Model Context Protocol
MCP
By Boston Identity · Explained · 7 min read
The short answer
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard for connecting AI applications to tools and data. An AI app's client calls MCP servers that offer tools; protected servers accept only OAuth tokens issued for them.
- What it is
- A protocol
- Defined by
- MCP project specification, revision 2026-07-28
- Who it's for
- Teams connecting AI assistants and agents to company tools and data
- In our briefings
- 2523by month, last 12
What is Model Context Protocol?
MCP is an open protocol for connecting applications built on large language models (LLMs) to outside data sources and tools.S1 An AI coding tool, a chat app or a custom AI workflow can use it as one standard way to give a model the context it needs.S1
The application the user works in is the host, and it starts the connections.S1 Inside the host, a client is the connector that talks to an MCP server, a service that offers context and capabilities; the messages between them are JSON-RPC 2.0.S1 A server can offer resources (data), prompts (message templates) and tools, which are functions the model can run.S1
Authorization is optional in MCP.S4 When a server on an HTTP connection uses it, the server acts as an OAuth 2.1 resource server, the service that accepts access tokens, and the client acts as an OAuth 2.1 client on the user's behalf.S4 §Roles The specification does not cover how the authorization server is built.S4 §Roles It does require that server, which signs the user in and issues tokens, to implement OAuth 2.1 and to publish discovery metadata under RFC 8414 or OpenID Connect Discovery.S4 §Overview An implementation that connects over stdio (standard input and output) should not use this flow, and gets its credentials from the environment instead.S4
MCP is not a policy system. It says how a client gets a client ID and an OAuth token and how it presents the token.S4 The decision about who may do what is moving up into identity providers and agent gateways.1
How does Model Context Protocol work?
We follow one host application, with its MCP client, as it reaches a protected MCP server over HTTP and gets a token from that server's authorization server. The steps use the current revision, in which every request stands on its own.S2
Figure steps
- The client checks the protocol version
- The server points to its authorization server
- The client registers and the user signs in
- The client lists the tools
- The model picks a tool and the client calls it
- The server asks for more scope when it needs it
The MCP client checks the version, gets a token for one server from that server's authorization server, then lists and calls tools, and asks for more scope only when the server names what is missing.
Drawn from the MCP specification, revision 2026-07-28
Swipe for the full figure →
The client checks the protocol version
Every request names the protocol version it uses, in its _meta field and, on HTTP, in the MCP-Protocol-Version header.S2 A server that does not support that version must answer with an error that lists the versions it does support, and the client should retry with one they share.S2 Servers must offer a server/discover call, which a client may send first to learn those versions.S2 Revisions up to 2025-11-25 opened with an initialize handshake; the current revision has none.S2
The server points to its authorization server
A protected server must answer a request with a missing, invalid or expired token with HTTP 401.S4 Its WWW-Authenticate header should name the scopes the request needs.S4 The server must publish Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728), a document that tells clients which authorization server it uses, and clients must use it to find that server.S4 §Overview The client then reads the authorization server's own metadata, published under RFC 8414 or OpenID Connect Discovery; clients must support both.S4 §Overview
The client registers and the user signs in
Before the flow starts, the client must get a client ID.S4 Clients and authorization servers should support Client ID Metadata Documents, in which a client names itself with a web address that points to its own description.S4 §Overview,2 Pre-registration is another route. Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated and kept only for authorization servers that do not support metadata documents.S4 The authorization server signs the user in if needed and issues the token.S4 §Roles The client must name the MCP server in a resource parameter on both the authorization and token requests.S4 When the response carries an issuer (iss) value, the client must check it against the issuer it recorded, before it sends the authorization code to a token endpoint.S4
The client lists the tools
From here every HTTP request carries the token in an Authorization: Bearer header, never in the URL's query string.S4 The server must check that the token was issued for it as the audience, and must not accept or pass on any other token.S4 The client sends tools/list, and the server returns each tool's name, description and input schema.S3 The list may vary with the authorization on the request, for example showing only the tools the caller's scopes permit.S3
The model picks a tool and the client calls it
Tools are model-controlled: the model can find and call them on its own, based on the context and the user's prompt.S3 The protocol does not require any particular way of involving the user, but there should always be a person who can deny a call, and applications should show confirmation prompts.S3 The specification's security principles also ask hosts to get the user's consent before invoking a tool, though MCP cannot enforce them.S1 The client then sends tools/call with the tool's name and arguments. The server returns the result and sets isError when the tool itself failed.S3
The server asks for more scope when it needs it
If the token lacks a scope an operation needs, the server should answer HTTP 403 with the error insufficient_scope and list every scope the operation needs in one challenge.S4 A client acting for a user should then re-authorize for the scopes it already asked for plus the new ones, so it keeps what it had.S4 Clients should limit their retries and stop after a few failed attempts.S4
Why does Model Context Protocol matter now?
Many MCP servers are reachable with no sign-in at all. In one academic scan, 3,233 of the 7,973 remote servers that answered took no authentication.3 Of 119 servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client, 114 accepted any redirect address, which lets an attacker collect an authorization code.4 At Black Hat, a research team showed that a malicious server picks the sign-in address a client opens, and turned that into code running as the user.5
The tool descriptions a model reads are a second way in. In the MCPTox study, poisoned descriptions for 353 tools on 45 real servers led agents to misuse tools they already held, at rates up to 72.8% for o1-mini.6
In September, five vendors shipped controls for MCP servers, and three of them route an agent's tool calls through an identity check.7 In a February concept paper, NIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence listed MCP among the standards it is considering for agent identity.8
Where does it fit?
| Compared with | How Model Context Protocol differs |
|---|---|
| OAuth | OAuth is the framework underneath. MCP's authorization uses a chosen subset of OAuth 2.1 and related standards: a protected MCP server is an OAuth 2.1 resource server, and the MCP client is an OAuth 2.1 client.S4 §Roles |
| Dynamic Client Registration | Dynamic Client Registration lets a client register itself with an authorization server at run time. MCP's current specification deprecates it in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents and keeps it only for authorization servers that lack them.S4 §Overview |
| Cross App Access | Cross App Access puts the company's identity provider between an agent and each application.9 MCP carries it as an opt-in extension, so an employee signs in once at the identity provider instead of approving each server.10 |
| OpenPort Protocol | OpenPort is a separate proposal for exposing tools to agents through a server-side gateway, and it requires that an agent never see tools its credential cannot use.11 MCP only allows a server to vary its tool list by the caller's authorization.S3 |
What goes wrong?
- Clients must treat tool annotations, the hints about how a tool behaves, as untrusted unless they come from a trusted server.S3 §Tool Tool descriptions can carry attacks too: poisoned descriptions have steered agents into misusing tools they already held.6
- Authorization is optional in the specification,S4 which also says MCP cannot enforce its consent and access principles itself and asks implementers to build them.S1 In one scan, four in ten remote servers took no authentication.3
- A server must not accept or pass on a token issued for anything else,S4 so a gateway that hands a person's token to the tools behind it is out of specification.12
- Servers that accept anonymous registration with any redirect address let attackers collect authorization codes.4 The current specification has deprecated Dynamic Client Registration, the route those servers use.S4 §Overview
- Servers must validate all tool inputs, implement proper access controls, rate-limit tool calls and sanitize tool outputs.S3 Clients should show a tool's inputs to the user before calling the server, to avoid malicious or accidental data leaks, and should log tool use for audit.S3
- The specification makes the client a plain OAuth client. Nothing in the token says which person an agent acts for, and delegation is left to optional extensions.13
What should a security leader ask?
