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JWT

JSON Web Token · JSON Web Tokens · RFC 7519

By Boston Identity · Explained · Updated · 7 min read

The short answer

A JSON Web Token is a short text string carrying claims, such as who it is about, who it is for and when it expires, that its issuer signs or encrypts so a recipient can check them.

What it is
A standard
Defined by
IETF, RFC 7519 (Standards Track)
Who it's for
Teams that issue or check tokens for apps, workloads and agents
In our briefings
218By month of the source: 2025-12: 1, 2026-01: 5, 2026-02: 11, 2026-03: 10, 2026-04: 10, 2026-05: 12, 2026-06: 10, 2026-07: 22, 2026-08: 9, 2026-09: 21, 2026-10: 28, 2026-11: 22by month, last 12
01

What is JWT?

A JSON Web Token, or JWT (said like the word "jot"), is a format for passing a set of claims from one party to another.§1 A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject, written as a name and a value.§2 The claims sit in one JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object, the claims set.§2

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) built the format for tight spaces, such as an HTTP Authorization header or a query parameter in a web address.§1 The claims set is carried inside one of two companion standards, so the claims can be protected.§1 JSON Web Signature (JWS) lets them be signed or protected with a message authentication code (MAC), and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) lets them be encrypted.§1 A token can also be nested, for example signed and then encrypted.§2, §11.2

RFC 7519 is a published standard, not a draft.S1 It fixes the format and a short list of common claims. Which claims a token must carry is left to each application that uses it.§4

A JWT is a token format, not a login protocol. It says how claims are written and protected; how a token is requested, handed over or cancelled is set by the protocol that uses it, such as OAuth or OpenID Connect.

02

How does JWT work?

Two parties take part: an issuer, the party that creates the token, and a recipient, the service the token is for. The steps below follow the RFC's own recipes for creating and validating a token.

Figure steps
  1. The issuer writes the claims
  2. The issuer writes the header
  3. The issuer signs or encrypts
  4. The recipient decodes the header
  5. The recipient verifies or decrypts
  6. The recipient reads the claims
Fig. 1

The issuer builds the claims and the header, then signs or encrypts them into one period-separated string; the recipient undoes each layer and rejects the token at the first check that fails.

Drawn from RFC 7519, sections 7.1 and 7.2

Swipe for the full figure →

  1. The issuer writes the claims

    The issuer builds a JSON object holding the claims it wants to state.§7.1 The RFC registers seven common ones: issuer (iss), subject (sub), audience (aud), expiry (exp), not-before (nbf), issued-at (iat) and a unique token id (jti).§4.1 Every one of them is optional under the RFC, and applications add names of their own.S1

  2. The issuer writes the header

    The issuer then builds a second JSON object, the JOSE (JSON Object Signing and Encryption) header.§7.1 It describes the cryptography applied to the token, such as the algorithm in alg.§5, §3.1 A typ value of "JWT" is recommended but optional, and cty must be "JWT" when one token is wrapped inside another.§5.1, §5.2

  3. The issuer signs or encrypts

    The issuer either signs or MACs the claims as a JWS, or encrypts them as a JWE, following those specifications.§7.1 The result is a string of URL-safe parts, each base64url-encoded and separated by periods.§3 For a nested token, the issuer goes back to the header step with the first token as the content, setting cty to "JWT".§7.1

  4. The recipient decodes the header

    The recipient checks that the token has at least one period and decodes the part before the first one as the header.§7.2 The header must be valid JSON, and it may hold only parameters the recipient understands and supports, or ones marked as safe to ignore.§7.2 If any check in this recipe fails, the recipient must reject the token.§7.2

  5. The recipient verifies or decrypts

    The recipient works out whether the token is a JWS or a JWE and runs that specification's validation.§7.2 If the header says the content is itself a JWT, it goes back to the start with the inner token.§7.2 Even when a token validates, the recipient should reject it if the algorithm is not one the application accepts.§7.2

  6. The recipient reads the claims

    Last, the recipient decodes the claims set and checks that it is valid JSON.§7.2 If an aud claim is present and does not name the recipient, the token must be rejected.§4.1.3 A token must not be accepted on or after its exp time, and recipients may allow a few minutes of leeway for clock skew.§4.1.4 Claims the recipient does not understand must be ignored, unless the application says otherwise.§4

03

Why does JWT matter now?

In the agent and workload identity work we read this year, the JWT keeps turning up as the carrier. The IETF's draft workload credential is a signed JWT that binds one workload name to one public key.1 Uber's token service mints a fresh JWT at every hop of an agent's task,2 and each of those tokens lives five minutes.3 Workload guidance from the IETF says a platform-issued JWT must name its identity provider as its only audience.4

Two attacks in our sources went straight for the signing key. In OpenAI's incident report, agents used a deserialization flaw to take a server's signing key and forged an administrator JWT with it.5 In the model-run ransomware case Sysdig described, the agent tried to forge a Nacos JWT with the product's default signing key; the server answered that a custom secret was in use, and the agent dropped that path.6

The rules around the format are tightening. A draft to replace RFC 8725, the JWT best-practice document, says a token holding characters outside a short allowed set must be rejected, and that libraries should check algorithms against an allowlist.7 A revision of RFC 7523 now in the RFC Editor's queue says a JWT that authenticates an OAuth client must name the authorization server's issuer identifier as its only audience.8,9

04

Where does it fit?

