NIST AI 100-1
AI RMF · AI Risk Management Framework · NIST AI RMF
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework (govern, map, measure, manage) for identifying and mitigating AI system risk.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on NIST AI 100-1 would have you leave with.
A delegated mission's authority must be a subset of the parent's, McGuinness argues, and OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) does not guarantee it. Token exchange carries the delegation, but he calls enforcing the narrowing implementation-dependent and not a protocol guarantee. He writes that in production token exchange deployments today, child tokens routinely inherit the parent's full scope unless the implementation explicitly narrows them, so agents compound a failure that OAuth delegation already has. A child agent may also run in a different runtime or expose weaker telemetry, so authority that is narrower on paper can be less governable in practice. He proposes that the mission's state owner rate each hop's trust quality, meaning how well that hop can be observed and checked, and give a low-rated child a more conservative budget. For a sub-agent an orchestrator spawns at runtime, he says the state owner must still issue its authority, but asks what triggers that issuance. Our briefing on Uber's production design found a token chain that records each agent hop without describing any narrowing. Our briefing on Highflame's open-source ZeroID found narrowing by scope intersection offered as an explicit step.
OAuth token exchange does not guarantee a sub-agent stays inside its parent's accessBI-FIND-2026-0228
OWASP's AIVSS v0.8 starts from a CVSS v4.0 base score and adds an uplift worth part of the gap between that base and 10. Ten agentic factors, each scored 0, 0.5 or 1, set the share, and an exploit-maturity multiplier scales it, by default 0.97. With the default mitigation factor of 1.0 (no or weak mitigation), all ten worked examples in the document land between 7.1 and 10.0, seven Critical and three High, and a goal-manipulation flaw with a CVSS base of 2.1 comes out at 7.1. The authors read a jump like that as a sign that the agentic deployment context, not the technical flaw, is the main risk driver. On our reading of the formula, a score can only fall below its CVSS base through the mitigation factor, and the document warns that AIVSS scores are not directly comparable to CVSS base scores.
OWASP's AIVSS lifts a CVSS 2.1 agent flaw to 7.1, and all ten worked examples land High or CriticalBI-FIND-2026-2299
Ardebili's report keeps a valid signature apart from a known signer. In his words, "A signature alone proves possession of a key." Since v0.105, verification also reports an identity_trust level: self-asserted, local-ca-pinned, ca-anchored or none. An Evidence Bundle carries its own signing key, so a pass on its own proves internal consistency, not identity, unless the auditor pins the expected signer with --public-key. For two-person approval, each signer is bound to an identity the operator vouches for, through a trust list or a pinned CA, a binding he calls "exactly as strong as the operator’s trust list or pinned CA". The check does not yet include the signer's login (OIDC in server mode, or Sigstore). Binding signers to those identities is on his roadmap. Identity elsewhere is early too. Today's trust primitives include did:key identifiers with Verifiable Credentials and delegation ("acted-as") chains, all labelled experimental; workload identity through SPIFFE/SPIRE, and DID/VC identity beyond that did:key slice, sit on the longer horizon. For people, the server mode's OIDC, RBAC, SAML and SCIM support is labelled experimental, and nova login is demo-only.
NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a personBI-FIND-2026-1820
›Cited in 11 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- OAuth token exchange does not guarantee a sub-agent stays inside its parent's access
Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 18, 2026
- OWASP's AIVSS lifts a CVSS 2.1 agent flaw to 7.1, and all ten worked examples land High or Critical
Article · · OWASP AIVSS project · Ken Huang et al. · Oct 22, 2026
- NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person
Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026
- An 'approved' flag can record four different human acts, and only a check says anything about the thing approved
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Andreas Ehstand · Sep 27, 2026
- A transparency-log profile for agents exposes edited and dropped records; an action nobody logged leaves no gap
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Pinar Emirdag et al. · Oct 12, 2026
- A paper says trusting agents' self-reported quality reliably fails; its own test shows it in 10 of 36 settings
Paper · · arXiv · Sunil Prakash · Mar 15, 2026
- NIST's request on securing AI agents asks about hijacking and rollback, and never about who the agent is
Article · · Federal Register (govinfo) · NIST Center for AI Standards et al. · Jan 8, 2026
- Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026
- One shared MCP token makes a whole company one identity in the logs; this paper wants per-user OAuth at a gateway
Paper · · arXiv · Herman Errico et al. · Nov 25, 2025
- AAGATE maps NIST's AI risk framework onto Kubernetes, and its paper never times the 'millisecond kill switch'
Paper · · arXiv · Ken Huang et al. · Oct 29, 2025
- DIRF credits its anti-cloning controls with a jump from near 0% to over 90%; no test in the paper applies them
Paper · · arXiv · Hammad Atta et al. · Aug 2, 2025
Related terms
What appears alongside NIST AI 100-1 in the same briefings.
Digital Identity Rights FrameworkISO/IEC 42001EU AI ActNIST SP 800-207SLSAANSOWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025LangGraph