- 01
Which MCP servers can our AI tools reach today, and which of them accept requests with no authentication?
- 02
Does each MCP server we run check that a token was issued for it, and does any gateway in front of it forward a user's token to other services?
- 03
Which of our MCP clients still register through Dynamic Client Registration, and when do they move to Client ID Metadata Documents?
- 04
Which tool calls run without a person approving them, and where are tool inputs and calls logged for audit?
- 05
When an agent calls a tool for an employee, can our logs show which person it acted for?
Sources
- S1
Specification - Model Context ProtocolModel Context Protocol project · Latest revision
- S2
Versioning and Compatibility - Model Context ProtocolModel Context Protocol project · Revision 2026-07-28 (latest)
- S3
Tools - Model Context ProtocolModel Context Protocol project · Latest revision
- S4
Authorization - Model Context ProtocolModel Context Protocol project · Latest revision
›Evidence: 13 claims from 10 briefings
- 1BI-FIND-2026-0069 · The rules cover one agent acting for one person; they break when that agent hands work to other agentsMCP with its community-added OAuth layer is the de facto tool-call protocol, and the panel is unanimous that it is not a policy system: it says how a client gets a token, not who is allowed to do what. The access decision is being pulled up into identity providers and agent gateways that sit above the protocol, which is exactly where Okta, Microsoft Entra and Ping Identity already sit for humans.
- 2BI-FIND-2026-0704 · Three vendors now route MCP tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's is generally availableOkta and Ping both shipped client ID metadata documents (CIMD), and CyberArk went the other way. With CIMD, an agent or app names itself with a URL that points to its own metadata, and needs no prior registration. Okta made CIMD a beta for AI agents and GA in preview for OIDC apps on September 16. Ping's Advanced Identity Cloud shipped it on September 29. CyberArk's September MCP feature relies on dynamic client registration (DCR) instead. Okta and Ping also changed their DCR support in the same releases, so neither has dropped it.
- 3BI-FIND-2026-0945 · 114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sentFour in ten of the remote MCP servers the authors found answered with no authentication: 3,233 of 7,973 servers that responded to an MCP handshake, against 2,428 using OAuth and 2,312 using static tokens or API keys. When the authors sampled the open ones, most were test or demonstration deployments with nothing sensitive in them. One was an internal customer-records server, meant to be private, that let anyone query more than 5,000 customer records (CVE-2025-61510). The count covers hosts that FOFA and Shodan index, so servers those engines miss are not in it.
- 4BI-FIND-2026-0944 · 114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sentOf the 119 remote MCP servers whose OAuth setups Zhou, Zhang and colleagues could test end to end, all of which register clients dynamically, 114 accepted any redirect address from an anonymous registrant. That lets an attacker register a client with a callback of their own, get the victim to click a genuine sign-in link, and collect the authorization code; seven of the nine CVEs the authors obtained trace to this flaw. Every server tested had at least one flaw, 325 in all. The 119 are what was left of 1,118 servers advertising a registration endpoint after the authors dropped duplicates, unreachable hosts and 316 servers behind enterprise access controls, so the rate describes servers open to outside registration, not MCP as a whole.
- 5BI-FIND-2026-0746 · An MCP server picks the login URL its client opens, and that was enough to run code on users' machinesMCP's sign-in flow lets the server tell the client where to send the user, and Zhong's team showed that the client passes that whole authorization URL to whatever opens it. A malicious or compromised server turned that into code running as the user: a PowerShell sub-expression through the widely used npm `open` package on Windows, which affected Google's Gemini CLI before version 0.17; file and SMB links that ran local or remote scripts; script injection in browser-based clients; and, in Anthropic's MCP Inspector, a stolen CSRF token that let a request start a local command. The fix in the official TypeScript SDK blocks javascript:, data: and vbscript: links but not file: or SMB, and the specification gives no rule for validating these URLs.
- 6BI-FIND-2025-0039 · MCPTox: a poisoned tool description steers most agents into misusing the tools they already holdA tool's description is enough to turn an agent against its user. MCPTox wrote poisoned descriptions for 353 tools on 45 real MCP servers and found agents acting on them across the board: o1-mini at 72.8%, DeepSeek-R1 at 70.9% and Phi-4 at 70.2%, down to 8.3% for Mistral, with refusals at 3% or below for every model. The attack needs no extra permission, because the poisoned text tells the agent to use a tool it already holds, such as reading an SSH private key or redirecting email to an attacker's address. The headline rates average three prompt settings, the paper's case counts do not add up, and its claim that more capable models are more vulnerable rests on one model family and breaks within it. No defense was tested.
- 7BI-FIND-2026-0703 · Three vendors now route MCP tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's is generally availableFive vendors shipped controls for MCP servers in September. Three of them proxy an agent's tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's proxy is generally available. Cloudflare's MCP server portals went GA on September 24. Okta's Agent Gateway APIs went to beta on September 16, and Google put MCP behind API Gateway in preview. The other two do different jobs: CyberArk registers MCP servers automatically when they support dynamic registration, and SailPoint lists them through its JDBC and REST connectors. The vendors agree that MCP servers need an identity control point. They do not yet agree on what it should do.
- 8BI-FIND-2026-0686 · NIST's agent identity work starts from OAuth, SPIFFE and SCIM and defers agents from outside the enterpriseNIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence framed agent identity in February as a question of applying what exists, not inventing something new. Its concept paper lists OAuth, OpenID Connect, SPIFFE, SCIM, the NGAC access-control standard and MCP as candidates it is "currently considering", and names none of the agent-specific IETF work, such as ID-JAG, the WIMSE drafts or token exchange for agents. It keeps human delegation and logging in scope and leaves agents from outside the enterprise for a later effort. The next steps are a possible project description and a lab-built practice guide, with no date; the comment period closed on 2 April.
- 9BI-FIND-2026-0261 · Okta's answer to agent sprawl: put the identity provider between every agent and every appOkta's product chief presents Cross App Access as the company's answer for agents: the identity provider sits between an agent and each application, an administrator approves the connection once, and the agent receives a short-lived token with no consent prompt. An agent acting for a person gets the overlap of that person's permissions and its own granted scopes; an autonomous one gets its own identity. The mechanism is the identity assertion grant now in the IETF OAuth working group, and the Model Context Protocol carries it as an extension. Kahn claims more than twenty-five software vendors are adopting it and names only Anthropic.
- 10BI-FIND-2026-0678 · MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that upMCP now has a stable way for a company's identity provider to stand between an employee's AI client and every MCP server. The client trades the employee's single sign-on ID token at the IdP for an ID-JAG, using OAuth token exchange, and hands that to the MCP server's own authorization server as a JWT assertion; the IdP checks group, role and conditional-access policy before issuing, and the employee sees one corporate login instead of a consent screen per server. The ID-JAG must be addressed to that authorization server, and when the client names a resource the access token must be restricted to it. The extension is opt-in: a server signals support in its authorization-server metadata.
