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Explainers · Glossary

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata

RFC 8414 · RFC8414 · Authorization Server Metadata

By Boston Identity · Explained · 6 min read

The short answer

A standard JSON document an OAuth authorization server publishes at a fixed web address built from its own name. Clients fetch it to learn the server's endpoints, keys and supported features instead of having them typed in by hand.

What it is
A standard
Defined by
IETF, RFC 8414 (Standards Track, 2018)
Who it's for
Teams running OAuth or MCP clients
In our briefings
67By month of the source: 2025-12: 0, 2026-01: 1, 2026-02: 5, 2026-03: 3, 2026-04: 1, 2026-05: 2, 2026-06: 6, 2026-07: 5, 2026-08: 3, 2026-09: 8, 2026-10: 7, 2026-11: 11by month, last 12
01

What is OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata?

An OAuth client needs to know a lot about the authorization server it talks to: where to send the user to sign in, where to get tokens, which keys sign the server's responses, and which options it supports. RFC 8414 puts all of that in one JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) document. The server publishes it at a well-known location derived from its issuer identifier, the https URL that names the server.§1, §2

The format comes from OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 and stays compatible with it, but RFC 8414 makes it apply to OAuth uses that have nothing to do with OpenID Connect.§1 Other specifications can add their own fields through an IANA registry, the public list kept by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, after review by designated experts.§7, §7.1

The document can be self-asserted by the server over HTTPS. It can also carry signed values in a JSON Web Token (JWT), where the signer vouches for the data.§1, §2.1

Not limited to OpenID Connect, even where the names suggest it. The openid-configuration path and the op_policy_uri and op_tos_uri fields come from OpenID Connect Discovery, but in RFC 8414 they refer to general OAuth features.§5

02

How does OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata work?

Two actors take part: the client, which wants to use OAuth, and the authorization server, which issues tokens. The client starts knowing only the server's issuer identifier.

Figure steps
  1. The client starts from the issuer identifier
  2. The client builds the well-known URL
  3. The client fetches it over TLS
  4. The server answers with its metadata
  5. The client checks the issuer matches
  6. The client uses what the server advertised
Fig. 1

How an OAuth client fetches an authorization server's metadata and checks it before use.

Drawn from RFC 8414, sections 3 and 3.3

Swipe for the full figure →

  1. The client starts from the issuer identifier

    The issuer identifier is an https URL with no query or fragment. RFC 8414 does not say how the client picks a server: the identifier may be configured by hand, or found through a lookup such as WebFinger.§1, §2

  2. The client builds the well-known URL

    The client inserts "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server" between the host and any path in the issuer identifier, after removing a trailing slash. So an issuer of https://example.com/issuer1 gives /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/issuer1 on example.com, which lets one host serve many tenants.§3, §3.1 An application may register its own suffix instead, but it must say which one it uses.§3

  3. The client fetches it over TLS

    The client must send an HTTP GET to that path, and the path must use https.§3, §3.1 The client must check the server's TLS (Transport Layer Security) certificate against the issuer URL, which blocks man-in-the-middle and DNS-based attacks.§6.1, §6.2

  4. The server answers with its metadata

    A successful answer must be a 200 OK with a JSON object.§3.2 Its members are a subset of the values RFC 8414 defines. The issuer and the supported response types are required, while fields such as the jwks_uri where the signing keys live, the supported grant types and the client authentication methods are optional.§2, §3.2 The authorization endpoint is required unless no grant type the server supports uses it, and the token endpoint is required unless the server supports only the implicit grant.§2 Lists with no entries must be left out.§3.2

  5. The client checks the issuer matches

    The issuer value in the document must be identical to the identifier the client used to build the URL. If the two differ, the client must not use any of the data.§3.3 The comparison is code point by code point, with no Unicode normalization.§4

  6. The client uses what the server advertised

    The client uses the listed endpoints and picks among the methods the server says it supports.§2, §3.2 Some omitted fields carry defaults: with no grant_types_supported, the default is authorization_code and implicit, and with no code_challenge_methods_supported the server does not support PKCE, Proof Key for Code Exchange.§2 For the signing algorithm lists, no default is implied.§2 If the client supports signed metadata, signed values must win over the plain ones.§2.1

03

Why does OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata matter now?