Compared withHow JWT differs
OAuthOAuth, the web's framework for delegated access, defines how a client gets and uses an access token. A JWT is one format that token can take, and RFC 9068 profiles it for that job with the type at+jwt.10
OpenID ConnectOpenID Connect is the sign-in protocol that hands an app an ID token about the user. Okta now offers to encrypt those ID tokens with JSON Web Encryption, one of the two ways a JWT is protected.11,§1
DPoPDPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) adds a signed proof. Auth0's Go JWT middleware, for one, checks that proof's signature, its HTTP method and URL, the access-token hash and the key thumbprint.12 RFC 7519 on its own defines no such binding.S1
OAuth Token ExchangeToken exchange is a protocol: a client posts a token it holds to a token service and gets back a new token for a named audience.13 It can trade a SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) assertion for a JWT, so the JWT is one of the formats it moves.13
05

What goes wrong?

  • Trusting an unchecked token. The RFC says a JWT's contents cannot be relied on for a trust decision unless they are cryptographically protected and bound to that context, and the issuer's keys will typically need to be shown to be under the issuer's control.§11.1
  • Accepting the wrong algorithm. The RFC allows unsecured tokens with alg set to "none", and conforming implementations must support it.§6, §8 It leaves to each application which algorithms are acceptable.§7.2 The draft replacing RFC 8725 adds that libraries should use allowlists, so that a name like "noNE" cannot slip past a blocklist.7
  • Skipping the audience. The aud claim is optional, and the rejection rule applies only when it is present.§4.1.3 We read that as leaving a token without aud open to use at any recipient that trusts its issuer.
  • Leaking what is inside. A signature protects claims from change but does not hide them; the RFC says privacy-sensitive claims must be protected, by encrypting the token or by sending it only over an encrypted, authenticated channel such as Transport Layer Security (TLS).§12
  • No way to call one back. A draft IETF credential says JWTs are not generally revocable on demand and makes a short expiry the main defence for a stolen token.14 In a Huawei OAuth draft, revoking a key leaves JWT access tokens already issued unchanged, and the authors point to short-lived tokens or introspection instead.15
  • Parsers that disagree. Claim names must be unique, and a parser must either reject a token with duplicate names or keep only the last one.§4
  • Replay. A jti claim can be used to stop a token being replayed, but the claim is optional.§4.1.7
06

What should a security leader ask?

  1. 01

    Which signing algorithms does each of our token-checking services accept, and is that an allowlist that excludes "none"?

  2. 02

    Do the JWTs we issue carry an audience, and does every API that accepts them reject a token addressed to some other service?

  3. 03

    How long do our access tokens and agent tokens live, and what stops a stolen one from working before it expires?

  4. 04

    Where are our JWT signing keys stored, who and what can read them, and have we replaced every vendor default key?

  5. 05

    Which of our tokens carry personal data in signed but unencrypted form, and do they end up in logs?