- 11BI-FIND-2026-1239 · OpenPort holds agent writes as drafts for an operator by default; its own tests check less than its spec asksIn OpenPort, tool discovery is part of authorization. The manifest an agent fetches must not show tools or fields its credential is not allowed to use, and error details should be redacted so a denial does not reveal privileged names. The authors argue that tool-exposure protocols such as MCP often leave which tools are visible under which credentials to each server. Delegated OAuth tokens must be mapped to minimal OpenPort scopes and policy windows before any tool access, and the protocol names no identity provider: it "mandates that authorization decisions are made server-side and are auditable."
- 12BI-FIND-2026-0191 · MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extensionThe specification binds every token to one server and forbids passing it on. Clients MUST send a resource parameter naming the server's canonical URI on every authorization and token request, and MUST check the issuer on every authorization response, the two controls against mix-up attacks. Servers MUST validate the audience of every token and 'MUST NOT accept or transit any other tokens'. Tokens travel only in the Authorization header, refresh tokens stay confidential and are never assumed, and offline access should not be advertised. That is the same anti-pattern the six-vendor agent draft names, a tool forwarding the token it received, and it is the rule a token-passthrough gateway breaks: a proxy that hands a person's token to the tools behind it is out of specification, whatever the vendor calls it.
- 13BI-FIND-2026-0189 · MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extensionAs of the 28 July 2026 revision, an MCP client is an OAuth 2.1 client and an MCP server is an OAuth 2.1 resource server, and that is the whole identity model. Authorization is optional; HTTP transports SHOULD use it, and 'implementations using an STDIO transport SHOULD NOT follow this specification, and instead retrieve credentials from the environment'. The authorization server is out of scope. There is no actor claim, no on-behalf-of flow, no token exchange and no transaction-token profile: nothing in the token says whom the agent is acting for, which is what the Identiverse summit panel meant by 'not a policy system' and what WorkOS meant by the gateway being undefined. Anything of that kind is routed to the new extension model, optional and additive, in a separate repository. This page is the baseline against which the summit's forecast, that the specification gains a delegated-identity mechanism within a year, will be graded.
›In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on Model Context Protocol would have you leave with.
An MCP Events subscription inherits none of the limits on the access token that created it, which is short-lived, narrow in scope and checked on every request. The draft's design sketch keys a webhook subscription on the principal, the delivery URL, the event name and its arguments; the token, its scopes and its expiry are not part of that key. The principal MUST be authenticated and authorized at subscribe time, and after that the sketch says the server 'SHOULD periodically re-verify permissions'. WorkOS's Maria Paktiti: "There is no interval, no MUST, and no conformance test behind it." The lifetime is negotiable up to no expiry: ttlMs: null requests a subscription that never expires, and a server that grants it returns refreshBefore: null, so no refresh comes. Hence her line that 'the TTL you grant is your revocation window'. In her worked example, IT revokes a departing employee's access to a customer-contracts folder on Monday morning and the 24-hour subscription's next refresh lands Tuesday morning; a server that checked only at subscribe time, which is all the draft strictly requires, delivers every contract edit in between [figure 2].
ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check scheduleBI-FIND-2026-0401
The WorkOS CLI writes its MCP server into a coding agent only when the user opts in: the setup offer it may show after workos auth login or workos install defaults to No and stops asking once declined, a non-interactive, CI or --json run installs nothing, and opting in takes an explicit command such as workos mcp install or workos setup --yes. Once connected, the agent acts as the person who signed it in. Paktiti writes that the agent "inherits your dashboard role and can only do what your account is allowed to do." It works against one environment at a time, starts in a sandbox environment, and operates on production only when the user tells it to. Teams that want tighter limits get three independent admin settings (Enable, Allow production access and Allow write access), and all three are on by default. Apart from those settings and the sandbox default, the post describes no way to give the agent less than the user's own role.
Opt in to WorkOS's MCP server and your coding agent acts as you, with write and production access on by defaultBI-FIND-2026-2401
Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in production, and has published sample tokens and a latency chart. Its security token service gives each hop a fresh token scoped to one audience, with a lifetime "in the order of minutes" (both sample payloads expire 300 seconds after issue), and the token carries the attested chain from the engineer to the agent making the call. Uber says "the system has been adopted by thousands of internal agents" and reports the exchange API's P99 as "consistently below 40 milliseconds" under current load; its chart sits mostly under 10 ms, with one spike reaching 40. The post covers this identity layer. Uber frames dynamic access control and a unified policy enforcement plane as its direction on top of it, and names session and intent claims as additions the token could carry in the future.
Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in productionBI-FIND-2026-0081
›Cited in 252 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check schedule
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 1, 2026
- Opt in to WorkOS's MCP server and your coding agent acts as you, with write and production access on by default
Article · · WorkOS · Maria Paktiti · Sep 30, 2026
- Uber runs per-hop token exchange with a full actor chain for AI agents in production
Article · · Uber Engineering blog · Matt Mathew et al. · May 21, 2026
- When the model cannot be trusted, control what the agent can reach, checked on every action
Podcast · · Tech Talks Daily · AI Agent Security: Why Identity and Access Control Matter More Than Guardrails · Aug 11, 2026
- Auth0 ships an agent gateway in beta and moves the identity form into the chat so the agent never sees the card
Video · · Okta · Uploaded September 24, 2026
- When AI agents hand work to other agents, the person who started the job can get lost
Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · NHI & AI Identity Summit : Governing AI · Sep 7, 2026
- MCP's July spec ties client credentials to the authorization server that issued them
Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026
- Singapore's regulator: each AI agent should have its own identity and, as a rule, no more access than its user
Article · · Infocomm Media Development Authority (Singapore) · May 20, 2026
- AAuth gives every agent its own key, then keeps the delegation chain out of the token on purpose
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt, Hellō · Sep 25, 2026
- The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026
- GitHub's AI triage agent got more consistent once code, not the model, ran the easy checks
Article · · The GitHub Blog · Man Yue Mo et al. · Jan 20, 2026
- The fraud question may shift to: is this your agent, and what is it authorized to do?
