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Explainers · Glossary

TPM

Trusted Platform Module · trusted platform module

A tamper-resistant chip on a device's motherboard that stores keys and signs on the device's behalf, so an identity can be tied to one physical machine.

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on TPM would have you leave with.

  1. OMB's post-quantum memo M-26-15 says "API gateways and application workloads must be configured to issue and validate PQC-signed tokens", naming JWTs as an example, and gives that line no date or phase of its own. The same appendix says cryptographic device attestation, often rooted in a Trusted Platform Module, must be migrated to post-quantum algorithms. In the body, agencies should count logical access control systems based on asymmetric encryption, such as public key infrastructure, that use any of the algorithms listed in Appendix A among the systems they prioritize. GSA will set up an inter-agency working group within 60 days on modernizing Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) for post-quantum cryptography, and GSA's FICAM office is working with interested agencies to test PQC-ready physical and logical access systems. The memo's text, appendices included, never mentions AI agents, machine identities, OAuth or code signing.

    OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokensBI-FIND-2026-0687

  2. On any connection that requires attestation under draft-fossati-seat-expat-05, session resumption and early data (0-RTT) are prohibited. The draft says a server "MUST NOT send a NewSessionTicket" and a client must not offer early data. The reason is the binding value, which comes from the connection's TLS exporter: a resumed connection derives a new exporter secret, so Evidence generated before a resumption and delivered after it fails verification, and the authors say the application typically cannot tell that failure from an invalid Authenticator. These connections therefore use a full handshake or the certificate-with-external-PSK (pre-shared key) handshake. In return, the authors say the Evidence needs no extra nonce or timestamp to be fresh for its connection, and attestation may be repeated with a new exchange. Our September briefing on the in-handshake draft, draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-08, found that it rules out resumption and early data too, for a different reason, so this cost does not separate the two designs.

    An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinishedBI-FIND-2026-2074

  3. Section 4.2 of draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-11 says its "Below Zero Trust" credential "cannot be manipulated or spoofed by an administrator of an endpoint with root access," and the draft offers no threat analysis or test to back that sentence. It roots the credential in a hardware based Attesting Environment plus the trustworthiness of a verifier, and that environment signs a hash of the verifier's results with a relying party's freshness proof. After 15 revisions since April 2021, Section 6 reads only "Security Considerations Text," and the words threat, attacker and adversary appear nowhere in -11. We read the sentence as a claim about the credential alone, because the draft's own runtime-opaque value 32 covers environments "not encrypted in a way which restricts the Attester's root operator visibility."

    An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholderBI-FIND-2026-2070

›Cited in 16 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. OMB tells agencies their API gateways must issue post-quantum signed tokens

    Article · · Office of Management and Budget (whitehouse.gov) · Russell T. Vought et al. · Jun 24, 2026

  2. An IETF draft puts TLS attestation after the handshake and bans session resumption; its formal analysis is unfinished

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Muhammad Usama Sardar et al. · Nov 2, 2026

  3. An IETF draft says root admins cannot spoof its credential; its security section is still a placeholder

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Eric Voit et al. · Oct 30, 2026

  4. A draft joining four agent records on one hash reports no valid joint run and now claims less about what agents did

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Steven Mih et al. · Aug 16, 2026

  5. Drake's agent-mail draft puts hardware-maker proof on hold, but its abstract still offers it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  6. One global registry for AI agent identities, and no one allowed to switch an identity off

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Christopher Drake, 1id.com · Oct 27, 2026

  7. LinkedIn, Uber and State Farm already run SPIRE for workload identity, and each plans to extend it

    Field signals · · 12 voices from the field · Nov 2024 to Oct 2026

  8. RATS wraps attestation messages in one envelope and requires composite evidence to be bound together

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Henk Birkholz et al. · Dec 11, 2025

  9. ChainIT's design has the payment rail rebuild each payment's hash before money moves; the paper reports no test

    Paper · · arXiv · Jeremy Blackburn et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  10. Anthropic asks for per-agent identity; its guide leaves Claude Code sub-agent credentials unspecified

    Article · · Anthropic (Claude) · Anthropic · May 27, 2026

  11. Anthropic says agents should never use static API keys, yet its sub-agents can carry the parent's permissions

    Article · · Anthropic · Anthropic · May 18, 2026

  12. The browser OAuth draft favors a backend that keeps tokens out of JavaScript

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  13. ACME's device-attestation draft now advises leaving device IDs out of certificates and drops a key-export rule

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brandon Weeks et al. · Jan 29, 2026

  14. A genuine TPM does not prove the server is LinkedIn's, so its SPIRE first checks the switch port and cabinet

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  15. An IETF draft now requires the attestation nonce and the certificate request to share one PKI operation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Hannes Tschofenig et al. · Oct 19, 2025

  16. A 2025 post-quantum passkey draft lets the private key sit encrypted on flash or disk, for want of ML-DSA hardware

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft · Aditya Mitra et al. · Apr 2, 2025