Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

HSM

hardware security module · HSMs

A dedicated hardware device that generates and stores cryptographic keys and performs signing/encryption operations inside a tamper-resistant boundary, so private keys never leave the device.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on HSM would have you leave with.

  1. Verifiable Intent chains three layers of signed SD-JWT credentials, tokens whose fields can be shown selectively. The issuer, a bank or payment network, binds the user's key for about a year (L1). The user signs mandates for the agent (L2): final values for an immediate purchase or, in autonomous mode, constraints plus the agent's key for a recommended 24 hours to 30 days. In autonomous mode the agent then signs a payment mandate for the network and a checkout mandate for the merchant, each valid about five minutes (L3a, L3b). The specification says "Layer 3 credentials MUST NOT contain a `cnf` claim in the payload (terminal delegation)", so the agent's credential names no next key and the agent cannot pass its authority to another agent. A verifier checks the agent's final values against the user's constraints, but only the ones disclosed to it, and it skips the allowlist check when no allowlist was disclosed. Eight constraint types are defined (merchants, line items, payees, amount range, budget, recurrence, agent recurrence, reference). Budget and the two recurrence limits need the payment network to keep a running count.

    Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke itBI-FIND-2026-0477

  2. OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.

    OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687

  3. Section 4.2 of draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-11 says its "Below Zero Trust" credential "cannot be manipulated or spoofed by an administrator of an endpoint with root access," and the draft offers no threat analysis or test to back that sentence. It roots the credential in a hardware based Attesting Environment plus the trustworthiness of a verifier, and that environment signs a hash of the verifier's results with a relying party's freshness proof. After 15 revisions since April 2021, Section 6 reads only "Security Considerations Text," and the words threat, attacker and adversary appear nowhere in -11. We read the sentence as a claim about the credential alone, because the draft's own runtime-opaque value 32 covers environments "not encrypted in a way which restricts the Attester's root operator visibility."

    An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholderBI-FIND-2026-2070

›Cited in 16 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Verifiable Intent stops an AI agent from passing its buying authority on, and v0.1 has no protocol to revoke it

    Article · · Verifiable Intent (GitHub, agent-intent/verifiable-intent) · Verifiable Intent Working Group · Apr 18, 2026

  2. OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens

    Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026

  3. An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026

  4. An unadopted AGTP draft would let gateways refuse an agent's out-of-scope requests from its TLS certificate

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Chris Hood, Nomotic, Inc. · Oct 30, 2026

  5. RATS wraps attestation messages in one envelope and requires composite evidence to be bound together

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Dec 11, 2025

  6. ChainIT's design has the payment rail rebuild each payment's hash before money moves; the paper reports no test

    Paper · · arXiv · Jeremy Blackburn et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  7. Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified

    Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026

  8. Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions

    Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026

  9. NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph

    Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  10. A SANS instructor's broker vaults agents' real keys, but its third delivery model breaks the abstract's promise

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kenneth G. Hartman · Mar 29, 2026

  11. IETF draft bars CAs from using attestation as proof about a key without a validated binding

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Mike Ounsworth et al. · Feb 11, 2026

  12. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  13. A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  14. IETF HSM evidence draft: a device may call a key device-bound only if no route, now or later, can export it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jean-Pierre Fiset et al. · Oct 10, 2025

  15. BT's appliance suppliers handed over one password for every box; BT has since moved to one per host

    Podcast · · Cloud Security Podcast · How BT Tackled 180 Years of Legacy to Build a Passwordless Future · Jul 17, 2025

  16. A 2025 post-quantum passkey draft lets the private key sit encrypted on flash or disk, for want of ML-DSA hardware

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft · Aditya Mitra et al. · Apr 2, 2025