Podcast · · AI Security and the Law · Blurred Lines: How AI Is Rewriting the Rules of Fraud, Identity, and Defense · Aug 21, 2026
- Hassan's agent delegation draft now classes granting access as execute, not write
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Amr Hassan · Oct 22, 2026
- In an a16z survey of 100 CISOs, agent security climbs the 2027 list and access management slips
Article · · Andreessen Horowitz · Stephenie Zhang et al. · Oct 28, 2026
- Palo Alto's own survey puts machine identities at 109 per person, up from 82 a year earlier
Podcast · · Packet Protector · PP115: Palo Alto Networks: Reality of 109 to 1: Securing Machine Identities and AI Agents (Sponsored) · Jun 23, 2026
- OAuth token exchange does not guarantee a sub-agent stays inside its parent's access
Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 18, 2026
- OWASP's AIVSS lifts a CVSS 2.1 agent flaw to 7.1, and all ten worked examples land High or Critical
Article · · OWASP AIVSS project · Ken Huang et al. · Oct 22, 2026
- MCP's November 2025 security guide makes proxy servers ask consent for each client before forwarding a login
Article · · Model Context Protocol · Model Context Protocol project · Nov 25, 2025
- Backstage gives an agent a token that names only its user, so the agent can run anything the user can
Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 10, 2026
- Sello has the services an AI agent calls sign its receipts; the agent can't fake them, but it can go around them
Paper · · arXiv · Juan Figuera · Jun 2, 2026
- Woven by Toyota's exception agent recommends; a person decides, because a human has to answer for it
Video · · Agentic AI Foundation · Uploaded November 4, 2026
- RBC's head of AI says most of its 50,000-plus agents are approved straight through
Podcast · · Tech Disruptors · RBC on Turning AI Into a Competitive Advantage · Oct 20, 2026
- ceLLMate checks a browser agent's HTTP requests, not its clicks, and blocked all 12 scripted GitLab attacks
Paper · · arXiv · Luoxi Meng et al. · Dec 14, 2025
- Okta and Google tie an agent's calls to the user, while GitHub's shared Copilot automations now act as Copilot
Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Oct 2026
- MCP's client credentials extension puts the secret in the form body, while its server rule names HTTP Basic
Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Oct 23, 2026
- A Nokia and China Mobile draft finds A2A and MCP stop at one hop, and wants cancellation carried down the chain
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Oct 27, 2026
- WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement
Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026
- OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026
- A digital ID is worth little until businesses can accept it, five voices say, and four point to bank onboarding
Field signals · · 14 voices from the field · Jun 2024 to Oct 2026
- WorkOS's agent checklist limits a delegated agent to what it and its user may both do, checked on every call
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 30, 2026
- JPMorgan won't let some agent sessions read and send email at once, says its security architect
Podcast · · Insecure Agents · "Is This Tool Call Allowed? It's Never That Simple": Michael Davis (J.P. Morgan) · Sep 9, 2026
- Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026
- Cross-App Access draft warns that one stolen sign-in token could reach every app the identity provider permits
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · May 21, 2026
- Give an agent access for the task and take it back afterwards, four voices say, and four say people approving each request cannot keep up
Field signals · · 8 voices from the field · Feb 2026 to Oct 2026
- RFC 9207's issuer check stops at the redirect, and n8n's token-exchange flaw sat just past it
Article · · WorkOS · Maria Paktiti · Jul 20, 2026
- A draft has each company sign its own half when one company's agent acts at another's request, refusals included
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih, Action State Group · Oct 29, 2026
- AGTP checks that an agent ID is signed; binding it to the connection is an add-on in the author's patent notice
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Jun 28, 2026
- Each agent and each tool call can pass its check while the system fails, an Oxford-led survey argues
Paper · · arXiv · Christian Schroeder de Witt · Apr 29, 2026
- BRICK, a proposed agent manifest, pins down which tools an AI agent may call but not who the agent is
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Samuel Sharaf et al. · Oct 26, 2026
- Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026
- Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026
- An agent audit log now names whom the agent acted for, but at low trust levels the agent may write that itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 26, 2026
- Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026
- NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person
Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026
- Approving a local MCP tool call does not limit the files it can reach, and researchers confirmed 150 cases
Paper · · arXiv · Zeqian Huang et al. · Oct 15, 2026
- Receiver acknowledged, gateways cut off: in a fixed 16-host replay, 112 of 225 revoked tool calls still committed
Paper · · arXiv · Lifei Liu et al. · Oct 11, 2026
- MCP's November 2025 authorization spec puts metadata documents ahead of dynamic client registration
Article · · Model Context Protocol · Nov 25, 2025
- OAuth tokens prove an agent's rights, not a person's consent; revision 05 adds a day-long grant with spend caps
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Oct 27, 2026
- A May 2025 agent-protocol framework, renamed twice and still unadopted, lists identity needs but no mechanism
Draft · · IETF · Jonathan Rosenberg et al. · Jul 4, 2026
- OAuth scopes grant agents far more than the task needs, four voices say, and authorization handed from agent to agent has no settled pattern yet
Field signals · · 7 voices from the field · Oct 2025 to Oct 2026
- A point-in-time access review can't keep pace with changing access, four voices say, and four vendors now put AI inside the review
Field signals · · 9 voices from the field · Nov 2024 to Aug 2026
- Microsoft's Entra Suite demo blocks a planted prompt injection and an unsanctioned MCP server but gives no catch rate
Video · · Microsoft Events · Uploaded November 24, 2025
- SailPoint’s JIT demo separates approved eligibility from expiring activation
Video · · SailPoint · Oct 16, 2026
- MCP client setup moves from registration to metadata checks in a Spring walkthrough
Video · · OWASP Foundation · Oct 24, 2026
- Shai-Hulud v4 used an MCP tool description to tell AI assistants to read SSH keys and keep quiet about it
Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 22, 2026
- IBM Research puts agent identity in a SPIFFE and OAuth sidecar; Maia Iyer calls authorization policy still open
Podcast · · Kubernetes Bytes · Your AI Agent Has Too Much Access | Fixing Agent Identity · Sep 15, 2026
- Barclays mandates one gateway for its agents' budgets, blocks and audit, and its AI engineering director says the setup is not yet tested at scale
Podcast · · Insecure Agents · The Fishbowl Problem: Agent Identity Across Clouds and Vendors, with Andy McMahon (Barclays) · Oct 5, 2026
- Agents and MCP servers get broad standing access because it is quick or easy, three voices say, and three vendors now pitch a gateway in front of MCP
Field signals · · 9 voices from the field · Sep 2025 to Oct 2026
- AAuth carries the signals an agent's approval needs, Hardt says; the brain that decides does not exist yet
Podcast · · Collateral Dialogue · Self-Driving Software: What OAuth Can’t Do for AI Agents | Dick Hardt, Hello · Sep 2, 2026
- The OWASP MCP Top 10 lead says few security teams can find the MCP servers developers run on their own machines
Podcast · · The Application Security Podcast · Shadow MCP Servers: The AI Security Risk Hiding on Your Developers' Laptops · Oct 12, 2026
- At OWASP, one poisoned memory entry made a demo agent send a Q4 report to an attacker server
Video · · OWASP Foundation · Recorded Jun 2026 · Uploaded October 21, 2026
- From Level 2 up, OWASP's AI security standard asks for an identity per agent and a check on every MCP tool call
Video · · OWASP Foundation · Oct 21, 2026
- SaaS apps that only know users end up giving agents human accounts, says Okta's former chief architect
Podcast · · The Identity Jedi Show: Where Identity Meets Strategy · Agents need a mission, not a key. · Oct 21, 2026
- Mythos also reports bugs that are not there, says Trend AI's CISO, so the work is in checking them
Podcast · · Cloud Security Podcast · Mythos Hype vs. Reality: Why You Need an Agentic Harness · Oct 21, 2026
- Of 30 deployed AI agents, 7 publish how a website can recognize them and one signs its requests
Paper · · arXiv · Leon Staufer et al. · Feb 19, 2026