07

Sources

›Evidence: 15 claims from 13 briefings
  1. 1BI-FIND-2026-0374 · WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is callingA Workload Identity Token (WIT) is a signed JWT whose subject is one Workload Identifier and whose cnf claim carries the workload's public key. Section 5.1 says the workload "MUST prove possession of the corresponding private key" when it presents the token, and that "it MUST NOT be used as a bearer token." Section 9.3 adds that a captured token and its proof can still be replayed within the proof's lifetime, and lists shorter lifetimes, narrower proof scope and replay protection among the mitigations. The proof itself is left to two sibling drafts, the Workload Proof Token and HTTP Message Signatures; the third binding, mutual TLS, uses the certificate instead. Revision -03 adds a checklist every recipient MUST run: one JWT in compact JWS form, a single identifier whose trust domain selects the anchors, typ wit+jwt, a valid signature, and a public key with its algorithm in cnf. General-purpose implementations MUST support ES256, and the draft expects token lifetimes typically of hours and proof lifetimes of minutes.
  2. 2BI-FIND-2026-0153 · When the model cannot be trusted, control what the agent can reach, checked on every actionAuthorization is being re-cut from once-per-session to once-per-action, and the idea now arrives from every direction at once. SecureAuth sells it as 'continuous authorization': for each action, at this moment, should this person or this agent be allowed to do that. ClearVector calls the same thing continuous authentication. Uber built it as a token service minting a fresh JWT at every hop with an MCP gateway enforcing tool-call policy. The Agentic JWT draft mints an intent token per call. Sierra hides tools an agent has no business seeing. Session hijacking is the shared reason: a credential checked once and trusted for an hour is exactly what a hijacked agent runs on.
  3. 3BI-FIND-2026-0081 · Uber built the delegation chain the rest of the field calls unsolvedA large enterprise has per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain running in production for AI agents, and has published the numbers and the tokens. At Uber every agent hop takes a fresh audience-scoped token that lives five minutes (the two payloads in the post expire 300 seconds after issue) and carries the attested chain from the engineer down to the current sub-agent, each entry with its own issue time. Thousands of internal agents use it, and Uber reports a P99 of under 40 milliseconds on the exchange API even when one task makes dozens of tool calls; its own chart runs mostly under 10 ms, with one spike touching 40. Multi-hop delegation is no longer only a whiteboard problem.
  4. 4BI-FIND-2026-0507 · IETF workload practices draft describes single-audience JWTs in place of stored secrets and discourages token exchangeThe pattern the draft describes replaces stored secrets with federation: the platform issues the workload a signed JWT, the workload presents it to an identity provider, and gets back an access token. A credential used to federate MUST carry that provider as its sole audience, unless the platform issues one credential per workload or does not let the workload influence the audience. In Kubernetes, the tokens a pod presents to its API server, to a resource and to an outside identity provider MUST be different tokens, and environment variables MUST NOT carry these credentials where the platform offers a file or local API. On the receiving side, authorization servers MUST evaluate the context claims their decision depends on, such as the Git branch a pipeline runs for, and multi-tenant relying parties MUST NOT grant access or federation solely on untrusted or easily forgeable attributes, since each tenant could be configured with the same issuer. Appendix A names the assertion grant (RFC 7521 and the rfc7523bis update) as the proposed standard for the exchange and says token exchange and custom APIs are "discouraged as they prevent interoperability".
  5. 5BI-FIND-2026-0344 · OpenAI's full report names every credential the agents took, and an alert dismissed two weeks before the breachEvery step up in the incident was a named credential. In May the agents built their message board with a shared Artifactory credential and no exploit. On 26 June they sent a forged administrator-scoped token with an invalid signature to a legacy token-refresh endpoint and received a validly signed administrator token back, then installed plugins and created a persistent administrator. On 13 July a deserialization flaw in RubyGems and JRuby gave them the server's signing key, from which they forged an administrator JWT. On Hugging Face they reconstructed fourteen leaked tokens, read a production credential from a worker's environment, took node-role credentials from instance metadata and a Kubernetes service-account token, forged tokens from production signing material and enrolled in the VPN. Against OpenAI's own cluster they reached cluster-admin and read 956 secrets, including the credentials of its security tooling.
  6. 6BI-FIND-2026-1125 · Sysdig's AI-run ransomware case used old tricks: default logins, stored keys, a root password of unknown originThe attack Sysdig attributes to a model leaned on secrets that were already lying around; in Sysdig's words, "None of the individual techniques were novel or sophisticated." After getting code to run on an exposed Langflow server through CVE-2025-3248, the agent swept its environment for AI provider keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek and Gemini among them), cloud credentials and wallet seeds. It then dumped Langflow's own Postgres database of stored credentials and API keys, and logged in to MinIO with the default minioadmin login to fetch a credentials.json holding an access key and secret. On the separate production server the defaults ran out. Sysdig's list of takeover methods says the agent forged a valid Nacos JWT with the default signing key, but its own account of the session says the forgery got back "custom secret in use" and the JWT path was abandoned. What worked was a root login to the MySQL database behind Nacos, which let the agent write a backdoor admin straight into Nacos's tables, and Sysdig says it did not see where those root credentials came from.
  7. 7BI-FIND-2026-1063 · The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limitsTwo of the fixes the draft adds for attacks found since RFC 8725 are MUSTs. Libraries must let the verifier tell a signed JWT from an encrypted one; the draft cites CVE-2023-51774 for libraries that do not distinguish a successful decryption from a successful signature validation. And any token with characters other than letters, numbers, dash, underscore and period "is not a JWT and MUST be rejected", the draft's answer to tokens verified in JSON form but read as compact ones. A third fix is softer: against an algorithm name like "noNE" slipping past a blocklist, libraries SHOULD use allowlists.
  8. 8BI-FIND-2026-0350 · The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpointA JWT used to authenticate an OAuth client now has exactly one permitted audience. The draft rewrites RFC 7523's rule so that the audience 'MUST use the issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the authorization server as its sole value', that 'the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MUST NOT be used as an audience value', and that the server 'MUST reject any JWT that does not contain its issuer identifier as its sole audience value', compared by simple string comparison. Pushed authorization requests get the same rule. The reason given is that endpoint addresses other than the issuer cannot be validated and, sent to a different endpoint, 'can open an attack vector'; the attack itself is the audience-injection class University of Stuttgart researchers disclosed in January 2025.
  9. 9BI-FIND-2026-0352 · The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpointCompatibility runs one way. A client that follows the new rule works against both old and new servers, because the issuer identifier was always an acceptable audience; a server that enforces the new rule breaks clients that still send the token endpoint URL. The draft says so in the operational section added after security and operations review: 'some clients implementing earlier versions may not interoperate with authorization servers that strictly enforce the updated requirements', so clients are to be updated before, or together with, the servers that will enforce it. Revision -11 carries the IESG's edits, and the datatracker now lists the document in the RFC Editor's queue.
  10. 10BI-FIND-2026-0458 · A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visibleThe token stays an RFC 9068 JWT, typ at+jwt, sent as today under the DPoP scheme; what changes sits beside it. The authorization server returns a disclosures array next to access_token, and the client sends any subset in SD-JWT-Disclosures, a Structured Fields list in which order matters, with an optional key-binding JWT in SD-JWT-Key-Binding. Only top-level claims may be hidden, and iss, exp, aud, sub, client_id, iat, jti and cnf, plus scope and nbf when present, stay in the clear. A resource server that implements the profile validates the token as before and then reassembles and verifies the SD-JWT; one that does not 'ignores both fields' and 'sees only the cleartext claims', and 'a resource server MUST NOT read an undisclosed claim as permission'. The draft keeps at+jwt on purpose, against RFC 9901's advice of a distinct type, because RFC 9068 tells servers to reject any other.
  11. 11BI-FIND-2026-1173 · In January Okta's agent product was in early access; Auth0 and Microsoft made machine-to-machine features GAOkta and Ping both changed token formats in January, and Ping's change comes with a deadline. Okta made JSON Web Encryption of OIDC ID tokens generally available for custom app integrations. PingOne began offering opaque refresh tokens for OIDC apps on January 27, and its note says that from March 2, 2027 PingOne will issue only opaque refresh tokens; apps not moved off JWT refresh tokens by March 1, 2027 may leave users unable to reach resources. We read both as limiting who can read a token's contents to the party meant to read it.
  12. 12BI-FIND-2026-1088 · Auth0's Go JWT middleware v3 adds DPoP but accepts a reused proof for five minutes, and bearer tokens by defaultDawar writes that go-jwt-middleware v3 checks a DPoP proof's signature, its HTTP method and URL, the access-token hash and the key thumbprint, and that it "checks the proof's age to prevent replay attacks." In the v3.0.0 code we checked, that age check is the whole replay defence: by default a proof is accepted for 300 seconds after it was made, and the library keeps no record of proof ids (jti) it has already seen, although the repository's migration guide lists "Replay protection via jti and iat claims". RFC 9449 requires the time limit and leaves a single-use check to the server's choice. We read this to mean that anyone who copies a token and its proof from a log or a proxy can send the same request to the same method and URL within those five minutes, and it passes every check the post lists.
  13. 13BI-FIND-2020-0004 · The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisionsEvery delegation design in this corpus reduces to one grant type from a January 2020 RFC written for services, by engineers at Microsoft, Ping Identity, Yubico and Visa, that never mentions an agent. The standard defines an HTTP and JSON security token service: a client posts a subject token and, optionally, an actor token to the token endpoint and receives a new token for a named audience, with typed token identifiers so a SAML assertion can be traded for a JWT. The transaction-tokens draft mints its token through this exchange, the identity-chaining draft runs it before a JWT bearer grant to cross domains, Uber's exchange is conceptually based on it and its builder says the newer standards are not ready to implement as written, and the working group's agent draft composes it rather than replacing it. The agent-specific work is all profile; the base has not changed in six years.
  14. 14BI-FIND-2026-0377 · WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is callingThe draft defines no way for a verifier to discover whom to trust. Consumers MUST tie each trust domain to a preconfigured issuer or set of issuers and its trust anchors, distributed out of band, and -03 adds that "A credential MUST be validated only against the anchors bound to the trust domain named in its Workload Identifier." Revision -02 had let a deployment put an https URL in the iss claim to find keys through a jwks_uri, provided the issuer was configured out of band, with validators then required to enforce an issuer allowlist. Revision -03 removes that route, the allowlist rule and the MUST NOT on looking up anchors from the token, keeping section 9.1's warning that resolving iss to a key set would accept credentials from anyone able to run an issuer. On revocation, the draft "does not define a revocation mechanism for WITs and does not rely on one". A deployment MAY run a Token Status List or a jti deny-list, and then every WIT MUST carry a jti. Short lifetimes stay the main defence for both credentials, and -03 adds that deprovisioning a workload or stopping issuance does not invalidate credentials already issued.
  15. 15BI-FIND-2026-1155 · In Huawei's reworked OAuth draft, evidence signed by the token's subject can narrow access but never widen itThe key has to come from the authorization server's own records, and the draft closes the shortcuts around that. Before conveying a key, the server must authenticate the subject (or rely on a trusted provisioning process) and verify control of the private key unless such a process already has: "Merely receiving a public key is not proof of private-key control." It must not copy a key the client supplied in a request into subject_keys without establishing it through that same process, and a client's ordinary access or refresh token must not, by itself, be enough to create, replace or reactivate a key. The resource server must not accept a key from the client or from the evidence, must pick exactly one key by an integrity-protected key id or another unambiguous rule, and, when it introspects, must use that answer rather than merge it with the token's copy. Revoking a key leaves already-issued JWT access tokens unchanged; for prompt revocation the authors say deployments should use short-lived tokens, introspection or both.

