SCIM
System for Cross-domain Identity Management
By Boston Identity · Explained · 6 min read
The short answer
SCIM, the System for Cross-domain Identity Management, is a standard web API that lets one system create, read, change and delete user and group accounts in another, using one shared schema instead of a custom connector per application.
- What it is
- A protocol
- Defined by
- IETF, RFC 7643 and RFC 7644 (2015)
- Who it's for
- Teams that add and remove accounts in SaaS apps
- In our briefings
- 340by month, last 12
What is SCIM?
The System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) is how an enterprise tells a cloud application that a person has joined, moved or left.S3 §2.4 It runs over HTTP, the web's request protocol, and carries each account as a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) document.S1 §3.1 RFC 7643 defines the shared schema: a User, a Group, and an enterprise extension with fields such as department and manager.S2 §4 RFC 7644 defines the protocol for creating, reading, changing and deleting those records.S1 §3.2
Before SCIM, the authors write, many cloud providers built their own user-management protocols, so a company that bought from several of them paid for the same integration work again and again.S2 §1 SCIM seeks to simplify that with a common user schema and one protocol for exchanging it.S2 §1 In its terms, the client is the system that sends the changes, and the service provider is the application that keeps the accounts.S2 §1.2
RFC 7642, the use-case document, sets SCIM apart from SAML web single sign-on: SCIM provisions and deprovisions accounts in a separate context from authentication.S3 §1
Not single sign-on. A SAML login proves who someone is at the moment they sign in, while SCIM creates, changes and removes the account itself in a separate exchange.S3 §1
How does SCIM work?
Two parties take part. The client sends the changes, often from inside the enterprise; the service provider is the application, often run by another company, that keeps the account.S2 §1.2 We follow one employee's account from the first day to the last.
Figure steps
- The client asks what the app supports
- The client creates the account
- The app assigns its own id
- The client looks the account up
- The client changes the account
- The client deletes the account
One account's life in SCIM, from discovery to delete, as requests between the client and the app.
Drawn from RFC 7644, section 3, and RFC 7643
Swipe for the full figure →
The client asks what the app supports
Before it sends any account, the client can read three discovery endpoints: /ServiceProviderConfig, /ResourceTypes and /Schemas.S1 §3.2 The configuration says whether the app supports features such as PATCH and bulk requests.S2 §5 The schema lists each attribute and whether it is required, because a provider may support only part of the standard schema.S1 §3.1
The client creates the account
When someone joins, the client sends an HTTP POST to /Users with a User record, for example a userName and the client's own externalId.S1 §3.3 RFC 7642 describes this as the enterprise pushing an account creation request to the cloud provider.S3 §2.4.1 If the app already holds a User with that userName, it must refuse with 409 Conflict.S1 §3.3
The app assigns its own id
On success the app must answer 201 Created and give the record's address in a Location header, and its response should carry the app's copy of the record.S1 §3.3 The app issues the id, which must be stable and never reassigned, and the client must not set it.S2 §3.1 The app is free to alter or ignore parts of what was sent, so that copy can help the client compare the two views.S1 §3.3
The client looks the account up
Later the client can read the account at /Users/{id}.S1 §3.4.1 Where the app supports filtering, which is optional, it can also search with a filter such as userName eq "bjensen".S1 §3.4.2.2 The externalId lets the client find a record by its own identifier without keeping a mapping table.S2 §3.1
The client changes the account
When the person moves to another department, the client pushes an update.S3 §2.4.2 PUT replaces the record's attributes, and every implementation must support it; PATCH sends only the changes, such as adding a user to a Group's members, and implementations should support it.S1 §3.5 Setting active to false typically means the account is suspended, but each app defines what the flag means.S2 §4.1.1
The client deletes the account
When the person leaves, the client sends DELETE to /Users/{id}, and the app answers 204 No Content.S1 §3.6 The app may keep the record internally, but it must return 404 Not Found for every later request about it and leave it out of search results.S1 §3.6 RFC 7642's leaver example suspends the account first and removes it a week later.S3 §2.4.3
Why does SCIM matter now?