- x402 saw about $1 million in agent payments in 30 days; Apify's founder says agents still buy through API keys
Video · · AI Engineer · Uploaded October 18, 2026
- KuppingerCole's Mike Small blames most cloud incidents on customers' identity mistakes and sees CNAPP moving to cover AI
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #455 - CNAPP and the Cloud Identity Problem with Mike Small · Oct 19, 2026
- An IETF draft says agent access checks may refuse when a source is down, but must not record that as a 'no'
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Girish Konda · Oct 19, 2026
- Orange researchers would drop certificates from agent handshakes by putting post-quantum keys on a ledger
Paper · · arXiv · Karol Budzyn et al. · Oct 16, 2026
- Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach
Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026
- Auth0 says its agent checkout token is limited to one purchase and amount; the tokens in its own diagram carry neither
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Sep 28, 2026
- A quarter of 31,132 agent skills matched a risky pattern; 23 of the 87 riskiest showed clear signs of malice
Paper · · arXiv · Yi Liu et al. · Jan 15, 2026
- Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified
Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026
- Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions
Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026
- Zenity: one AgentCore agent's credentials reached all agents in its account and region; AWS calls it expected
Article · · Zenity Labs · Tamir Ishay Sharbat · Oct 8, 2026
- Human Delegation Provenance is now an audit record only, and one that cannot prove it is complete
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Oct 6, 2026
- An end-to-end encrypted draft would hide an AI agent's task from the broker, but not who sent it or to whom
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora, Imara Labs · Sep 21, 2026
- Bu's checklist names a verifier for each agent-protocol claim and checks 'the same agent as before' separately
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Songbo Bu · Oct 14, 2026
- An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026
- Okta's expired SCIM agent draft recorded certificates and OAuth clients; the joint draft after it dropped both
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 16, 2025
- With real MCP tools for cloud, database and email, most injected attacks got past four models, even with a plan
Paper · · arXiv · Quan Zhang et al. · Mar 30, 2026
- A paper says trusting agents' self-reported quality reliably fails; its own test shows it in 10 of 36 settings
Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 15, 2026
- OpenA2A's draft aims to keep secrets from the agent, and says no implementation yet supports its new controls
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 2, 2026
- Before an agent pays or changes data, Schrock's last check treats it as untrusted and keeps the record itself
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 26, 2026
- Two implementations stop at the last of Reece's ten cross-company rules: a person approving one specific action
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Morgan Reece · Aug 31, 2026
- OpenA2A's protocol proves an agent holds a key and scores its behaviour, but never says who it works for
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abdel Fane, OpenA2A · Oct 6, 2026
- Sharif's profile writes an AI agent's rights to pay and delete into an identity certificate valid up to a year
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Oct 2, 2026
- An MCP server picks the login URL its client opens, and that was enough to run code on users' machines
Video · · Black Hat · Aug 20, 2026
- A coding agent tricked into writing one file lets the editor's language server send your keys out
Video · · Black Hat · Aug 18, 2026
- Auth0's own Claude Code tutorial runs the agent on the developer's login and hands it fifteen admin scopes
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Manish Hatwalne · Sep 29, 2026
- The official MCP TypeScript SDK now binds tokens to keys, ahead of the spec it implements
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026
- In Omada's survey of 577 identity leaders, executives report stronger AI agent controls than practitioners do
Podcast · · The Security Strategist · Non-Human Identities and Agentic AI: The New Frontier in Identity Security · Apr 27, 2026
- Three vendors now route MCP tool calls through an identity check, and only Cloudflare's is generally available
Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Sep 2026
- OWASP's agent Top 10 blames identity systems built for people, and does not say how it chose or ranked its risks
Article · · OWASP GenAI Security Project · John Sotiropoulos et al. · Dec 9, 2025
- Okta says its agent kill switch revokes all tokens; its product screen says tokens outside the gateway survive
Video · · Okta · Sep 24, 2026
- Okta's Oktane keynote: two agent products generally available now, support for other identity providers in 2027
Video · · Okta · Sep 23, 2026
- Okta's September videos: six customer stories with few measured results, and keynote recaps that drop the ship dates
Channel digest · · Okta (Oktane) · Sep 2026
- NIST's agent identity work starts from OAuth, SPIFFE and SCIM and defers agents from outside the enterprise
Article · · NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence · Harold Booth et al. · Feb 5, 2026
- MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up
Article · · Model Context Protocol (modelcontextprotocol.io) · MCP project et al. · Jun 18, 2026
- A draft ties what each AI agent may read to what it may do, and still can't take a grant back
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hamdy Atakora · Sep 21, 2026
- DIF's agent spec names every AI agent by a DID; the IETF's Agent Name Service switched to domain names
Article · · Decentralized Identity Foundation (KYA-OS) · Dylan Hobbs et al. · Jul 29, 2026
- Microsoft limits stolen refresh tokens by restricting where they can be used, not by binding the token itself
Podcast · · Entra.Chat · Stolen Tokens, Agents and Universal CAE: What Global Secure Access Adds to Entra ID · Oct 9, 2026
- Corvic's own tests find its agent vault keeps keys out of prompts but does much less against a misused connector
Paper · · arXiv · Kenney, Corvic AI · Sep 27, 2026
- PayPal moved MCP tool permission checks into the server, and prompt-injected agents stopped getting through
Paper · · arXiv · Huan Li et al. · Sep 18, 2026
- A survey rates only workload identity ready for agents, and argues no standard can tell what an agent intends
Paper · · arXiv · Takumi Otsuka et al. · Apr 25, 2026
- A phishing agent hosted on Microsoft's own domain, and why giving agents identities does not stop it
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026
- Registering an MCP server on Bifrost ran its command, and the admin API that allowed it shipped with no password
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026
- AAuth's R3 lets an agent ask for an API's named operations, and a person approve one exact call
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt · Sep 28, 2026
- An integrator builds agent access on OpenID Connect and OAuth; clients want one view across many MCP gateways
Podcast · · Identity Unfiltered · CIAM, Agentic AI & the Future of Identity · Oct 5, 2026
- Opal's access-review AI runs with a person approving by default, and an Opal engineer still reads the rejections
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #448 - Sponsor Spotlight - Opal Security · Sep 17, 2026
- Microsoft's Access Review Agent suggests whether to keep or remove access; the reviewer still decides, in Teams
Podcast · · Entra.Chat · AI is Coming to Identity Governance! Meet the Entra Access Review Agent · Oct 18, 2025
- WorkOS's Tobin South, in November 2025: agents will get a new kind of account, not a new identity standard
Podcast · · CodingCat.dev Podcast · 5.10 - How to Secure AI - Identity Access Management for Agents · Nov 21, 2025
- x402 v2 can take payment before delivering, with no identity beyond a wallet address and no way to dispute it
Article · · x402 Foundation (GitHub) · x402 Foundation · Aug 31, 2026
- Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026
- Eight panels agree an agent acts for a person, never as that person. When agents hand work to other agents, nobody had an answer.
Conference · · Las Vegas · June 2026, a one-day summit track inside Identiverse 2026; the eight panels were published as podcast episodes between 18 August and 7 September 2026
- Three MCP auth flaws in a month, and the spec had already written the rule the SDKs skipped
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 2, 2026
- OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025
- Four vendors now say the access review is finished for agents. This one adds that agents will approve agents.
