2012
- Richer's 2023 draft let each service in a call chain add a hash-linked token, but left serialization unfinished
Draft · · IETF (individual Internet-Draft) · Justin Richer · Sep 15, 2023