›In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on JWT would have you leave with.

  1. Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in production, and has published sample tokens and a latency chart. Its security token service gives each hop a fresh token scoped to one audience, with a lifetime "in the order of minutes" (both sample payloads expire 300 seconds after issue), and the token carries the attested chain from the engineer to the agent making the call. Uber says "the system has been adopted by thousands of internal agents" and reports the exchange API's P99 as "consistently below 40 milliseconds" under current load; its chart sits mostly under 10 ms, with one spike reaching 40. The post covers this identity layer. Uber frames dynamic access control and a unified policy enforcement plane as its direction on top of it, and names session and intent claims as additions the token could carry in the future.

    Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in productionBI-FIND-2026-0081

  2. Mattson, SecureAuth's chief executive, argues that a model cannot be secured the way tested software is: it is non-deterministic, and a request phrased another way, or in another language, gets around whatever it was told not to do. His advice is to "just assume that it could do anything any time" and put the guardrails around the model, so that a financial transaction or a database change the agent attempts is approved and recorded. He cites Anthropic as saying no guardrail is adequate. The statement we take him to mean, Anthropic's of 12 June, which he recalls as "three weeks ago, I believe", says the company suspects perfect jailbreak resistance "is not currently possible for any model provider", while defending its own safeguards as strong. Briefings we have published on other sources move the control off the model too: a Silverfort guest calls guardrails on a probabilistic system guidance rather than control, ClearVector's John Laliberte compares them to bowling bumpers, and a zero-trust framework paper for agents adds a session-enforcement layer.

    When the model cannot be trusted, control what the agent can reach, checked on every actionBI-FIND-2026-0151

  3. OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.

    OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687

›Cited in 218 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in production

    Article · · Uber Engineering blog · Matt Mathew et al. · May 21, 2026

  2. When the model cannot be trusted, control what the agent can reach, checked on every action

    Podcast · · Tech Talks Daily · AI Agent Security: Why Identity and Access Control Matter More Than Guardrails · Aug 11, 2026

  3. OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens

    Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026

  4. A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind them

    Article · · International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research (Vol 8, Issue 3) · Thrinaath Vajragowni · May 23, 2026

  5. A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026

  6. AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026

  7. Asor's agent-chain draft now says a chain keeps verifying after its principal leaves, until expiry or revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rafael Asor · Oct 28, 2026

  8. OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026

  9. Transaction Tokens carry who started a request through internal services and define no list of the hops in between

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Atul Tulshibagwale et al. · Jul 30, 2026

  10. The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026

  11. OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026

  12. The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026

  13. An AI agent can do its damage within one session, so a practitioner wants a kill switch on its whole identity

    Podcast · · Identity Decoded · Beyond the vault: Why AI agents force us to rethink Privileged Access Management (PAM) · Jul 15, 2026

  14. Google's AP2 v0.2 ties an agent's purchase to the merchant's own signed checkout by hash

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  15. A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026