SCIM dates from 2015, and AI agents have put it back on the agenda. In February, the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) listed SCIM among the existing standards it is considering for agent identity.1 Tobin South, who co-chairs the OpenID Foundation's AI identity group, holds that web login, SAML, SCIM and the identity provider's handling of agents each need a modest upgrade rather than a new identity system.2
A joint draft by authors from Microsoft, Okta and Nextident makes an AI agent its own SCIM resource at /Agents, with an active flag and an optional list of owners.3,4 No SCIM agent draft is yet a working-group document.5 The joint draft gives the agent no credential, so removing an agent over SCIM says nothing to the tokens, sessions or keys it holds.6
The base protocol has grown too: RFC 9865 updated RFC 7644 with cursor-based paging,7 and RFC 9967 added SCIM events, which report a change and let each receiver choose its own follow-up.8
Where does it fit?
| Compared with | How SCIM differs |
|---|---|
| SAML | SAML carries signed statements about a user to an application at sign-in. SCIM manages the account record itself, in a separate exchange from authentication.S3 §1 |
| LDAP | LDAP reads and manages entries in a directory. SCIM's authors drew on LDAP directories among other sources, and they note that older wire protocols do not easily cross firewalls, which is one reason SCIM runs over HTTP.S2 §1 |
| SCIM AI Agent Resource Extension | This individual draft adds an Agent resource type to SCIM at /Agents and keeps the ordinary SCIM lifecycle for it.3,4 It carries no credential the agent could use.6 |
What goes wrong?
- RFC 7644 says it "does not itself define a SCIM-specific scheme for authentication and authorization", and the provider must map each client to an access control policy.S1 §2 It depends on TLS (Transport Layer Security) or standard HTTP authentication schemes, and tokens issued on weak or no authentication should not be used, apart from cases such as one-time anonymous registration.S1 §2
- Filtering, PATCH and bulk requests are optional or only recommended, so a vendor's claim to support SCIM says little until the client reads what the app advertises.9
- Each app decides what a false active flag meansS2 §4.1.1 and what access a Group membership grants,S2 §4.2 so we treat a successful deactivation or group change as something to test against the app's real behaviour.10
- The delete rules say nothing about the removed user's sessions or tokens, and the protocol defines no query for deletions, so a client that missed one has to probe each id it knows or compare full listings.11
- A bulk request carries on past failures, and the RFC's own example returns 200 OK for a request in which every operation failed, so an offboarding job has to check each operation's status.12
What should a security leader ask?
- 01
Which of our applications receive accounts over SCIM, and which still depend on someone removing accounts by hand?
- 02
For each SCIM application, what does setting active to false actually do: block login, end open sessions, or revoke tokens?
- 03
When a leaver's account is deleted over SCIM, how do we confirm that each application removed access, including sessions and tokens?
- 04
What does each vendor's /ServiceProviderConfig say about PATCH, filtering and bulk support?
- 05
If we register AI agents over SCIM, which system issues and revokes the credentials those agents use?
Sources
- S1
System for Cross-domain Identity Management: Protocol (RFC 7644)IETF (RFC Editor) · Proposed Standard, September 2015; updated by RFC 9865
- S2
System for Cross-domain Identity Management: Core Schema (RFC 7643)IETF (RFC Editor) · Proposed Standard, September 2015
- S3
System for Cross-domain Identity Management: Definitions, Overview, Concepts, and Requirements (RFC 7642)IETF (RFC Editor) · Informational, September 2015
›Evidence: 12 claims from 8 briefings
- 1BI-FIND-2026-0686 · NIST's agent identity work starts from OAuth, SPIFFE and SCIM and defers agents from outside the enterpriseNIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence framed agent identity in February as a question of applying what exists, not inventing something new. Its concept paper lists OAuth, OpenID Connect, SPIFFE, SCIM, the NGAC access-control standard and MCP as candidates it is "currently considering", and names none of the agent-specific IETF work, such as ID-JAG, the WIMSE drafts or token exchange for agents. It keeps human delegation and logging in scope and leaves agents from outside the enterprise for a later effort. The next steps are a possible project description and a lab-built practice guide, with no date; the comment period closed on 2 April.