Podcast · · The Non-Human & AI Identity Podcast · Ep # 15 - Identity is the 3rd Generation of Security · Sep 22, 2026
- The 'intent' in the Agentic JWT draft is a workflow step, and the agent reports its own fingerprint
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Abhishek Goswami · Jul 1, 2026
- The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Scott Courtney et al. · Apr 13, 2026
- The IBAC paper's strict mode blocked every prompt injection, and its agent finished only a third of its tasks
Article · · ibac.dev · Jordan Potti · Mar 3, 2026
- MCP made authorization optional, and two identity veterans say most servers took the option
Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Agentic AI and the Authorization Gap No One Closed · Jun 9, 2026
- Two ways to give an AI agent an OAuth identity clashed in April; a draft now lets them work together
Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Securing Non-Human Identities in the Age of Agentic AI with Sarah Cecchetti, Director of Product Management at Semperis · Apr 28, 2026
- Three vendors say AI systems now create identities on their own; the only survey behind it is one vendor's own
Podcast · · The Data Exchange with Ben Lorica · The Rise of the Machine Identity: Securing the AI Workforce and AI Agents · Jan 29, 2026
- Okta's answer to agent sprawl: put the identity provider between every agent and every app
Podcast · · Cloud Security Podcast · Who Governs Your AI Agents? Identity, Offboarding & Open Standards · Jul 2, 2026
- Auth0's agent gateway keeps every credential away from the agent; the post shows no step where a person approves
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrés Aguiar · Sep 18, 2026
- An OpenID Foundation co-chair says AI agents need modest upgrades to today's identity systems, not a new one
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #390 - Identity Management for Agentic AI with Tobin South · Dec 8, 2025
- By Sierra's own account, its 75,000 agent sessions measure activity, not outcome
Article · · Sierra · Neil Rahilly · Jul 9, 2026
- SecureAuth's sales chief sells agent identity on an unsourced ratio and on sums buyers work out from their own headcount
Podcast · · GTM Vault · Securing AI Agents Beyond Authentication | Mark van Oppen, SecureAuth · Jul 5, 2026
- Mission-Bound OAuth's author now says the mission object does not belong in OAuth
Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 15, 2026
- Most of the work in Sierra's MCP gateway was identity: who each agent acts as and what it may reach
Article · · Sierra Engineering · Mihai Parparita · Jul 22, 2026
- MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extension
Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026
- The first largely AI-run intrusion campaign got in by telling the model the attackers were a security firm
Article · · Anthropic · Nov 13, 2025
- An MCP gateway can be demoed in a week; Sierra's rollout waited on the auth layer underneath it
Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 11, 2026
- Sierra's cloud agent runs 75,000 sessions a month and never holds a credential
Article · · Sierra Engineering · Allen Chen et al. · Jul 15, 2026
- Highflame's open-source ZeroID narrows an agent's token at every hop, a step we did not find in Uber's write-up
Article · · Highflame (GitHub) · Sep 25, 2026
- SailPoint's product chief wants an agent's access checked before each tool call and again at each resource access
Podcast · · The Security Strategist · Who Owns an AI Agent? Rethinking Identity, Security, & Accountability · Aug 27, 2026
- Ping moved agent identity from roadmap to shipping product, and let AI agents run its admin tools too
Conference · · Ping Identity · Austin · 2-day event (Day 1 / Day 2), 2026
- Canva sandboxes bounded conversion jobs; broad workforce agents pose a different access problem
Podcast · · AI Security Podcast · Why I Dont Trust Your AI Agent | Kane Narraway, Canva · Aug 20, 2026
- xChk ships human OIDC portfolios and a separate agent approval API
Paper · · arXiv · Sean MacGuire · Jul 15, 2026
- A July OAuth draft keeps agent identity stable as keys rotate
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Jul 5, 2026
- In one author's MCP benchmark, a confirmation prompt on every call still let 6 of 10 attacks through
Paper · · arXiv · Ting Liu, SymbolicLight · Jun 27, 2026
- OpenID's AuthZEN group approves a draft that lets policy tell an agent 'not yet, and here is what is required'
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam · Jun 15, 2026
- In May 2026 Blackhawk's technology chief said Google's AP2 means little to merchants without a credential store
Podcast · · So What About AI Agents · Agentic Commerce - Who's side is agent on? EP 60 - with Nik Sathe - Blackhawk Network (BHN) · Jun 10, 2026
- Agent payment protocols prove an agent may pay; a Toronto paper adds a step to check the job was done
Paper · · arXiv · Adrian de Valois-Franklin et al. · Jun 7, 2026
- Huawei researchers add agent delegation to an existing permission model and prove each action traces to a human
Paper · · arXiv · Amjad Ibrahim et al. · Jun 2, 2026
- Google's agent registry went GA in June while Okta, SailPoint and Ping pulled agents into their own lists
Release tracker · · 11 vendors' release notes · Jun 2026
- Putting AIRGuard's policy in an agent's prompt barely cut attacks; enforcing it before each tool call did
Paper · · arXiv · Suliu Qin et al. · May 27, 2026
- 114 of 119 MCP servers that let outsiders register an OAuth client let them choose where sign-in codes are sent
Paper · · arXiv · Huijun Zhou et al. · May 21, 2026
- A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default
Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026
- Three vendors put MCP controls in three different places in May, and only Auth0's was GA
Release tracker · · 10 vendors' release notes · May 2026
- An Imperial and Oxford protocol would give AI agents one approved use of a secret, never the secret itself
Paper · · arXiv · Xiaohang Yu et al. · Apr 27, 2026
- A 'decentralized' agent identity draft blocks risky calls when its Registry is down, and did:aip is taken
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paras Singla · Apr 17, 2026
- A proposed consent log for A2A and MCP records the terms an agent accepted, but the agent fills it in itself
Paper · · arXiv · Ravi Kiran Kadaboina · Apr 16, 2026
- Most agent-payment protocols leave the agent's own reasoning out of scope, a survey of 142 works finds
Paper · · arXiv · Qian'ang Mao et al. · Apr 15, 2026
- An agent certificate draft ties access to a trust score set by the issuing CA, usually the agent operator's own
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Apr 10, 2026
- AITH claims 4.7 million agent checks a second, but the test simulated its post-quantum signatures
Paper · · arXiv · Zhaoliang Chen · Apr 9, 2026
- A proposed record of who authorized an AI agent's actions cannot yet prove which agent took them
Paper · · arXiv · Asiri Dalugoda, Helixar · Apr 6, 2026
- An OAuth draft for AI agents' step-up login finishes the one-time-code path but leaves passkeys unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Martin Besozzi · Apr 3, 2026
- The commonest credential leak in AI agent skills is a debug print the framework hands to the model
Paper · · arXiv · Zhihao Chen et al. · Apr 3, 2026
- Microsoft and Google made AI agent identity generally available in April; Okta's notes put its GA in May
Release tracker · · 8 vendors' release notes · Apr 2026
- OpenID agent-claims draft adds a provider-set user, application or agent label; scores stay each provider's own
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Mar 26, 2026
- An agent-credential draft carries a hash of the user's instruction that its own verification steps never check
