Zanzibar
Google's global, consistent authorization system for evaluating relationship-based access control (ReBAC) at scale, described in a 2019 USENIX ATC paper.
In our briefings
The claim each of the newest briefings on Zanzibar would have you leave with.
AAP puts narrowing on the authorization server. On every token exchange the server must reduce privileges "by one or more of" four means (dropping capabilities, tightening constraints, shortening the token's lifetime, or lowering the delegation limit) and must never grant a capability the parent token lacked. As written, a derived token that keeps every capability and only expires sooner meets that rule. Section 7.7 also tells the resource server to "ensure delegated tokens do not contain broader capabilities than the original agent token", yet about its parent a derived token carries only an identifier and an optional note of what was removed, and the draft does not say how the server learns what the original token held. The resource-server conformance checklist in Appendix D lists no such comparison; its delegation checks are counts, depth against max_depth and chain length against depth plus one.
An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cutBI-FIND-2026-0964
Zanzibar handles what Google calls the "new enemy" problem, where a user removed from a permission list still sees new material, with two mechanisms. Against ignoring the order of permission changes, it relies on external consistency: Spanner's TrueTime gives each permission write a timestamp that reflects causal order, and each check is evaluated at a single snapshot. Against checking new content with an old permission list, it uses the zookie. When content is about to be saved, the client service runs a content-change check, which carries no zookie and is evaluated at the latest snapshot, and Zanzibar returns a zookie holding a timestamp later than every earlier permission write. The service stores it with that content version and sends it back on later checks, and Zanzibar may then answer from any snapshot at least that fresh. Always checking at the latest snapshot would need global synchronization, so the design lets most checks run on data already replicated, and it relies on the client services to cooperate.
Zanzibar guards against stale permissions with Spanner and a stored token; in one 2018 week only Safe checks averaged p95 under 10 msBI-FIND-2019-0001
Cited in 2 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cut
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Angel Cruz · Feb 7, 2026
- Zanzibar guards against stale permissions with Spanner and a stored token; in one 2018 week only Safe checks averaged p95 under 10 ms
Article · · Google Research (USENIX ATC 2019) · Ruoming Pang et al. · Jul 10, 2019
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What appears alongside Zanzibar in the same briefings.