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Explainers · Glossary

RBAC

role-based access control

Access control in which each user holds one or more roles, and each role carries a fixed set of permissions that grant or deny actions.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on RBAC would have you leave with.

  1. Vajragowni's paper puts fixed numbers on governing non-human identities (NHIs). His lifecycle algorithm treats a credential older than 90 days as stale, rotating API keys and service-account passwords and renewing certificates. It calls an identity unused for more than 180 days dormant and quarantines any NHI with no owner at once, with a ticket to assign an owner or decommission it within 14 days. Identities both orphaned and unused for more than 365 days are decommissioned. His KPI table recommends targets such as under 2% of NHIs with no assigned owner or application, over 98% of credentials rotated within the policy window, and under 4 hours on average from a decommission trigger to revocation. The paper reports no deployment or test of these values and gives no reason for choosing them. Its own dormancy KPI counts identities with no activity in 90 days, where the algorithm waits 180.

    A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind themBI-FIND-2026-0030

  2. Ardebili's report keeps a valid signature apart from a known signer. In his words, "A signature alone proves possession of a key." Since v0.105, verification also reports an identity_trust level: self-asserted, local-ca-pinned, ca-anchored or none. An Evidence Bundle carries its own signing key, so a pass on its own proves internal consistency, not identity, unless the auditor pins the expected signer with --public-key. For two-person approval, each signer is bound to an identity the operator vouches for, through a trust list or a pinned CA, a binding he calls "exactly as strong as the operator’s trust list or pinned CA". The check does not yet include the signer's login (OIDC in server mode, or Sigstore). Binding signers to those identities is on his roadmap. Identity elsewhere is early too. Today's trust primitives include did:key identifiers with Verifiable Credentials and delegation ("acted-as") chains, all labelled experimental; workload identity through SPIFFE/SPIRE, and DID/VC identity beyond that did:key slice, sit on the longer horizon. For people, the server mode's OIDC, RBAC, SAML and SCIM support is labelled experimental, and nova login is demo-only.

    NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a personBI-FIND-2026-1820

  3. Loren and Sven broke namespace-based tenancy three times, each time with a resource the tenant was allowed to create in its own namespace. In a standard Kubeflow setup the tenant's service account could create an Istio VirtualService; one in the attacker's namespace bound to the Kubeflow gateway, which sits in another namespace, rerouted the dashboard's favicon to the attacker's pod and captured victims' session cookies, and a wildcard contributor entry got it past the Istio authorization policy. In Traefik, an annotation on a Service in the attacker's namespace named a ServiceTransport in the victim's namespace, so the proxy made its mutual-TLS handshake with the victim's client certificate. In Istio, a VirtualService that claims a host such as example.com on the service mesh lets the attacker's pod intercept other workloads' requests to that host, though passing them on still needs an authorization policy that admits the attacker. The speakers call the first two insecure cross-namespace references, a problem Loren says exists in other projects too, and Loren says current security best practices "do not protect against these problems."

    ERNW broke Kubernetes namespace tenancy three ways, using resources tenants are allowed to createBI-FIND-2026-1573

›Cited in 19 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. A paper's 90- and 180-day rules for machine identities come with no test behind them

    Article · · International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research (Vol 8, Issue 3) · Thrinaath Vajragowni · May 23, 2026

  2. NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026

  3. ERNW broke Kubernetes namespace tenancy three ways, using resources tenants are allowed to create

    Video · · TROOPERS IT Security Conference · Uploaded August 12, 2026

  4. Datadog keeps tokens out of its AI agents' sandboxes: each holds an identity only the gateway accepts

    Video · · fwd:cloudsec · Uploaded September 25, 2026

  5. IBM Research puts agent identity in a SPIFFE and OAuth sidecar; Maia Iyer calls authorization policy still open

    Podcast · · Kubernetes Bytes · Your AI Agent Has Too Much Access | Fixing Agent Identity · Sep 15, 2026

  6. SaaS apps that only know users end up giving agents human accounts, says Okta's former chief architect

    Podcast · · The Identity Jedi Show: Where Identity Meets Strategy · Agents need a mission, not a key. · Oct 21, 2026

  7. Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified

    Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026

  8. Registering an MCP server on Bifrost ran its command, and the admin API that allowed it shipped with no password

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Sep 29, 2026

  9. WorkOS's Tobin South, in November 2025: agents will get a new kind of account, not a new identity standard

    Podcast · · CodingCat.dev Podcast · 5.10 - How to Secure AI - Identity Access Management for Agents · Nov 21, 2025

  10. A county CTO says identity is already critical infrastructure, and nobody will own it until someone declares it

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #452 - When Identity Becomes Critical Infrastructure with Shea McGrew · Oct 5, 2026

  11. SIG Auth's storage-token fix needs driver changes

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  12. Ericsson researchers would check every query a telecom network agent sends to its knowledge base

    Paper · · arXiv · Loay Abdelrazek et al. · Oct 22, 2025

  13. SPICE includes software agents as credential issuers, holders and verifiers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brent Zundel et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  14. A guide to securing agent plans has the planner choose each step's tools and leaves out agent identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Ron F. Del Rosario et al. · Sep 10, 2025

  15. A code scanner's top find in 583 MCP servers was hard-coded keys; tool poisoning needed an MCP-specific scanner

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohammed Mehedi Hasan et al. · Jun 16, 2025

  16. ATFAA names identity inheritance as an agent threat and answers it with existing cloud policy tools

    Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025

  17. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  18. Zanzibar guards against stale permissions with Spanner and a stored token; in one 2018 week only Safe checks averaged p95 under 10 ms

    Article · · Google Research (USENIX ATC 2019) · Ruoming Pang et al. · Jul 10, 2019

  19. Microsoft's 2023 keynote: workload standards should carry identity across service calls first, policy later

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Recorded May 31, 2023 · Uploaded June 17, 2024