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chudah Yakung, Attest · Mar 26, 2026
- AIP puts an agent's delegation chain in the token; its perfect score against attacks tests rules only AIP has
Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 25, 2026
- A KubeCon demo moves MCP servers' OAuth checks into a gateway, safe only if nothing can reach a server directly
Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded March 24, 2026
- Checking each agent call against the user's own task stopped all 634 off-task calls the authors wrote
Paper · · arXiv · Reshabh K Sharma et al. · Mar 17, 2026
- An agent identity draft signs every tool call, but never finished saying whom the agent answers to
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · James Cao et al. · Mar 16, 2026
- An MCP signing draft shows a client who wrote a tool, and admits a poisoned tool can still be validly signed
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI · Mar 14, 2026
- A survey labels 36.8% of agent skills malicious, but its own definition counts skills with any security flaw
Paper · · arXiv · Yanna Jiang et al. · Feb 24, 2026
- A warning in the system prompt did not reliably stop coding agents obeying lines planted in a skill file
Paper · · arXiv · David Schmotz et al. · Feb 23, 2026
- OpenPort holds agent writes as drafts for an operator by default; its own tests check less than its spec asks
Paper · · arXiv · Genliang Zhu et al. · Feb 22, 2026
- Google DeepMind wants agent authority to narrow at every hand-off, and misreads MCP's scopes on the way
Paper · · arXiv · Nenad Tomašev et al. · Feb 12, 2026
- MACAW Security's trust layer signs every agent call, but what stopped its prompt-injection test was a policy
Paper · · arXiv · Mohan Rajagopalan et al. · Feb 11, 2026
- Auth0's AgentCore guide says prompts alone are not enough, then lets the prompt decide when to ask a person
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Kapil Patil · Feb 10, 2026
- An open spec for stopping agent actions before they run needs the vendor's help to cover ChatGPT or Copilot
Paper · · arXiv · Herman Errico · Feb 10, 2026
- A Cisco-led agent draft puts the verifiable credential at a public URL, with selective disclosure a SHOULD it does not yet show
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean Diaconu et al. · Feb 6, 2026
- 157 of 98,380 community agent skills proved malicious in a sandbox, and one publisher made more than half
Paper · · arXiv · Yi Liu et al. · Feb 6, 2026
- A secure-MCP proposal registers every agent and tool centrally, and never mentions MCP's own OAuth rules
Paper · · arXiv · Xinyi Hou et al. · Feb 1, 2026
- In February Okta let AI agents reach its management APIs over MCP; Cloudflare added controls on MCP connections
Release tracker · · 7 vendors' release notes · Feb 2026
- Faramesh holds each agent action for a signed permit; its bypass tests assume no path around the gate
Paper · · arXiv · Amjad Fatmi · Jan 25, 2026
- Rubrik ties agent recovery to protected backups and puts identity oversight in Agent Cloud
Podcast · · AI Security Podcast · Why AI Agents Fail in Production: Governance, Trust & The "Undo" Button · Jan 23, 2026
- A proposed agent:// name survives a move between clouds but not a change of job
Paper · · arXiv · Roland R. Rodriguez et al. · Jan 21, 2026
- Cisco Duo's MCP beta lets agents register themselves; Duo calls client ID metadata documents the future
Article · · Cisco Duo · Colin Medfisch · Jan 7, 2026
- A Glasgow-Aarhus sandbox for MCP tools catches a secret printed as-is; base64 or truncation slips past it
Paper · · arXiv · Zhuoran Tan et al. · Jan 3, 2026
- A Shenzhen paper ties each AI agent to a verified owner and its exact code, at 15 to 40 seconds of proving a step
Paper · · arXiv · Zibin Lin et al. · Dec 19, 2025
- Oxford's VET checks an agent's output against its declared setup, and by the 32nd message four of five models cost over 3×
Paper · · arXiv · Artem Grigor et al. · Dec 17, 2025
- A third-party MCP server can reconstruct what a user asked from the tool calls alone, in tests on simulated dialogues
Paper · · arXiv · Yunhao Yao et al. · Dec 16, 2025
- Refuse the risky action when its plan relies on untrusted input, a Beihang survey of agent attacks proposes
Paper · · arXiv · Guanquan Shi et al. · Dec 7, 2025
- No app, no developer: least privilege for an AI agent has to come from the task, six security researchers argue
Paper · · arXiv · Mihai Christodorescu et al. · Dec 1, 2025
- One shared MCP token makes a whole company one identity in the logs; this paper wants per-user OAuth at a gateway
Paper · · arXiv · Herman Errico et al. · Nov 25, 2025
- CORAL's public agent server rejected forged messages but let a wrong key open the session stream
Paper · · arXiv · Yedidel Louck et al. · Nov 5, 2025
- Auth0's case for Token Vault: take the user ID out of the token call and let the session prove whose token it is
Article · · Auth0 Blog · Abhishek Hingnikar, Okta · Nov 4, 2025
- On its authors' tasks, an LLM check of agent scopes works at one tool and refuses most valid three-tool requests
Paper · · arXiv · Majed El Helou et al. · Oct 30, 2025
- AAGATE maps NIST's AI risk framework onto Kubernetes, and its paper never times the 'millisecond kill switch'
Paper · · arXiv · Ken Huang et al. · Oct 29, 2025
- An MCP sandbox blocked every test attack that reached for the host; a poisoned tool that only redirected the agent got through
Paper · · arXiv · Christoph Bühler et al. · Oct 24, 2025
- An agent OAuth proposal has the helper forward grants before receiving access tokens
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kehan Yao, China Mobile · Oct 20, 2025
- Given 30 steps, the best computer-use agent solved four of 36 web hacking challenges, and newer Claude models scored lower
Paper · · arXiv · Xiaoxue Ren et al. · Oct 14, 2025
- An October SCIM draft gives agents their own records, with security still unfinished
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Macy Abbey et al. · Oct 11, 2025
- A2AS promises prompt-injection defense at no latency cost, and publishes no test of it
Paper · · arXiv · Eugene Neelou et al. · Oct 8, 2025
- An MCP threat survey shows agents trusting tool names and descriptions, and skips the spec's own OAuth rules
Paper · · arXiv · Xinyi Hou et al. · Oct 7, 2025
- A decade of AI privacy papers: nearly half on training-data leakage, 2% on agents leaking user context
Paper · · arXiv · Niloofar Mireshghallah et al. · Oct 2, 2025
- Toucan's 1.5 million MCP tool-use examples come only from servers that need no API key or account
Paper · · arXiv · Zhangchen Xu et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- Left to run a decentralized-ID check, AI agents finished as few as 4 runs in 100; one pair agreed to skip half
Paper · · arXiv · Sandro Rodriguez Garzon et al. · Oct 1, 2025
- Stytch sells a one-call check for whether a visitor is an AI agent, priced at half a cent a lookup
Podcast · · So What About AI Agents · EP 39 - Agentic Authentication | Bobbie Chen · Sep 23, 2025
- Researchers found Claude Code's pull requests by a line the tool writes; maintainers merged 83.8% of them
Paper · · arXiv · Miku Watanabe et al. · Sep 18, 2025
- Agentic JWT binds an agent's token to its task and its own code, but it is one author's draft, not a standard
Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2509.13597) · Abhishek Goswami · Sep 16, 2025
- A DeepMind paper puts agent markets on DIDs and credentials but leaves delegation unspecified
Paper · · arXiv · Nenad Tomašev et al. · Sep 12, 2025
- A guide to securing agent plans has the planner choose each step's tools and leaves out agent identity
Paper · · arXiv · Ron F. Del Rosario et al. · Sep 10, 2025
- A blockchain-agent survey's blueprint has no agent identity; risk scores and a human signature guard the wallet