More OAuth rules now key on the issuer identifier that RFC 8414 defines. RFC 8414 says that identifier is there to prevent authorization server mix-up attacks.§2 The OAuth working group's revision of RFC 7523 says a JWT that authenticates a client must use the server's issuer identifier as its sole audience, the party the token is meant for. The token endpoint URL must not be used, and the server must reject any JWT without the issuer as its only audience.1 The draft's reason is that endpoint addresses other than the issuer cannot be validated, and the attack it answers is the audience-injection class University of Stuttgart researchers disclosed in January 2025.1

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) applies the same binding on the client side. Its revision of 2026-07-28 says clients must key stored credentials by the issuer identifier and must re-register when the authorization server changes. Two client-side SDK bugs broke that rule, and the Python SDK's fix was exactly that binding.2

A draft on refresh-token lifetimes notes that missing lifetime fields may mean no fixed limit, or, from a server that has not declared support in its metadata, possibly no support at all. The draft says clients should handle the two cases the same way.3

04

Where does it fit?

Compared withHow OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata differs
Pushed Authorization RequestsThe revision of RFC 7523 gives pushed authorization requests the same audience rule it sets for client-authentication JWTs. The issuer identifier defined by RFC 8414 is the only allowed value.1
Dynamic Client RegistrationDynamic Client Registration is how a client signs itself up with a server at runtime. RFC 8414 tells the client where that sign-up happens, through the optional registration_endpoint field.§2
JWT Bearer GrantRFC 7523 covers the JWT a client signs to authenticate itself. Its revision makes the RFC 8414 issuer identifier that JWT's only audience and bars the token endpoint URL.1 RFC 8414 lists which signing algorithms the token endpoint accepts for such JWTs.§2
PKCERFC 8414 is where a server lists the PKCE code challenge methods it supports. Leaving that field out means the server does not support PKCE.§2
05

What goes wrong?

  • An attacker who can sit in the network path or poison DNS can feed a client fake endpoints and keys if the client skips the certificate check. The attacker could then reach whatever the client has access to.§6.2
  • An attacker can publish a document that copies the real server's issuer value but lists its own endpoints and signing keys. The exact issuer match is the defense, and the client must perform it.§6.2
  • When the issuer has a path, RFC 8414 and OpenID Connect Discovery put the well-known string in different places. Legacy deployments may need to publish at both, and clients should try the RFC 8414 location first.§5
  • The standard does not decide which APIs a client should use with a server. If a client uses the wrong one, an attacker may proxy a real API without the server or client noticing.§6.4
  • The document is not a full inventory. A server may choose not to advertise some scopes it supports,§2 and a standard format makes the server easier to use for attackers as well as for clients.§6.3
06

What should a security leader ask?

  1. 01

    Do our OAuth and MCP clients refuse a metadata document whose issuer does not exactly match the issuer they started from?

  2. 02

    Do our clients store tokens and registrations keyed by issuer, and re-register when the authorization server changes?

  3. 03

    Which of our clients that sign JWTs to authenticate still put the token endpoint URL in the audience instead of the issuer?

  4. 04

    For tenants whose issuer has a path, which discovery location do our libraries try first?

  5. 05

    Does our authorization server publish code_challenge_methods_supported, so clients can see that PKCE is on?

