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Key Binding JWT

KB-JWT · key binding JWT · KB-SD-JWT

The signed token that a holder of an SD-JWT (Selective Disclosure JSON Web Token) attaches to a presentation to prove it holds the key named in the credential's cnf claim.

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In our briefings

What our briefings say about Key Binding JWT itself, with the most direct claims first.

  1. The mechanism is one substitution. In RFC 9901 a holder proves possession by appending a signed key-binding JWT; here that slot can hold a KB-SD-JWT, a selective-disclosure token in its own right. Its delegate payload carries the claims an issuer would have written and, on a link that delegates onward, a cnf key naming the next holder. A verifier splits the compact form and validates the issuer's SD-JWT. It then validates each KB-SD-JWT with the previous link's cnf as the issuer key and, for each link before the last, requires exactly one disclosed delegate payload and a matching hash of the link before. sd_hash covers that link with its disclosures as passed on; issuer_jwt_hash covers only its signed part, and a holder that wants the delegate free to drop disclosures must use it. Any failed step aborts. One signature can delegate several alternative payloads, of which the delegate discloses exactly one. The draft's example is an AI agent buying from a merchant without revealing which other merchants could have filled the order.

    OAuth adopts Delegate SD-JWT, which traces each hand-off to the issuer but never checks that authority narrowedBI-FIND-2026-0444

›Cited in 8 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026

  2. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  3. Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026

  4. OAuth adopts Delegate SD-JWT, which traces each hand-off to the issuer but never checks that authority narrowed

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Gareth Oliver et al. · Apr 22, 2026

  5. The SD-JWT standard that agent drafts build on never mentions agents and leaves key binding to each verifier

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Daniel Fett et al. · Nov 20, 2025

  6. A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visible

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Su-hyeon Forten Lee · Oct 3, 2026

  7. Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  8. Google's AP2 authorization companion lets a verifier trust a credential issuer or the agent's provider, and names no trust list or revocation

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

Related terms

What appears alongside Key Binding JWT in the same briefings.

SD Agent (SD-Card)Mandate (AP2)Delegate SD-JWT