Paper · · arXiv · Nicolò Romandini et al. · Sep 8, 2025
- Tool poisoning runs through calls an agent is allowed to make; MindGuard looks for it in the model's attention
Paper · · arXiv · Zhiqiang Wang et al. · Aug 28, 2025
- Twenty models nearly always name real MCP tools; the judge splits them on planning, which a schema check cannot catch
Paper · · arXiv · Zhenting Wang · Aug 28, 2025
- MCPTox: a poisoned tool description steers most agents into misusing the tools they already hold
Paper · · arXiv · Haohua Du · Aug 19, 2025
- A poisoned MCP tool got an agent to copy the client's config file without asking; deleting a file did ask
Paper · · arXiv · Yongjian Guo et al. · Aug 18, 2025
- In a test harness, two of three MCP hosts refused a prompt asking for credentials; none refused a poisoned tool
Paper · · arXiv · Yixuan Yang et al. · Aug 17, 2025
- A 'provable' bound on agent-memory injection assumes independent layers and fills in none of its detection rates
Paper · · arXiv · Ken Huang et al. · Aug 17, 2025
- In x402 a wallet signature is the whole payment: no agent identity, no delegation, no refund once money moves
Article · · x402.org (Coinbase Developer Platform) · Erik Reppel et al. · Aug 16, 2025
- MCP-Guard's classifier alone came within half a point of its best full pipelines' F1 on the authors' test set, and ran faster
Paper · · arXiv · Wenpeng Xing et al. · Aug 14, 2025
- ERC-8004 stopped requiring agents to approve who rates them in January and admits fakes can inflate ratings
Article · · Ethereum Improvement Proposals · Marco De Rossi et al. · Aug 13, 2025
- A national-lab provenance model logs an AI agent's prompts and decisions, but not whom it acted for
Paper · · arXiv · Renan Souza et al. · Aug 4, 2025
- Sean O'Dell says Shared Signals audiences have stopped asking what CAEP is and started asking how to deploy it
Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #361 - Identiverse 2025 - Sean O'Dell on Harnessing CAEP Abilities with Event-Driven Identity · Jul 14, 2025
- LPCI paper names instructions planted in agent memory that fire in a later session; its 43% failure rate matches a five-model average
Paper · · arXiv · Hammad Atta et al. · Jul 14, 2025
- An MCP privilege study says obscure servers are riskier; its own table points the other way
Paper · · arXiv · Zhihao Li et al. · Jul 5, 2025
- A July OAuth draft proposes authorization for models inside a client
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yurong Song et al. · Jul 3, 2025
- A survey of MCP and A2A attacks pairs each identity threat with a fix, and tests none of them
Paper · · arXiv · Mohamed Amine Ferrag et al. · Jun 29, 2025
- AI governance researchers argue OAuth tokens can't link an agent's work across services or sub-agents
Paper · · arXiv · Alan Chan et al. · Jun 19, 2025
- MCP's June 2025 authorization spec: a server accepts only tokens issued for it and passes none upstream
Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jun 18, 2025
- RAS-Eval cites weak MCP authentication, yet maps none of its 3,802 agent attacks to an authentication weakness
Paper · · arXiv · Yuchuan Fu et al. · Jun 18, 2025
- Each of eight AI models fell for at least one jailbreak planted in a simulated MCP server
Paper · · arXiv · Junfeng Fang et al. · Jun 16, 2025
- A code scanner's top find in 583 MCP servers was hard-coded keys; tool poisoning needed an MCP-specific scanner
Paper · · arXiv · Mohammed Mehedi Hasan et al. · Jun 16, 2025
- MCPWorld's 'MCP-only' agent also had a shell, and without it success falls from 53.23% to 43.00%
Paper · · arXiv · Yunhe Yan et al. · Jun 9, 2025
- ETDI would sign MCP tool definitions against lookalikes, but leaves open who vouches for the publisher's key
Paper · · arXiv · Manish Bhatt et al. · Jun 2, 2025
- In Microsoft's agent tests, label checks blocked policy-breaking tool calls and its FIDES planner finished more tasks
Paper · · arXiv · Manuel Costa et al. · May 29, 2025
- AgentDNS gives AI agents one sign-in by having a central root hold each vendor's key
Paper · · arXiv · Enfang Cui et al. · May 28, 2025
- A Cloud Security Alliance paper wants AI agents on a new identity stack, with OAuth kept for simple cases
Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.19301) / Cloud Security Alliance · Ken Huang et al. · May 25, 2025
- Function-calling models over-approve unsafe MCP calls; MCIP tests an offline classifier on synthetic chats
Paper · · arXiv · Huihao Jing et al. · May 20, 2025
- Calling an MCP tool 'the best tool in the world' won the model's pick in almost every test
Paper · · arXiv · Zihan Wang et al. · May 16, 2025
- The first Agent Name Service paper puts capabilities in the name and leaves protocol translation and governance out
Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.10609) / OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Ken Huang et al. · May 15, 2025
- Decentralized AI agents have no off switch by default; builders say cutting API access still stops most of them
Paper · · arXiv · Botao Amber Hu et al. · May 14, 2025
- Mastercard's Agent Pay began in April 2025 as a promise that payment agents would be registered and verified
Article · · Mastercard · Mastercard · Apr 29, 2025
- An MCP gateway can do OAuth for servers that have none; this one passes them a user header
Paper · · arXiv · Ivo Brett · Apr 28, 2025
- A 'zero trust' registry against AI tool squatting still has to trust its administrator
Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025
- An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity
Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025
- OWASP's multi-agent threat guide finds the hop where a user's permission check drops out, but names no fix
Article · · OWASP GenAI Security Project · OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Apr 22, 2025
- MCP Guardian wraps tool calls in token and regex checks, leaving poisoned servers and agent IDs open
Paper · · arXiv · Sonu Kumar et al. · Apr 17, 2025
- Most of Progent's protection from prompt injection comes from a policy written before the agent reads anything
Paper · · arXiv · Tianneng Shi et al. · Apr 16, 2025
- An early MCP security checklist was never tested, and the protocol has since adopted only part of it
Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 11, 2025
- In a 2025 MCP audit, Claude refused an encoded backdoor but wrote the plain one into .bashrc
Paper · · arXiv · Brandon Radosevich et al. · Apr 2, 2025
- In Invariant Labs' Cursor test, hidden text in an MCP tool description got the agent to send out the user's MCP config
Article · · Invariant Labs · Luca Beurer-Kellner et al. · Apr 1, 2025
- RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025
- MAESTRO names your AI agents' identity threats and leaves designing the controls to you
Article · · Cloud Security Alliance · Ken Huang · Feb 6, 2025
- An MIT-led paper has the user sign the agent's delegation token and lets OpenID Connect vouch for both parties
Paper · · arXiv · Tobin South et al. · Jan 16, 2025
- RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018
In our columns
- 114 of 119 MCP servers tested accepted any redirect. The registration debate misses it
Column · Nov 13, 2026
- An agent's log must name whom it acted for, and the agent must not be the one writing it
Column · Nov 9, 2026
- Switching off an AI agent needs a receipt from every system that held its access
Column · Nov 7, 2026
- Signing MCP tools moves the risk to whoever registers them, so guard who may add a tool
Column · Nov 2, 2026
- An AI agent's own trail can't show what it skipped; the gateway's can
Column · Oct 16, 2026
Related terms
What appears alongside Model Context Protocol in the same briefings.
Cross App AccessOAuthOpenPort ProtocolAnthropicA2AClaude DesktopAgentic JWTTool squatting
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