07

Sources

›Evidence: 3 claims from 3 briefings
  1. 1BI-FIND-2026-0350 · The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpointA JWT used to authenticate an OAuth client now has exactly one permitted audience. The draft rewrites RFC 7523's rule so that the audience 'MUST use the issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the authorization server as its sole value', that 'the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MUST NOT be used as an audience value', and that the server 'MUST reject any JWT that does not contain its issuer identifier as its sole audience value', compared by simple string comparison. Pushed authorization requests get the same rule. The reason given is that endpoint addresses other than the issuer cannot be validated and, sent to a different endpoint, 'can open an attack vector'; the attack itself is the audience-injection class University of Stuttgart researchers disclosed in January 2025.
  2. 2BI-FIND-2026-0399 · Three MCP auth flaws in a month, and the spec had already written the rule the SDKs skippedThe rule the two client-side bugs broke is already written into the protocol, as a minor change. The MCP revision of 2026-07-28 says clients 'MUST key persisted credentials by the issuer identifier, MUST NOT reuse them with a different authorization server, and MUST re-register when the authorization server changes', and must validate a present iss parameter before redeeming an authorization code; the Python SDK's affected versions span that revision, and its fix is exactly that binding. The IETF's OAuth working group is tightening the same screw from the other side: its revision of RFC 7523 restricts a client-authentication JWT's audience to the issuer identifier alone, for the same mix-up reason. The SDKs lagged the specifications they implement; the field usually tells the MCP authorization story the other way round.
  3. 3BI-FIND-2026-1067 · An OAuth draft caps every refresh token at the user's grant, and tells the app when that grant endsThe draft adds two fields to the token response: refresh_token_timeout, the seconds a client may hold a refresh token without using it, and authorization_expires_in, the lifetime in seconds of the user's grant for the scopes the token covers. If they are finite, the server MUST return them in every response that carries a refresh token. Leaving them out means no fixed limit, or, from a server that has not declared support in its metadata, possibly no support at all, and the draft says clients should handle the two cases the same way. Where one grant covers scopes with different lifetimes, it recommends returning the shortest and admits this risks an app asking the user to reauthorize too early.

›In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata would have you leave with.

  1. Revision -02 of Shankarlingam's draft says the delay before a disabled agent is refused is "a property of the receiver's configuration, not of the token alone", and that passing the receiver's checks does not show a disabled client is refused within the bound the receiver computes. Raising the maximum token age, DNS caching, caching of issuer metadata and keys, or the clock-skew allowance lengthens the time a disabled client is still accepted, while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check keeps passing. Those checks, the draft says, "establish that a token is authentic; they do not establish that the client is still enabled." A receiver SHOULD recompute the bound before any change to those settings takes effect, and SHOULD test it directly, again after any change to those settings: obtain link tokens for a test client, disable it at a time not known to whoever observes the receiver, keep presenting tokens issued before the disable, and compare the last acceptance with the time the authorization server records the disable. The receiver meets its bound if that gap does not exceed the computed delay. It SHOULD also log the maximum age in effect with each verification result, and the security section says receivers SHOULD treat such changes as security relevant. The draft describes this test and reports no results from running it.

    A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how longBI-FIND-2026-2345

  2. Token Status List puts the status of many tokens in a signed, compressed bit array per list, which the authors size for up to millions of tokens, and an issuer may run several lists. Each token carries an index and the list's URI. A verifier fetches the list, validates it and reads the token's 1, 2, 4 or 8 bits for VALID, INVALID, SUSPENDED or an application-specific value. Because many tokens share one list, the issuer does not learn which token a verifier is asking about, which the authors call herd privacy. With OAuth introspection, by contrast, the verifier contacts the issuer about each token. The draft warns that an issuer could defeat this with a unique list or list URI per token, which relying parties that verify many tokens can spot by comparing the number and size of lists with the tokens they see. The uri and index pair is unique to each token, so the draft also warns that a relying party may track one token's status over time and that colluding parties may link two transactions involving the same token; it recommends batches of one-time-use tokens. A revocation reaches a verifier when it next fetches the list, and the issuer can signal how long a copy may be cached through the list's exp and ttl.

    OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checkedBI-FIND-2026-0632

  3. The IETF datatracker shows that the IESG approved OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining) as a Proposed Standard on 22 June 2026, and that it has been in the RFC Editor's queue since that day. Revision 17, the text we read, was posted on 19 July 2026 during that editing. Its authors are Arndt Schwenkschuster and Pieter Kasselman of Defakto Security, Kelley Burgin of MITRE, Mike Jenkins of NSA-CCSS, Brian Campbell of Ping Identity and Aaron Parecki of Okta. Campbell co-wrote RFC 8693 and RFC 7523, the two RFCs the draft combines, and Parecki co-wrote RFC 9728, one of the ways it names for finding the other domain's authorization server. The working group's write-up for the IESG lists implementations, among them Keycloak 26.5 and Okta's. Two other drafts we have read point to it: the transaction-tokens draft leaves crossing domains to it, and the AI agent authentication draft says cross-domain access SHOULD use identity chaining.

    OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agentBI-FIND-2026-0184

›Cited in 67 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. A disabled agent's old tokens still pass every check; a DNS draft now asks receivers to time how long

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sriram Shankarlingam, HexaEight · Oct 20, 2026

  2. OAuth's token revocation list nears RFC, and a shared list hides which token is checked

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Aug 13, 2026

  3. OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026

  4. The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026

  5. A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026

  6. MCP's November 2025 security guide makes proxy servers ask consent for each client before forwarding a login

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Model Context Protocol project · Nov 25, 2025

  7. MCP's client credentials extension puts the secret in the form body, while its server rule names HTTP Basic

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Oct 23, 2026

  8. An OAuth client gets to name who vouches for it, and removing one waits on server caches

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Sep 28, 2026

  9. Register a platform's identity provider once, not each agent: trust rests on its issuer, with no revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Paul Carleton et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  10. An OAuth draft lets the API, not the agent, describe the approval, and now name the key the token is bound to

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaroslav Rosomakho et al. · Jun 25, 2026

  11. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  12. OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  13. OAuth's SPIFFE draft opens metadata URLs to all three credentials and says what a self-served key cannot prove

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jun 15, 2026

  14. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  15. Cross-App Access draft warns that one stolen sign-in token could reach every app the identity provider permits

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · May 21, 2026

  16. Global Token Revocation must end a user's refresh tokens; their access tokens can outlive the call

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki, Okta · Feb 25, 2026

  17. Agent delegation records not anchored in trusted time become deniable once timestamps can be forged

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · V.K. Uppalapati · Sep 29, 2026

  18. Niyikiza's agent tokens narrow to a tool's arguments offline; revision -02 breaks -01 implementations

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Niki Aimable Niyikiza · Jun 15, 2026

  19. MCP's November 2025 authorization spec puts metadata documents ahead of dynamic client registration

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Nov 25, 2025

  20. Drake's agent registry names who may issue an agent's token, and its answer has no signature of its own

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Sep 25, 2026

  21. Drake's agent-mail draft puts hardware-maker proof on hold, but its abstract still offers it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  22. One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  23. A cross-domain transaction-token grant now names AI agents as a use and keeps the call chain at home

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · George Fletcher et al. · Sep 10, 2026

  24. MCP client setup moves from registration to metadata checks in a Spring walkthrough

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Oct 24, 2026

  25. An OAuth agent profile has the token server block any widening of scope, and leaves revoking the chain optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sanjeev Kumar, Orchestrum Technologies LLP · Aug 30, 2026

  26. OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation process

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Roland Hedberg et al. · Feb 17, 2026

  27. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  28. An MCP server picks the login URL its client opens, and that was enough to run code on users' machines

    Video · · Black Hat · Aug 20, 2026

  29. TPX replaces an app's embedded AI provider key with a capped, metered grant the user approves at their provider

    Article · · tokenpony.dev · Alex Polvi · Jul 20, 2026

  30. MCP's enterprise login extension says IdP revocation is immediate. Its own spec does not back that up

    Article · · Model Context Protocol (modelcontextprotocol.io) · MCP project et al. · Jun 18, 2026