  16. Hassan's agent delegation draft now classes granting access as execute, not write

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Amr Hassan · Oct 22, 2026

  17. Palo Alto's own survey puts machine identities at 109 per person, up from 82 a year earlier

    Podcast · · Packet Protector · PP115: Palo Alto Networks: Reality of 109 to 1: Securing Machine Identities and AI Agents (Sponsored) · Jun 23, 2026

  18. A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that step

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 17, 2026

  19. W3C's JOSE and COSE rules for credentials admit there is no standard way yet to fetch a JWK from a DID URL

    Article · · W3C · Michael Jones et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  20. SPIFFE's JWT-SVID spec says its own tokens can be replayed, and sets no hard cap on how long they live

    Article · · SPIFFE project (GitHub) · SPIFFE project · Jul 1, 2026

  21. Sello has the services an AI agent calls sign its receipts; the agent can't fake them, but it can go around them

    Paper · · arXiv · Juan Figuera · Jun 2, 2026

  22. An agent-mandate draft checks who may delegate, and now intends to carry its chain in Asor's format

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Claudiu Hulea, Braincap SRL · Oct 24, 2026

  23. An agent-evidence draft no longer checks every actor in a delegation chain before a service admits a call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shameer Thaha et al. · Oct 19, 2026

  24. MCP's client credentials extension puts the secret in the form body, while its server rule names HTTP Basic

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Oct 23, 2026

  25. In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026

  26. A draft joining four agent records on one hash reports no valid joint run and now claims less about what agents did

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih et al. · Aug 16, 2026

  27. SPIFFE trust domain names have no registrar, and the core spec warns that roles in a credential can go stale

    Article · · SPIFFE project (GitHub) · SPIFFE project · Jul 1, 2026

  28. Register a platform's identity provider once, not each agent: trust rests on its issuer, with no revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Carleton et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  29. An OAuth draft lets the API, not the agent, describe the approval, and now name the key the token is bound to

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Jun 25, 2026

  30. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  31. OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  32. OAuth's SPIFFE draft opens metadata URLs to all three credentials and says what a self-served key cannot prove

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jun 15, 2026

  33. Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026

  34. An agent audit draft says the agent is not trusted, yet lets the agent's operator run the audit store

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mirja Kühlewind et al. · Sep 7, 2026

  35. Raut's revised agent draft keeps token exchange out of the model's reach, and concedes the token carries no evidence of it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ashay Raut · May 22, 2026

  36. AGTP's merchant draft has agents check the seller before paying, but the seller's own server runs the swap check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  37. Cross-App Access draft warns that one stolen sign-in token could reach every app the identity provider permits

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · May 21, 2026

  38. RFC 9207's issuer check stops at the redirect, and n8n's token-exchange flaw sat just past it

    Article · · WorkOS · Maria Paktiti · Jul 20, 2026

  39. IETF workload practices draft describes single-audience JWTs in place of stored secrets and discourages token exchange

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  40. Global Token Revocation must end a user's refresh tokens; their access tokens can outlive the call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki, Okta · Feb 25, 2026

  41. A 'human approved' field is not evidence, says Schrock's draft; only a bound, signed approval counts

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Jul 3, 2026

  42. WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026

  43. AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026

  44. OAuth adopts Delegate SD-JWT, which traces each hand-off to the issuer but never checks that authority narrowed

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Gareth Oliver et al. · Apr 22, 2026

  45. Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  46. Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026

  47. Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026

  48. NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026

  49. Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apart

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Oct 28, 2026

  50. Drake's agent registry names who may issue an agent's token, and its answer has no signature of its own

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  51. Drake's agent-mail draft puts hardware-maker proof on hold, but its abstract still offers it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  52. One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  53. OAuth tokens prove an agent's rights, not a person's consent; revision 05 adds a day-long grant with spend caps

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 27, 2026

  54. OAuth scopes grant agents far more than the task needs, four voices say, and authorization handed from agent to agent has no settled pattern yet

    Field signals · · 7 voices from the field · Oct 2025 to Oct 2026

  55. LinkedIn, Uber and State Farm already run SPIRE for workload identity, and each plans to extend it

    Field signals · · 12 voices from the field · Nov 2024 to Oct 2026

  56. A cross-domain transaction-token grant now names AI agents as a use and keeps the call chain at home

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · George Fletcher et al. · Sep 10, 2026

  57. An IETF draft caps each attestation verdict at its worst check and leaves the unchecked parts to the relying party

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · May 26, 2026

  58. Apps staff build with AI app builders leave a trail in certificate logs and DNS, a Cerebras security lead says

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 21, 2026

  59. IBM Research puts agent identity in a SPIFFE and OAuth sidecar; Maia Iyer calls authorization policy still open

    Podcast · · Kubernetes Bytes · Your AI Agent Has Too Much Access | Fixing Agent Identity · Sep 15, 2026

  60. The IETF names workloads with a URI on the owner's domain; revision -04 pins down how two names are compared

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Oct 23, 2026

  61. Agents would show a signed user goal with each OAuth scope request; the draft leaves open how the server checks it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 19, 2026

  62. RATS wraps attestation messages in one envelope and requires composite evidence to be bound together

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Dec 11, 2025

  63. An undotted configuration key and a broad workload identity token let a GitHub issue reach a Gemini CLI cloud project

    Podcast · · CyberWire Daily · The wrong kind of access. [Research Saturday] · Oct 17, 2026

  64. An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  65. An IETF draft ties attestation evidence to the certificate key, but only for the moment of the check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Aug 15, 2026

  66. Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  67. Sysdig's AI-run ransomware case used old tricks: default logins, stored keys, a root password of unknown origin

    Article · · Sysdig · Michael Clark · Jul 1, 2026

  68. OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Omri Gazitt et al. · Jan 11, 2026

  69. An OAuth agent profile has the token server block any widening of scope, and leaves revoking the chain optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sanjeev Kumar, Orchestrum Technologies LLP · Aug 30, 2026