- 2BI-FIND-2025-0088 · An OpenID Foundation co-chair says AI agents need modest upgrades to today's identity systems, not a new oneThe co-chair of the OpenID Foundation's AI identity group does not think agents need a new identity system. Tobin South's position is that web login, SAML, SCIM and the identity provider's handling of agents each need a modest upgrade, that no single fix exists, and that anyone who says otherwise is selling a product. He points out that identity providers already let a company declare an agent, tie it to a person and switch it off. The IETF's agent-authentication draft opens with the same complaint, that the field keeps reinventing mechanisms it already has.
- 3BI-FIND-2026-0407 · Three companies merged SCIM's two agent drafts, but no working group has taken it up and it expires in DecemberThe competing SCIM proposals for AI agents have collapsed into one draft, which the working group has not yet taken up. WorkOS frames the October 2025 Okta draft by Abbey and Cohen as modelling an agent as a property of an 'agentic application', against Microsoft's Wahl modelling it as its own resource. The Okta draft as filed already defines Agent as its own SCIM resource type, related to an agentic application as owned, authorized or guest, and the SCIM working group's IETF 125 slides list both drafts as representing agents as a resource type. By June 2026 there is a single informational draft, draft-wzdk-scim-agent-resource-00, by Mark Wahl and Pamela Dingle of Microsoft, Danny Zollner of Okta and Ismael Kazzouzi of Nextident, keeping the agent as its own resource with the ordinary SCIM lifecycle. WorkOS calls the joint authorship 'a real signal of forming consensus'. We checked the datatracker: it is an individual submission, not a SCIM working-group document, it replaces neither earlier draft, both of which have expired, and it expires on 7 December 2026. The post's label of the Okta draft as standards track does not match the datatracker, which records no intended status for it.
- 4BI-FIND-2026-0409 · A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials aloneThe draft makes an AI agent its own SCIM resource type, Agent, at /Agents (URN urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Agent) with three required attributes, active, displayName and an agentUserName unique across the provisioning domain, an optional description, and an optional multi-valued owners attribute whose immutable value points at a User, a Group or another Agent. It also amends the RFC 7643 Group members attribute so an agent can join groups much as a user does; roles and entitlements come up only in its introduction. Identity providers and SaaS targets that already speak SCIM would need one new resource type and one changed attribute to carry agents.
- 5BI-FIND-2026-0411 · A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials aloneThere is still no working-group document. The datatracker holds five individual SCIM agent drafts: three expired (Wahl's schema and both Abbey and Cohen filings) and two active: this one, which expires on 7 December 2026, and a separate SCIM Agent Governance Extension filed by Saurabh Kushwaha on 27 July 2026. The SCIM working group heard progress slides at IETF 124 and IETF 125 and has adopted none of them; its header says Informational while the datatracker records no intended status at all. Three vendors on one author list shows the vendors agree; adoption is the working group's call.
- 6BI-FIND-2026-0410 · A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials aloneThe draft provisions an agent's existence and nothing it can use to act. There is no credential, key, client identifier or authentication attribute anywhere in the schema; the abstract says the identity lets the agent "subsequently be authenticated and authorized" and leaves how to other specifications. The only agent-specific lifecycle control is the active flag, whose meaning the service defines, plus the generic SCIM update and delete. So deprovisioning an agent over SCIM tells the target the agent should no longer exist and says nothing to any token, session, key or scheduled job that agent holds. The security and privacy sections are copied from the base SCIM RFCs and add no agent-specific threat.
