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Explainers · Glossary

PKI

public key infrastructure

The certificates, certificate authorities and key-management processes that bind public keys to identities, underpinning TLS, code signing and machine/workload identity.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on PKI would have you leave with.

  1. OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.

    OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687

  2. Reading the public documentation for AWS Nitro Enclaves, Google Confidential Space and Azure's attestation service, Reddy, Ritz, Sheffer and Mihalcea find that the measurements each provider attests vouch for an approved workload and cannot tell two running copies of it apart. In their words, "Measurements establish the type of a workload, not which running instance it is." That suffices to release a secret to any genuine instance of an approved image, but attested TLS may need to reach one specific instance. Where copies must be told apart, the draft has the workload generate a key pair inside the attested environment and carry the public key in the attestation, as Nitro already lets an enclave do in its attestation document. The authors leave the SEAT working group to decide whether attested TLS must identify a specific instance, and whether a key-based identity is enough.

    Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apartBI-FIND-2026-1731

  3. Under revision 12, an attested client is one whose attester signed for its key. The Client Attestation JWT must carry four claims: the client identifier, an expiry, an issue time (optional until this revision) and the client instance's public key. What would make 'attested' say something about the software stays optional and undefined. The JWT 'is generally understood to convey' that the attester verified the instance's authenticity and integrity, which 'might encompass statements about its software and hardware environment', and it may describe properties of the key, such as hardware-backed storage, or other characteristics of the instance, such as (new in revision 12) the criteria or policy it was evaluated against. The draft defines no claim for any of these, puts the evidence and how it is collected out of scope, and lets a client with no backend do the attester's job itself. A new Section 12.3 says every claim in the JWT, integrity included, is an assertion by the attester, and that a server 'should rely on such claims only to the extent that it trusts the issuing Client Attester'.

    An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucherBI-FIND-2026-0361

›Cited in 22 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens

    Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026

  2. Attestation shows which image is running, not which copy; a new IETF draft weighs two ways to tell copies apart

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Oct 28, 2026

  3. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  4. The post-quantum executive order sets the hard dates; every identity requirement is in OMB's memo

    Article · · The White House · Executive Office of the President · Jun 22, 2026

  5. OWASP's agent Top 10 blames identity systems built for people, and does not say how it chose or ranked its risks

    Article · · OWASP GenAI Security Project · John Sotiropoulos et al. · Dec 9, 2025

  6. The Agent Name Service draft was rebuilt on DNS, with a GoDaddy author, and no standards body has adopted it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Scott Courtney et al. · Apr 13, 2026

  7. A preprint cuts off every sub-agent within about 40 seconds of its parent stopping, with no revocation server

    Paper · · arXiv · Saurabh Deochake, SentinelOne · May 20, 2026

  8. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  9. A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  10. An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025

  11. Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025

  12. A 'provable' bound on agent-memory injection assumes independent layers and fills in none of its detection rates

    Paper · · arXiv · Ken Huang et al. · Aug 17, 2025

  13. CMP adds KEM authentication with fresh secrets for each certificate-management operation

    Article · · RFC Editor · Hendrik Brockhaus et al. · Jul 29, 2025

  14. ETDI would sign MCP tool definitions against lookalikes, but leaves open who vouches for the publisher's key

    Paper · · arXiv · Manish Bhatt et al. · Jun 2, 2025

  15. A Cloud Security Alliance paper wants AI agents on a new identity stack, with OAuth kept for simple cases

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.19301) / Cloud Security Alliance · Ken Huang et al. · May 25, 2025

  16. The first Agent Name Service paper puts capabilities in the name and leaves protocol translation and governance out

    Paper · · arXiv (cs.CR preprint 2505.10609) / OWASP Agentic Security Initiative · Ken Huang et al. · May 15, 2025

  17. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  18. In March 2024 ENISA found deepfake injection leading attacks on ID proofing, with no agreed standard to detect it

    Article · · ENISA · Evgenia Nikolouzou et al. · Mar 12, 2024

  19. The 2022 TLS BCP makes peer identity and session controls part of secure deployment

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Nov 1, 2022

  20. NIST's 2020 zero trust model named AI agents that manage security and left their authentication open

    Article · · NIST · Scott Rose et al. · Aug 11, 2020

  21. RFC 8705 lets OAuth bind tokens to a client certificate, and leaves the proxy in front of the API to the deployer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Brian Campbell et al. · Feb 28, 2020

  22. A 2020 simulation fit the web's certificate revocations in under 5 MB; OAuth's Token Status List draft cites it

    Article · · NDSS Symposium 2020 · Trevor Smith et al. · Feb 12, 2020