Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

IETF working group

WG · OAuth WG · WIMSE WG

A group inside the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that works on one topic, such as OAuth or workload identity, and reaches consensus on its drafts before the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approves them.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on IETF working group would have you leave with.

  1. Okta's and Microsoft's competing SCIM drafts for AI agents have given way to one joint draft, and no IETF working group has taken it up. In June 2026 Mark Wahl and Pamela Dingle of Microsoft, Danny Zollner of Okta and Ismael Kazzouzi of Nextident filed draft-wzdk-scim-agent-resource-00, an informational draft that defines the agent as its own SCIM resource type. WorkOS calls the joint authorship "a real signal of forming consensus". The datatracker lists it as an individual submission that replaces neither earlier draft; both of those have expired, and this one expires on 7 December 2026. WorkOS says the October 2025 Okta draft by Abbey and Cohen modelled agents through an "agentic application" instead of as their own resource. As filed, that draft already defines Agent as its own resource type, related to an agentic application as owned, authorized or guest, and the SCIM working group's IETF 125 slides say both drafts represented agents as a resource type. The joint draft's text never mentions the Okta draft or agentic applications, and it has none of the Okta draft's certificate, protocol or OAuth configuration attributes, so we would not call it a merger of the two texts. An agent governance extension from an Oracle author, draft-kushwaha-scim-agent-governance-00, filed in July 2026, was also active on the datatracker; the post does not mention it.

    Okta and Microsoft now co-author one SCIM draft for AI agents, but no working group has taken it upBI-FIND-2026-0407

  2. Asked which identity and security controls are most likely to break first as agentic systems scale, John Yeoh, CSA's chief scientific officer, names lifecycle management. He cites CircleCI and Microsoft's Midnight Blizzard breach as poor lifecycle management of non-human identities, where keys for secrets were not rotated fast enough, and expects agents to fail faster because people now give them specs that spin up sub-agents. Access reviews that ignore intent and behaviour come next, then logging, in what he calls "a good domino of control collapse". Aizome's Amir Ofek answers the same question differently: applying controls built for non-human identities, which are deterministic rather than dynamic, is what will break first.

    CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to breakBI-FIND-2026-0113

  3. Revision -02 of Shankarlingam's draft says the delay before a disabled agent is refused is "a property of the receiver's configuration, not of the token alone", and that passing the receiver's checks does not show a disabled client is refused within the bound the receiver computes. Raising the maximum token age, DNS caching, caching of issuer metadata and keys, or the clock-skew allowance lengthens the time a disabled client is still accepted, while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check keeps passing. Those checks, the draft says, "establish that a token is authentic; they do not establish that the client is still enabled." A receiver SHOULD recompute the bound before any change to those settings takes effect, and SHOULD test it directly, again after any change to those settings: obtain link tokens for a test client, disable it at a time not known to whoever observes the receiver, keep presenting tokens issued before the disable, and compare the last acceptance with the time the authorization server records the disable. The receiver meets its bound if that gap does not exceed the computed delay. It SHOULD also log the maximum age in effect with each verification result, and the security section says receivers SHOULD treat such changes as security relevant. The draft describes this test and reports no results from running it.

    A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how longBI-FIND-2026-2345

›Cited in 17 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Okta and Microsoft now co-author one SCIM draft for AI agents, but no working group has taken it up

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 30, 2026

  2. CSA's John Yeoh expects lifecycle management to be the first agent control to break

    Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · NHI & AI Identity Summit : The Next 24 Months · Sep 7, 2026

  3. A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026

  4. AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026

  5. Transaction Tokens carry who started a request through internal services and define no list of the hops in between

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Atul Tulshibagwale et al. · Jul 30, 2026

  6. Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the job

    Video · · Identerati Office Hours · Nov 6, 2026

  7. JPMorgan won't let some agent sessions read and send email at once, says its security architect

    Podcast · · Insecure Agents · "Is This Tool Call Allowed? It's Never That Simple": Michael Davis (J.P. Morgan) · Sep 9, 2026

  8. Cross-App Access draft warns that one stolen sign-in token could reach every app the identity provider permits

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · May 21, 2026

  9. Nothing carries a person's limits on an agent through to the moment it acts, Yossif's problem statement argues

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mohamad Khalil Yossif · Jul 22, 2026

  10. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  11. Folding every hop's signature into one would stop anyone stripping a signed hop out of an agent's request

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Sep 28, 2026

  12. Transaction tokens are nearly a standard, and there is still no agreed place in them for the agent

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #449 - Decoded - Transaction Tokens with George Fletcher · Sep 21, 2026

  13. A third SCIM agent draft gives the agent five lifecycle states, a quarantine, and an archive it can never leave

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Saurabh Kushwaha, Oracle · Jul 27, 2026

  14. The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  15. OpenID's enterprise login draft adds tenant and session-expiry claims, and its security section is still blank

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 25, 2025

  16. In March 2024 ENISA found deepfake injection leading attacks on ID proofing, with no agreed standard to detect it

    Article · · ENISA · Evgenia Nikolouzou et al. · Mar 12, 2024

  17. The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions

    Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020