- 7BI-FIND-2025-0539 · RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no accessRFC 9865 formally updates RFC 7644, SCIM's protocol specification, and under it a client can be handed cursors it never asked for. A provider MAY make cursors its only method by returning a nextCursor even when the request carried no cursor parameter. A provider that supports both methods MUST choose a default for requests with no pagination parameter, and the RFC's own ServiceProviderConfig example sets that default to cursor. Only a lowercase should, not a requirement keyword, advises providers adding cursors to existing index-based paging to keep index as the default. Clients MUST NOT read a missing ServiceProviderConfig value as meaning there is no limit on page size or cursor lifetime, or no default method.
- 8BI-FIND-2026-1697 · RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiverUnder RFC 9967 a SCIM event reports a change, and each receiver can choose its own follow-up; the authors say receivers do this "instead of interpreting SETs as commands". The deactivate event says a resource such as a User "has been deactivated and disabled", but its exact meaning SHOULD be agreed between the event publisher and the receiver. The RFC adds only that this typically means the subject may no longer have an active security session. The activate event "does not necessarily reflect any particular state change" either.
- 9BI-FIND-2015-0017 · RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in partMuch of what a provisioning client relies on is optional in RFC 7644. Filtering and sorting are OPTIONAL. Implementers MUST support PUT but only SHOULD support PATCH, which the RFC also calls "an OPTIONAL server function." Bulk is optional, ETags are a MAY, and multi-tenancy is OPTIONAL with no scheme defined. The RFC points clients to three discovery endpoints, /ServiceProviderConfig, /Schemas and /ResourceTypes, and says clients SHOULD NOT expect a resource back with exactly the schema and values they sent. Paging is by index and keeps no state, so clients MUST be prepared for inconsistent results; the RFC Editor's page now lists RFC 9865, on cursor-based pagination, as an update. We read this as meaning that a vendor's claim to support SCIM says little until the client reads what the provider advertises.
- 10BI-FIND-2015-0038 · SCIM leaves the meaning of active status and group access to each providerRFC 7643 leaves the definitive meaning of a User’s active flag to the service provider. It gives login enabled and account suspended as typical examples for true and false. The Group schema likewise leaves membership semantics and any resulting authorization to the provider, explicitly outside this specification. We therefore read successful provisioning of these attributes as something to test against each application’s access behavior, rather than a complete specification of that behavior.
- 11BI-FIND-2015-0018 · RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in partA deleted account drops out of view under RFC 7644. A provider MAY keep a deleted resource rather than erase it, but MUST answer 404 for every operation on it and MUST leave it out of future query results. It SHOULD NOT let the old record block a new user created with the same userName. A client can filter on meta.lastModified to find changed resources where the provider supports filtering, but the RFC defines no query for deletions. We read that as leaving a client two ways to learn of a deletion it missed: probe each id it knows and get a 404, or compare full listings. Our briefing on the 2023 SCIM delta-query draft found its authors treating a removal that never syncs as an access problem. Section 3.6, on deleting, says nothing about the deleted user's sessions or tokens.
- 12BI-FIND-2015-0016 · RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in partUnder RFC 7644 a PATCH is all or nothing and a bulk request is not. A PATCH "SHALL be treated as atomic": if one operation fails, the original resource MUST be restored. In a bulk request the service provider MUST carry on past partial failures. The client can override that with failOnErrors, the number of errors after which the provider stops and fails the remaining operations; the response then carries the error and any operations that succeeded before it. The RFC says a bulk job processed successfully gets HTTP 200 OK, and its own example of a request in which every operation failed still returns 200 OK, so the top-level status does not show whether the operations worked. The provider MAY also change the order of operations, as long as the result is the same, and it must try to resolve circular references between them but may stop with a 409. We read this as a risk for offboarding jobs sent in bulk: a request that removes group memberships and then deletes the account can apply in part, so the client has to check the status of every operation, not the 200 alone.
›In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on SCIM would have you leave with.