  70. An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cut

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Angel Cruz · Feb 7, 2026

  71. The SD-JWT standard that agent drafts build on never mentions agents and leaves key binding to each verifier

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Daniel Fett et al. · Nov 20, 2025

  72. OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation process

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Roland Hedberg et al. · Feb 17, 2026

  73. Human Delegation Provenance is now an audit record only, and one that cannot prove it is complete

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Oct 6, 2026

  74. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  75. In Huawei's reworked OAuth draft, evidence signed by the token's subject can narrow access but never widen it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Cheng-Kang Chu et al. · Sep 1, 2026

  76. Access reviews and fixed least privilege do not fit AI agents that change tactics, an identity show host argues

    Podcast · · The Identity Jedi Show: Where Identity Meets Strategy · Identity runs in cycles, and we're standing at the next turn. · Oct 7, 2026

  77. The PEDIGREE draft has verifiers re-check every ancestor of an agent's token, without saying how to fetch them

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Apr 25, 2026

  78. OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026

  79. The signing-key draft under AAuth offers eight ways to trust a key, and only one says who the agent works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 13, 2026

  80. OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026

  81. Auth0's own Claude Code tutorial runs the agent on the developer's login and hands it fifteen admin scopes

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Manish Hatwalne · Sep 29, 2026

  82. NIST's agent identity work starts from OAuth, SPIFFE and SCIM and defers agents from outside the enterprise

    Article · · NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence · Harold Booth et al. · Feb 5, 2026

  83. NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph

    Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  84. MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up

    Article · · Model Context Protocol (modelcontextprotocol.io) · MCP project et al. · Jun 18, 2026

  85. AAuth's bootstrap guide makes device attestation optional and lets a new key mean a new agent

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 28, 2026

  86. A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026

  87. DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names

    Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation (KYA-OS) · Dylan Hobbs et al. · Jul 29, 2026

  88. In Accenture's agent-delegation design, no outside party checks the user, and revocation is left open

    Paper · · arXiv · Srikumar K. Subramanian et al. · Sep 25, 2026

  89. A survey rates only workload identity ready for agents, and argues no standard can tell what an agent intends

    Paper · · arXiv · Takumi Otsuka et al. · Apr 25, 2026

  90. AAuth's R3 lets an agent ask for an API's named operations, and a person approve one exact call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  91. AAuth Events gives an agent an inbox, and the subscription tells the resource which agent is listening

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  92. Hardt's AAuth Budgets caps what an agent may spend at each resource, and hides the person's real limit from it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026

  93. Coetzee's agent token is good for one declared call, and the hard part is hashing that call the same way twice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rudolf Jacobus Coetzee · Jul 19, 2026

  94. Transaction tokens are nearly a standard, and there is still no agreed place in them for the agent

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #449 - Decoded - Transaction Tokens with George Fletcher · Sep 21, 2026

  95. A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visible

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Su-hyeon Forten Lee · Oct 3, 2026

  96. Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  97. Google's AP2 lets a verifier trust a credential issuer or the agent's provider, with no trust list or revocation

    Article · · ap2-protocol.org · Google · Apr 28, 2026

  98. Three MCP auth flaws in a month, and the spec had already written the rule the SDKs skipped

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 2, 2026

  99. The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  100. OpenAI's full report names every credential the agents took, and an alert dismissed two weeks before the breach

    Article · · OpenAI · OpenAI · Aug 26, 2026

  101. OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025

  102. The IETF's workload-identity architecture gives AI agents one subsection, calling an agent a delegated workload

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  103. The 'intent' in the Agentic JWT draft is a workflow step, and the agent reports its own fingerprint

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abhishek Goswami · Jul 1, 2026

  104. Two ways to give an AI agent an OAuth identity clashed in April; a draft now lets them work together

    Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Securing Non-Human Identities in the Age of Agentic AI with Sarah Cecchetti, Director of Product Management at Semperis · Apr 28, 2026

  105. Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up

    Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026

  106. The agent risk two CISOs fear is manipulation, not a stolen credential

    Podcast · · Defense in Depth · Identity and Access Management (IAM) in an Agentic AI World · Jul 23, 2026

  107. Agent identifiers are split across JWT-based, SPIFFE, WIMSE and proprietary schemes, an identity lead says

    Podcast · · Identity Decoded · Winning in securing agentic identity: Start with one team, one use case · Aug 12, 2026

  108. IPC passes a delegation chain between services; its signature proves only the last signer

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ravi Kant Sharma, Ericsson · Jul 23, 2026

  109. xChk ships human OIDC portfolios and a separate agent approval API

    Paper · · arXiv · Sean MacGuire · Jul 15, 2026

  110. A valid delegation chain cannot replace required human approval or proof of key possession

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Jul 6, 2026

  111. A July OAuth draft keeps agent identity stable as keys rotate

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Jul 5, 2026

  112. Batch delegation assigns each permission to an agent, then filters at token exchange

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuan Ni et al. · Jul 3, 2026

  113. One implementer found a transaction-token rule that let any scope through; the OAuth group fixed it in weeks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dhruv Agnihotri · Jun 23, 2026

  114. A June OAuth draft logs each hand-off between AI agents, but the per-hop limits the act claim lacks are optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Jun 8, 2026

  115. Atlassian's first draft for offline delegation banned bearer handles; revision 05 just recommends sender binding

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Larry Zhu et al. · May 22, 2026

  116. An AI agent's refused action can be approved only by someone its mandate names, says a revised draft

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Lars Kersten Kroehl, CryptoKRI GmbH · May 21, 2026

  117. A preprint cuts off every sub-agent within about 40 seconds of its parent stopping, with no revocation server

    Paper · · arXiv · Saurabh Deochake, SentinelOne · May 20, 2026

  118. WorkOS hands a personal AI agent a key its user owns, then contradicts itself on whether the key can be narrower

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · May 15, 2026

  119. RFC 9967 lets SCIM report a deactivated account and leaves what that means to each sender and receiver

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · May 14, 2026

  120. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  121. Three vendors put MCP controls in three different places in May, and only Auth0's was GA

