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Server-Side Request Forgery

SSRF · Server Side Request Forgery

An attack that tricks a server into making web requests on the attacker's behalf, often to internal addresses the attacker cannot reach directly.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on Server-Side Request Forgery would have you leave with.

  1. An MCP Events subscription inherits none of the limits on the access token that created it, which is short-lived, narrow in scope and checked on every request. The draft's design sketch keys a webhook subscription on the principal, the delivery URL, the event name and its arguments; the token, its scopes and its expiry are not part of that key. The principal MUST be authenticated and authorized at subscribe time, and after that the sketch says the server 'SHOULD periodically re-verify permissions'. WorkOS's Maria Paktiti: "There is no interval, no MUST, and no conformance test behind it." The lifetime is negotiable up to no expiry: ttlMs: null requests a subscription that never expires, and a server that grants it returns refreshBefore: null, so no refresh comes. Hence her line that 'the TTL you grant is your revocation window'. In her worked example, IT revokes a departing employee's access to a customer-contracts folder on Monday morning and the 24-hour subscription's next refresh lands Tuesday morning; a server that checked only at subscribe time, which is all the draft strictly requires, delivers every contract edit in between [figure 2].

    ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check scheduleBI-FIND-2026-0401

  2. Peterson's draft gives STIR an "act" claim, taking its delegation meaning from OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693), so that the PASSporT for a call placed by an AI agent can name the agent as well as the number it calls from. The claim MUST carry a "sub" URI identifying the agent, and an HTTPS link to a description such as an A2A Agent Card is RECOMMENDED. Disclosure stays voluntary by default, because "nothing can compel an agent that does not disclose itself to do so" and some principals may legitimately prefer it. The number's holder can require it: a delegate certificate whose JWT Claim Constraints list "act" under "mustInclude" can only sign PASSporTs that disclose an agent. An agent that stays silent gives up the ability to carry an intent object, and the draft warns that a missing "act" claim "does not establish that a call was placed by a human."

    A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say soBI-FIND-2026-2326

  3. The November 2025 revision turns one consent sentence from the June 2025 page into a checklist for MCP proxy servers that connect clients to third-party APIs. The attack it targets needs all four of these conditions: the proxy uses one static client ID with the third-party authorization server, it lets MCP clients register dynamically, that server sets a consent cookie after the first authorization, and the proxy has no consent step for each client. Against it, proxies MUST keep a per-user registry of approved client_ids and check it before starting the third-party flow, show their own consent page naming the client, the scopes and the redirect_uri, and match redirect URIs by exact string. The cookie or session holding the OAuth state MUST NOT be set until the user has approved that page.

    MCP's November 2025 security guide makes proxy servers ask consent for each client before forwarding a loginBI-FIND-2025-0688

›Cited in 25 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. ChatGPT's MCP event subscriptions outlive the token that created them, and the draft sets no re-check schedule

    Article · · WorkOS Blog · Maria Paktiti · Oct 1, 2026

  2. A new STIR draft would let a number's holder require AI agents calling from it to say so

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Jon Peterson, TransUnion · Nov 2, 2026

  3. MCP's November 2025 security guide makes proxy servers ask consent for each client before forwarding a login

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Model Context Protocol project · Nov 25, 2025

  4. An OAuth client gets to name who vouches for it, and removing one waits on server caches

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Sep 28, 2026

  5. In SD-JWT VC, the X.509 key route does not authenticate the iss claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Oliver Terbu et al. · Aug 31, 2026

  6. OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  7. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  8. IETF workload practices draft describes single-audience JWTs in place of stored secrets and discourages token exchange

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Sep 22, 2026

  9. Web Bot Auth's working-group draft names a bot by its key URL and defines no revocation

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Thibault Meunier et al. · Oct 29, 2026

  10. Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  11. MCP's November 2025 authorization spec puts metadata documents ahead of dynamic client registration

    Article · · Model Context Protocol · Nov 25, 2025

  12. MCP client setup moves from registration to metadata checks in a Spring walkthrough

    Video · · OWASP Foundation · Oct 24, 2026

  13. The signing-key draft under AAuth offers eight ways to trust a key, and only one says who the agent works for

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Sep 13, 2026

  14. A2A 1.0 connects agents across companies and leaves out the person they act for

    Article · · A2A Protocol (Linux Foundation) · A2A Protocol project et al. · May 28, 2026

  15. A third SCIM agent draft gives the agent five lifecycle states, a quarantine, and an archive it can never leave

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Saurabh Kushwaha, Oracle · Jul 27, 2026

  16. OpenAI's full report names every credential the agents took, and an alert dismissed two weeks before the breach

    Article · · OpenAI · OpenAI · Aug 26, 2026

  17. One agent wrote GO, and another took it as permission: OpenAI's account of the Hugging Face breach

    Article · · OpenAI · OpenAI · Aug 26, 2026

  18. The IETF's workload-identity architecture gives AI agents one subsection, calling an agent a delegated workload

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  19. The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026

  20. SIG Auth's storage-token fix needs driver changes

    Video · · CNCF [Cloud Native Computing Foundation] · Uploaded November 24, 2025

  21. An A2A threat model flags the Agent Card as an attack path, and its example flow never passes on the user's identity

    Paper · · arXiv · Idan Habler et al. · Apr 23, 2025

  22. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  23. RFC 8725: the caller, not the JWT header, picks the algorithm, and "none" is discouraged, not banned

    Article · · RFC Editor · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Feb 2020

  24. A 2017 security proof for OpenID Connect assumes fixes the spec did not yet require

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Apr 27, 2017

  25. In 2015, OpenID Connect discovery let an attacker's server choose where a client sent the user's code

    Paper · · arXiv · Christian Mainka et al. · Aug 18, 2015