An MCP Events subscription inherits none of the limits on the access token that created it, which is short-lived, narrow in scope and checked on every request. The draft's design sketch keys a webhook subscription on the principal, the delivery URL, the event name and its arguments; the token, its scopes and its expiry are not part of that key. The principal MUST be authenticated and authorized at subscribe time, and after that the sketch says the server 'SHOULD periodically re-verify permissions'. WorkOS's Maria Paktiti: "There is no interval, no MUST, and no conformance test behind it." The lifetime is negotiable up to no expiry: ttlMs: null requests a subscription that never expires, and a server that grants it returns refreshBefore: null, so no refresh comes. Hence her line that 'the TTL you grant is your revocation window'. In her worked example, IT revokes a departing employee's access to a customer-contracts folder on Monday morning and the 24-hour subscription's next refresh lands Tuesday morning; a server that checked only at subscribe time, which is all the draft strictly requires, delivers every contract edit in between [figure 2].
ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check scheduleBI-FIND-2026-0401
Okta's and Microsoft's competing SCIM drafts for AI agents have given way to one joint draft, and no IETF working group has taken it up. In June 2026 Mark Wahl and Pamela Dingle of Microsoft, Danny Zollner of Okta and Ismael Kazzouzi of Nextident filed draft-wzdk-scim-agent-resource-00, an informational draft that defines the agent as its own SCIM resource type. WorkOS calls the joint authorship "a real signal of forming consensus". The datatracker lists it as an individual submission that replaces neither earlier draft; both of those have expired, and this one expires on 7 December 2026. WorkOS says the October 2025 Okta draft by Abbey and Cohen modelled agents through an "agentic application" instead of as their own resource. As filed, that draft already defines Agent as its own resource type, related to an agentic application as owned, authorized or guest, and the SCIM working group's IETF 125 slides say both drafts represented agents as a resource type. The joint draft's text never mentions the Okta draft or agentic applications, and it has none of the Okta draft's certificate, protocol or OAuth configuration attributes, so we would not call it a merger of the two texts. An agent governance extension from an Oracle author, draft-kushwaha-scim-agent-governance-00, filed in July 2026, was also active on the datatracker; the post does not mention it.
Okta and Microsoft now co-author one SCIM draft for AI agents, but no working group has taken it upBI-FIND-2026-0407
Auth0 Agent Gateway, badged 'Beta Now' on its slide, is one hub between an organisation's agents and the MCP servers they call. Auth0 says it can handle access policies, credential injection, audit logging and organisation boundaries, and the slide adds a kill switch. The console in the demo already lists Asana, Atlassian, BambooHR, GitHub, Notion, Salesforce, Sentry, Slack and Workday as servers, counts '31 of 200 tools max', and labels MCP Servers beta and a separate Agents section preview. One HR agent, with the same code and one deployment, reaches Workday and Slack for one customer tenant and BambooHR and Slack for another, because the gateway handles the token exchanges and routes the agent to the right tool for each customer. Our briefing on WorkOS's account of Sierra's internal gateway found that access control and audit held up that rollout, and we read Agent Gateway as a product for that layer. The keynote does not mention Ping Identity, but our briefing on Ping's March 2026 launch video covers a Ping product also called Agent Gateway.