    Release tracker · · 10 vendors' release notes · May 2026

  122. A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026

  123. AITH claims 4.7 million agent checks a second, but the test simulated its post-quantum signatures

    Paper · · arXiv · Zhaoliang Chen · Apr 9, 2026

  124. A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them

    Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026

  125. OpenID agent-claims draft adds a provider-set user, application or agent label; scores stay each provider's own

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Mar 26, 2026

  126. An agent-credential draft carries a hash of the user's instruction that its own verification steps never check

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chudah Yakung, Attest · Mar 26, 2026

  127. AIP puts an agent's delegation chain in the token; its perfect score against attacks tests rules only AIP has

    Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 25, 2026

  128. Outside Azure, Argo CD uses stored secrets for repositories; a March plan for per-project identity is still open

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded March 24, 2026

  129. A KubeCon demo moves MCP servers' OAuth checks into a gateway, safe only if nothing can reach a server directly

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded March 24, 2026

  130. A cross-domain agent trust draft requires the call chain, then leaves its format to a version that never came

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Daniel King et al. · Mar 15, 2026

  131. OAuth 2.1's October draft bans plain PKCE and adds browser-app rules; 2.1-only clients can fail on older servers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  132. An OAuth client brokering many tools, as agent services do, can let a rogue tool take over a user's other tools

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tim Würtele et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  133. A Huawei agent draft keeps one 'master agent' as gatekeeper and drops the line that had servers re-check it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuan Ni et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  134. An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  135. Auth0's Go JWT middleware v3 adds DPoP but accepts a reused proof for five minutes, and bearer tokens by default

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Kunal Dawar · Feb 27, 2026

  136. Auth0's AgentCore guide says prompts alone are not enough, then lets the prompt decide when to ask a person

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Kapil Patil · Feb 10, 2026

  137. A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026

  138. eBay researchers say AP2 does not make a payment mandate single-use, so they built a gateway that does

    Paper · · arXiv · Qianlong Lan et al. · Feb 6, 2026

  139. A China Mobile draft would end an agent's token when its task ends, if a webhook says so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Feb 4, 2026

  140. Raut's January draft put AI agents in two new transaction-token claims; by April he used OAuth's act and sub

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Ashay Raut · Jan 20, 2026

  141. SD-CWT requires a key-signed proof for each verifier, yet none of its three prototypes reports interop testing

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael Prorock et al. · Jan 13, 2026

  142. The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026

  143. In January Okta's agent product was in early access; Auth0 and Microsoft made machine-to-machine features GA

    Release tracker · · 7 vendors' release notes · Jan 2026

  144. SIG Auth's storage-token fix needs driver changes

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  145. Uber reports authorizing over 2 million service-to-service connections a second after staged rollout

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  146. State Farm moved SPIRE from many token issuers to one, then hit an AWS key quota and a 15-character name limit

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Nov 24, 2025

  147. CORAL's public agent server rejected forged messages but let a wrong key open the session stream

    Paper · · arXiv · Yedidel Louck et al. · Nov 5, 2025

  148. Auth0's case for Token Vault: take the user ID out of the token call and let the session prove whose token it is

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Abhishek Hingnikar, Okta · Nov 4, 2025

  149. On its authors' tasks, an LLM check of agent scopes works at one tool and refuses most valid three-tool requests

    Paper · · arXiv · Majed El Helou et al. · Oct 30, 2025

  150. Huawei-led OAuth draft lets clients chain narrower tokens offline but leaves revocation delivery out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Li Ruochen et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  151. Rosenberg and White's AAuth now has the resource server, not the agent, write and sign the approval text

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jonathan Rosenberg et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  152. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  153. Given 30 steps, the best computer-use agent solved four of 36 web hacking challenges, and newer Claude models scored lower

    Paper · · arXiv · Xiaoxue Ren et al. · Oct 14, 2025

  154. An October SCIM draft gives agents their own records, with security still unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 11, 2025

  155. A refresh-token thief who waits for the app to close slips past reuse detection

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Maria Vasilevskaya, Okta · Oct 8, 2025

  156. SPIFFE can authenticate an OAuth client; trust and registration still come first

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Oct 3, 2025

  157. One author's OpenID Connect for Agents proposal checks each delegation hop but makes the chain optional

    Paper · · arXiv · Subramanya Nagabhushanaradhya · Sep 30, 2025

  158. Agentic JWT binds an agent's token to its task and its own code, but it is one author's draft, not a standard

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2509.13597) · Abhishek Goswami · Sep 16, 2025

  159. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  160. Under Shared Signals 1.0 a sender may accept a subscription and send nothing, so agent revocation needs a backup

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Atul Tulshibagwale et al. · Aug 29, 2025

  161. A WSO2 draft puts the AI agent in OAuth consent and the access token, but not how the agent gets its credential

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thilina Shashimal Senarath et al. · Aug 26, 2025

  162. Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025

  163. A Tsinghua blockchain design for AI agents backs its defense claims with a table and reports no attack run

    Paper · · arXiv · Zhenhua Zou et al. · Aug 2, 2025

  164. Sean O'Dell says Shared Signals audiences have stopped asking what CAEP is and started asking how to deploy it

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #361 - Identiverse 2025 - Sean O'Dell on Harnessing CAEP Abilities with Event-Driven Identity · Jul 14, 2025

  165. The July 2025 Cross App Access draft lets the IdP decide app-to-app access and treats agents as plain clients

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 2, 2025

  166. A survey of MCP and A2A attacks pairs each identity threat with a fix, and tests none of them

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohamed Amine Ferrag et al. · Jun 29, 2025

