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Explainers · Glossary

XACML

eXtensible Access Control Markup Language

An OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) standard for writing fine-grained access-control policy as data and evaluating it centrally. The Attribute-Centric Authorization Language (ACAL) supersedes it.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on XACML would have you leave with.

  1. A person's approved request is not, by itself, authority an agent can be held to, McGuinness argues, and relatively few deployments perform the step that would make it one. That step converts approved intent into a bounded authority artifact an enforcement point can evaluate. By his account, many systems instead fall into one of five patterns: scope enumeration, app-local mapping, LLM-generated requests, broad standing authority with prompt discipline, or a formal policy language. He says the most common land in the third or fourth, and that where nothing makes the conversion, the agent's own judgment becomes the effective policy engine. This is one author's argument, but two production designs we have read fit it. Uber's agent tokens carry the full chain of who asked through every hop, and Sierra's gateway runs interactive agent work as the user, with that person's permissions. In our reading, neither records what the person approved.

    A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that stepBI-FIND-2026-0202

  2. AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 has no way to say that an agent is acting for a person. The words agent, delegation and on-behalf-of do not appear; a subject is one user or machine with a type, an id and free-form properties, so an application can only encode "agent X for user Y" in property or context keys the standard does not name, and two decision services need not read them the same way. Whatever the application sends is taken on trust: the spec says "the PDP must trust the PEP" (the policy service trusts the enforcing application), leaves authenticating the caller out of scope, and only says the service SHOULD authenticate it. A delegation claim passed through AuthZEN is the calling application's word, with no token or chain to check.

    OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sendsBI-FIND-2026-0867

  3. The author of Mission-Bound OAuth has argued himself out of it. McGuinness's closing verdict is that a durable, approvable record of what an agent may do, the mission, is the right object, and that the authorization server is the wrong place to keep it: his test is that an architecture which still makes sense with the protocol removed has found the wrong home, and a mission makes as much sense under a job scheduler or a tool broker as under OAuth. The replacement he sketches is a separate Mission Authority Service that authorization servers, gateways and schedulers consult, with per-step credentials and no standing authority as the stricter fallback; a note added after publication says the design has since moved on to a draft family and a handbook of his own.

    Mission-Bound OAuth's author now says the mission object does not belong in OAuthBI-FIND-2026-0223

›Cited in 8 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that step

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 17, 2026

  2. OpenID's AuthZEN API can't say an agent acts for someone, and its policy service trusts whatever the app sends

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Omri Gazitt et al. · Jan 11, 2026

  3. Mission-Bound OAuth's author now says the mission object does not belong in OAuth

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 15, 2026

  4. A June OAuth draft logs each hand-off between AI agents, but the per-hop limits the act claim lacks are optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Jun 8, 2026

  5. Huawei researchers add agent delegation to an existing permission model and prove each action traces to a human

    Paper · · arXiv · Amjad Ibrahim et al. · Jun 2, 2026

  6. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  7. An MIT-led paper has the user sign the agent's delegation token and lets OpenID Connect vouch for both parties

    Paper · · arXiv · Tobin South et al. · Jan 16, 2025

  8. NIST's 2020 zero trust model named AI agents that manage security and left their authentication open

    Article · · NIST · Scott Rose et al. · Aug 11, 2020

Related terms

What appears alongside XACML in the same briefings.

Open Policy AgentCedarAuthZENIBACZanzibar