Auth0 ships an agent gateway in beta and moves the identity form into the chat so the agent never sees the cardBI-FIND-2026-0214
›Cited in 34 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check schedule
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 1, 2026
- Okta and Microsoft now co-author one SCIM draft for AI agents, but no working group has taken it up
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 30, 2026
- Auth0 ships an agent gateway in beta and moves the identity form into the chat so the agent never sees the card
Video · · Okta · Uploaded September 24, 2026
- A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind them
Article · · International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research (Vol 8, Issue 3) · Thrinaath Vajragowni · May 23, 2026
- AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026
- WorkOS's agent checklist limits a delegated agent to what it and its user may both do, checked on every call
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 30, 2026
- NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person
Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026
- SaaS apps that only know users end up giving agents human accounts, says Okta's former chief architect
Podcast · · The Identity Jedi Show: Where Identity Meets Strategy · Agents need a mission, not a key. · Oct 21, 2026
- An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026
- Okta's expired SCIM agent draft recorded certificates and OAuth clients; the joint draft after it dropped both
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- Okta says its agent kill switch revokes all tokens; its product screen says tokens outside the gateway survive
Video · · Okta · Sep 24, 2026
- NIST's agent identity work starts from OAuth, SPIFFE and SCIM and defers agents from outside the enterprise
Article · · NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence · Harold Booth et al. · Feb 5, 2026
- WorkOS's Tobin South, in November 2025: agents will get a new kind of account, not a new identity standard
Podcast · · CodingCat.dev Podcast · 5.10 - How to Secure AI - Identity Access Management for Agents · Nov 21, 2025
- A third SCIM agent draft gives the agent five lifecycle states, a quarantine, and an archive it can never leave
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Saurabh Kushwaha, Oracle · Jul 27, 2026
- A joint SCIM draft gives an agent a username, an owner and an on-off switch, and leaves its credentials alone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mark Wahl et al. · Jun 5, 2026
- OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025
- MCP made authorization optional, and two identity veterans say most servers took the option
Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Agentic AI and the Authorization Gap No One Closed · Jun 9, 2026
- An OpenID Foundation co-chair says AI agents need modest upgrades to today's identity systems, not a new one
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #390 - Identity Management for Agentic AI with Tobin South · Dec 8, 2025
- RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026
- Microsoft and Google made AI agent identity generally available in April; Okta's notes put its GA in May
Release tracker · · 8 vendors' release notes · Apr 2026
- AIP puts an agent's delegation chain in the token; its perfect score against attacks tests rules only AIP has
Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 25, 2026
- A cross-domain agent trust draft requires the call chain, then leaves its format to a version that never came
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Daniel King et al. · Mar 15, 2026
- An open spec for stopping agent actions before they run needs the vendor's help to cover ChatGPT or Copilot
Paper · · arXiv · Herman Errico · Feb 10, 2026
- A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026
- A SCIM draft lets apps publish the roles and entitlements they accept, and never says who may read the list
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Danny Zollner et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- An October SCIM draft gives agents their own records, with security still unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 11, 2025
- RFC 9865 publishes SCIM cursor paging with draft -11's rules intact: a cursor still grants no access
Article · · RFC Editor · Matt Peterson et al. · Oct 9, 2025
- SCIM's cursor-paging draft says holding a cursor grants no access, and permissions are checked again as the caller pages
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Matt Peterson et al. · Jul 16, 2025
- RFC 9068 makes resource servers check a JWT access token's type and audience, and warns a client could pose as a user
Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci, Okta · Oct 1, 2021
- OAuth's resource indicators RFC says servers should bind tokens to a resource, but requires it of neither side
Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 1, 2020
- Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018
- SCIM leaves the meaning of active status and group access to each provider
Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- RFC 7644 leaves SCIM's access rules to each deployment, and a bulk request can succeed in part
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Sep 1, 2015
- A 2023 SCIM draft treated a missed deletion as an access problem and proposed a watermark to catch it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Anjali Sehgal et al. · Nov 14, 2023
In our columns
- Agents outrun the quarterly access review, so log every event-triggered check
Column · Oct 28, 2026
- SCIM's agent drafts agree on the record. Only one makes switching it off revoke tokens
Column · Oct 8, 2026
- Machine identities lack a shared schema, so buy discovery tools that export their data
Column · Sep 17, 2026
Related terms
What appears alongside SCIM in the same briefings.
SCIM AI Agent Resource ExtensionSCIM Agent Governance Extension (draft-kushwaha)RFC 7644 (SCIM Protocol)SCIM Agents and Agentic Applications ExtensionOktaWorkOS Directory SyncSCIM Roles and Entitlements ExtensionRFC 8417 (Security Event Token)
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