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Open Policy Agent

OPA · Rego

An open-source, general-purpose policy engine for evaluating structured authorization decisions against a declarative policy language.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on Open Policy Agent would have you leave with.

  1. A delegated mission's authority must be a subset of the parent's, McGuinness argues, and OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) does not guarantee it. Token exchange carries the delegation, but he calls enforcing the narrowing implementation-dependent and not a protocol guarantee. He writes that in production token exchange deployments today, child tokens routinely inherit the parent's full scope unless the implementation explicitly narrows them, so agents compound a failure that OAuth delegation already has. A child agent may also run in a different runtime or expose weaker telemetry, so authority that is narrower on paper can be less governable in practice. He proposes that the mission's state owner rate each hop's trust quality, meaning how well that hop can be observed and checked, and give a low-rated child a more conservative budget. For a sub-agent an orchestrator spawns at runtime, he says the state owner must still issue its authority, but asks what triggers that issuance. Our briefing on Uber's production design found a token chain that records each agent hop without describing any narrowing. Our briefing on Highflame's open-source ZeroID found narrowing by scope intersection offered as an explicit step.

    OAuth token exchange does not guarantee a sub-agent stays inside its parent's accessBI-FIND-2026-0228

  2. Ardebili's report keeps a valid signature apart from a known signer. In his words, "A signature alone proves possession of a key." Since v0.105, verification also reports an identity_trust level: self-asserted, local-ca-pinned, ca-anchored or none. An Evidence Bundle carries its own signing key, so a pass on its own proves internal consistency, not identity, unless the auditor pins the expected signer with --public-key. For two-person approval, each signer is bound to an identity the operator vouches for, through a trust list or a pinned CA, a binding he calls "exactly as strong as the operator’s trust list or pinned CA". The check does not yet include the signer's login (OIDC in server mode, or Sigstore). Binding signers to those identities is on his roadmap. Identity elsewhere is early too. Today's trust primitives include did:key identifiers with Verifiable Credentials and delegation ("acted-as") chains, all labelled experimental; workload identity through SPIFFE/SPIRE, and DID/VC identity beyond that did:key slice, sit on the longer horizon. For people, the server mode's OIDC, RBAC, SAML and SCIM support is labelled experimental, and nova login is demo-only.

    NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a personBI-FIND-2026-1820

  3. In Liu, Yu and Zhang's 16-host test, a revocation that a receiver had acknowledged and stored never reached the gateways behind it, and those gateways kept letting calls through. Keycloak sent the revocation as a Shared Signals event to two receivers, each serving four of eight tool gateways, and a network rule cut only receiver B's handoff to its gateways. Receiver B still answered HTTP 202 and persisted the event. Its gateways admitted every call assigned to them and every one committed: 3,360 calls in each of two separately built executions, 112 of 225 (49.78%) in every block. Normal delivery and recovery committed none. The authors say the 49.78% "should not be read as an incident rate", since it follows from receiver B owning half the gateways. The test ran Keycloak's own delivery code with receivers and gateways the authors wrote, and the paper attributes the gap to no Keycloak defect.

    Receiver acknowledged, gateways cut off: in a fixed 16-host replay, 112 of 225 revoked tool calls still committedBI-FIND-2026-1792

›Cited in 18 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. OAuth token exchange does not guarantee a sub-agent stays inside its parent's access

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 18, 2026

  2. NovaFabric seals AI agent runs as signed evidence, and its author says a signature proves a key, not a person

    Paper · · arXiv · Mohsen Seyedkazemi Ardebili · Oct 25, 2026

  3. Receiver acknowledged, gateways cut off: in a fixed 16-host replay, 112 of 225 revoked tool calls still committed

    Paper · · arXiv · Lifei Liu et al. · Oct 11, 2026

  4. An IETF draft caps each attestation verdict at its worst check and leaves the unchecked parts to the relying party

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thomas Fossati et al. · May 26, 2026

  5. Five places to put authorization in microservices, and why Drus says the classic gateway one does not scale

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Uploaded October 21, 2026

  6. Okta says its agent kill switch revokes all tokens; its product screen says tokens outside the gateway survive

    Video · · Okta · Sep 24, 2026

  7. A June OAuth draft logs each hand-off between AI agents, but the per-hop limits the act claim lacks are optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Jun 8, 2026

  8. A proposed standard for agent authority advises against delegating it across company lines by default

    Paper · · arXiv · Partha Madhira · May 12, 2026

  9. A Huawei agent draft keeps one 'master agent' as gatekeeper and drops the line that had servers re-check it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yuan Ni et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  10. An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  11. Wisconsin researchers check each agent action against its history, in small tests with hand-written rules

    Paper · · arXiv · Nils Palumbo et al. · Feb 18, 2026

  12. MI9 re-checks agent permissions when goals change; its 99.81% score comes from tests Gemini wrote and scored

    Paper · · arXiv · Charles L. Wang et al. · Aug 5, 2025

  13. ETDI would sign MCP tool definitions against lookalikes, but leaves open who vouches for the publisher's key

    Paper · · arXiv · Manish Bhatt et al. · Jun 2, 2025

  14. A Cloud Security Alliance paper wants AI agents on a new identity stack, with OAuth kept for simple cases

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.19301) / Cloud Security Alliance · Ken Huang et al. · May 25, 2025

  15. The first Agent Name Service paper puts capabilities in the name and leaves protocol translation and governance out

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.10609) / OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Ken Huang et al. · May 15, 2025

  16. ATFAA names identity inheritance as an agent threat and answers it with existing cloud policy tools

    Paper · · arXiv · Vineeth Sai Narajala et al. · Apr 28, 2025

  17. MCP Guardian wraps tool calls in token and regex checks, leaving poisoned servers and agent IDs open

    Paper · · arXiv · Sonu Kumar et al. · Apr 17, 2025

  18. Microsoft's 2023 keynote: workload standards should carry identity across service calls first, policy later

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Recorded May 31, 2023 · Uploaded June 17, 2024

Related terms

What appears alongside Open Policy Agent in the same briefings.

XACMLAuthZENReBACCedarCrewAIMAESTROOpenTelemetryLangChain