  31. PayPal moved MCP tool permission checks into the server, and prompt-injected agents stopped getting through

    Paper · · arXiv · Huan Li et al. · Sep 18, 2026

  32. Three MCP auth flaws in a month, and the spec had already written the rule the SDKs skipped

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 2, 2026

  33. MCP's authorization spec makes the agent a plain OAuth client and leaves delegation to an extension

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jul 28, 2026

  34. A July OAuth draft keeps agent identity stable as keys rotate

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Jul 5, 2026

  35. One implementer found a transaction-token rule that let any scope through; the OAuth group fixed it in weeks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dhruv Agnihotri · Jun 23, 2026

  36. A June OAuth draft logs each hand-off between AI agents, but the per-hop limits the act claim lacks are optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Jun 8, 2026

  37. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  38. A KubeCon demo moves MCP servers' OAuth checks into a gateway, safe only if nothing can reach a server directly

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded March 24, 2026

  39. OAuth 2.1's October draft bans plain PKCE and adds browser-app rules; 2.1-only clients can fail on older servers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  40. An OAuth client brokering many tools, as agent services do, can let a rogue tool take over a user's other tools

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tim Würtele et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  41. OAuth's in-app login draft lets a native app collect the password itself, and leaves each server to vet the app

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  42. An OAuth draft caps every refresh token at the user's grant, and tells the app when that grant ends

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Nick Watson, Google · Feb 27, 2026

  43. A China Mobile draft would end an agent's token when its task ends, if a webhook says so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Meiling Chen et al. · Feb 4, 2026

  44. The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026

  45. On its authors' tasks, an LLM check of agent scopes works at one tool and refuses most valid three-tool requests

    Paper · · arXiv · Majed El Helou et al. · Oct 30, 2025

  46. Huawei-led OAuth draft lets clients chain narrower tokens offline but leaves revocation delivery out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Li Ruochen et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  47. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

  48. SPIFFE can authenticate an OAuth client; trust and registration still come first

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Oct 3, 2025

  49. RFC 9864 deprecates ambiguous signature identifiers without prohibiting their use

    Article · · IETF / RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2025

  50. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  51. An OAuth client that never registers: the July 2025 draft makes its URL the identity and leaves most server checks as SHOULDs

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 23, 2025

  52. The July 2025 Cross App Access draft lets the IdP decide app-to-app access and treats agents as plain clients

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 2, 2025

  53. MCP's June 2025 authorization spec: a server accepts only tokens issued for it and passes none upstream

    Article · · Model Context Protocol project · Jun 18, 2025

  54. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  55. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  56. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  57. RFC 9470 lets an API demand a fresher or stronger sign-in, with no shared scale for 'stronger'

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci et al. · Sep 8, 2023

  58. DPoP token binding depends on checks at the resource server

    Article · · RFC Editor · Daniel Fett et al. · Sep 2023

  59. Rich Authorization Requests need API-specific permission rules

    Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · May 1, 2023

  60. RFC 9207 has OAuth servers name themselves in each response; clients must refuse a missing name only where they expect one

    Article · · RFC Editor · Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen et al. · Mar 1, 2022

  61. RFC 9068 makes resource servers check a JWT access token's type and audience, and warns a client could pose as a user

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci, Okta · Oct 1, 2021

  62. Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021

  63. RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020

  64. RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020

  65. The OAuth device grant names remote phishing as its risk and leaves the defence mostly to what the approval screen tells the user

    Article · · RFC Editor · William Denniss et al. · Aug 1, 2019

  66. RFC 8414 tells an OAuth client to discard server metadata whose issuer differs from the URL it started from

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Jun 1, 2018

  67. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012

Related terms

What appears alongside OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata in the same briefings.

Dynamic Client RegistrationOAuth 2.0 Protected Resource MetadataResource Indicators for OAuth 2.0JWT Bearer GrantJSON Web Token Best Current PracticesJWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access TokensPKCEPushed Authorization Requests

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