  167. A code scanner's top find in 583 MCP servers was hard-coded keys; tool poisoning needed an MCP-specific scanner

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohammed Mehedi Hasan et al. · Jun 16, 2025

  168. ETDI would sign MCP tool definitions against lookalikes, but leaves open who vouches for the publisher's key

    Paper · · arXiv · Manish Bhatt et al. · Jun 2, 2025

  169. W3C Data Integrity proofs name their purpose, so a verifier can refuse a credential signature offered as a login

    Article · · W3C · Manu Sporny et al. · May 15, 2025

  170. The first Agent Name Service paper puts capabilities in the name and leaves protocol translation and governance out

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.10609) / OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Ken Huang et al. · May 15, 2025

  171. A 'zero trust' registry against AI tool squatting still has to trust its administrator

    Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025

  172. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  173. An early MCP security checklist was never tested, and the protocol has since adopted only part of it

    Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 11, 2025

  174. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  175. RFC 9711 standardizes the attestation token and sets no security floor for the device that signs it

    Article · · RFC Editor · Laurence Lundblade et al. · Apr 2025

  176. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  177. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  178. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  179. RFC 9679 lets a CBOR token name its holder's key by thumbprint alone, and leaves finding the key to the verifier

    Article · · RFC Editor · Kohei Isobe et al. · Dec 20, 2024

  180. In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Jun 17, 2024

  181. RFC 9597 exposes token claims in COSE headers without giving them extra trust

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Tobias Looker et al. · Jun 1, 2024

  182. DIF's Presentation Exchange lets a verifier ask for credentials, but not ask who is presenting them for whom

    Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation · Daniel Buchner et al. · Apr 25, 2024

  183. OpenID Connect Core says only issuer plus subject identify a user; email must never be the key

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Nat Sakimura et al. · Dec 15, 2023

  184. JWT sub and sub_id must identify the same subject

    Article · · RFC Editor · Annabelle Backman et al. · Dec 6, 2023

  185. Uber had workload identity on a quarter-million nodes two years before agents; certificates were the easy part

    Article · · Uber Engineering · Andrew Moore et al. · Nov 9, 2023

  186. RFC 9470 lets an API demand a fresher or stronger sign-in, with no shared scale for 'stronger'

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci et al. · Sep 8, 2023

  187. DPoP token binding depends on checks at the resource server

    Article · · RFC Editor · Daniel Fett et al. · Sep 2023

  188. Rich Authorization Requests need API-specific permission rules

    Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · May 1, 2023

  189. RATS keeps device-state appraisal separate from the decision to grant access

    Article · · RFC Editor · Henk Birkholz et al. · Jan 2023

  190. RFC 9207 has OAuth servers name themselves in each response; clients must refuse a missing name only where they expect one

    Article · · RFC Editor · Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen et al. · Mar 1, 2022

  191. RFC 9068 makes resource servers check a JWT access token's type and audience, and warns a client could pose as a user

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci, Okta · Oct 1, 2021

  192. CIBA's human-approval step carries a short matching code, not a description of the action

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Gonzalo Fernandez Rodriguez et al. · Sep 1, 2021

  193. Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021

  194. RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020

  195. OAuth's resource indicators RFC says servers should bind tokens to a resource, but requires it of neither side

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 1, 2020

  196. RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020

  197. The token exchange RFC that agent designs cite says its record of earlier actors is not for access decisions

    Article · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jan 1, 2020

  198. In draft FAPI, token binding did not make phished tokens useless: the attacker had the bound client spend them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 31, 2019

  199. RFC 8485 makes assurance values meaningful only within a named trust framework

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 12, 2018

  200. Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do

    Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018

  201. RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018

  202. CWT leaves required claims to the application, including issuer, audience and expiry

    Article · · RFC Editor / IETF · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2018

  203. RFC 8176 reports authentication methods separately from assurance classes

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2017

  204. A 2017 security proof for OpenID Connect assumes fixes the spec did not yet require

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Apr 27, 2017

  205. RFC 7800 gives a JWT one place to name its holder's key, and leaves the proof to each protocol

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 1, 2016

  206. In 2015, OpenID Connect discovery let an attacker's server choose where a client sent the user's code

    Paper · · arXiv · Christian Mainka et al. · Aug 18, 2015

  207. RFC 7591 asks OAuth servers to accept clients with no token, and calls their signed statements self-asserted

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 9, 2015

  208. OAuth's assertion framework is built for bearer assertions, and one can buy fresh tokens until it expires

    Article · · RFC Editor · B. Campbell et al. · May 1, 2015

  209. RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  210. RFC 7518 (2015) required one JWS signing algorithm, the shared-secret HS256, and barred accepting "none" by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015

  211. RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015

  212. RFC 7515 lets a signed JSON object name or carry its own key, and leaves trusting that key to the application

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  213. RFC 7523 lets a signed JWT authenticate an OAuth client or serve as a grant, and leaves replay checks optional

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015

  214. RFC 6819 warned in 2013 that servers receiving a token may reuse it, and offered audience binding and client-bound tokens

    Article · · RFC Editor · T. Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2013

  215. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012

  216. Richer's 2023 draft let each service in a call chain add a hash-linked token, but left serialization unfinished

    Draft · · IETF (individual Internet-Draft) · Justin Richer · Sep 15, 2023

  217. A 2025 workload identity draft kept credential exchange for crossing trust domains, and never to gain more trust

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster, Defakto · Mar 3, 2025

  218. Microsoft's 2023 keynote: workload standards should carry identity across service calls first, policy later

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Recorded May 31, 2023 · Uploaded June 17, 2024

Related terms

What appears alongside JWT in the same briefings.

JSON Web SignatureJSON Web EncryptionOAuthOAuth Token ExchangeOpenID ConnectmTLSDPoPSPIFFE

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