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FAPI

FAPI 2.0 · Financial-grade API · FAPI 2.0 Security Profile

OpenID's Financial-grade API Security Profile: a high-assurance OAuth/OpenID Connect profile originally built for banking APIs, now referenced wherever a deployment needs OAuth hardened beyond the baseline.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on FAPI would have you leave with.

  1. Much of the new text in -01 says how an agent's access ends, in plain prose with no MUST or SHOULD. Section 8 now says a posture check at provisioning "establishes trust at the moment a credential is issued or renewed" and does not by itself show that posture still holds at a later request. It offers two existing remedies: shorter credential lifetimes, so posture is re-assessed at each renewal, or the event mechanisms of Section 11, so a posture change after issuance revokes or down-scopes the agent's credentials and tokens. Deprovisioning becomes a third phase after provisioning and rotation. At a minimum renewal stops and the short-lived credentials lapse; where the change must take effect before expiry, the issuer signals relying parties and the issuers of any derived credentials. A new Section 9.3 bounds a long-lived session or stream by the credential that opened it: the accepting party re-validates when that credential expires, and both sides end or down-scope the session on a revocation or risk signal. A retired agent's identifier must not be reassigned to a different agent.

    WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirementBI-FIND-2026-2029

  2. The draft's sharpest rule reads "The Large Language Model MUST NOT have access to an agent's credentials or to credentials that may be needed to access tools and services", which it says keeps prompt injection from getting the model to use, expose or disclose them. Around it sit the identity rules. An agent MUST be assigned exactly one WIMSE identifier and MUST hold credentials cryptographically bound to it; those credentials SHOULD be short-lived and MUST carry an explicit expiry, and static API keys are "an antipattern for agent identity". The draft names WIT, X.509 WIC and SPIFFE SVIDs as formats and leaves the choice to the deployment. Our briefing on Sierra's cloud agent platform found a similar boundary built in: a proxy approves each call and swaps in the credential, so the agent never holds it.

    Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reachBI-FIND-2026-0179

  3. In OpenID Federation 1.0, the rules a federation sets for its members can only tighten on the way down a trust chain. A Trust Anchor or Intermediate attaches metadata policy to the entities below it, with operators such as subset_of, one_of and essential, and the spec says that "once applied to a metadata parameter, a metadata policy cannot be repealed or made more permissive by Intermediate Entities that are subordinate in the Trust Chain." Where two levels restrict the same parameter with one_of or subset_of, their values merge by intersection, an Intermediate that introduces a conflict makes the chain invalid, and superiors can also cap path length, restrict names and limit which entity types a subordinate may be. We read this as a working model of the attenuation rule agent-delegation designs need, though here it governs organizations' published metadata, not anyone's delegated authority.

    OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation processBI-FIND-2026-1165

›Cited in 14 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  2. Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  3. OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation process

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Roland Hedberg et al. · Feb 17, 2026

  4. OpenID experts tell EMVCo an agent's payment can look like the cardholder's, and no one vouches for the agent

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Serj Hallam et al. · Oct 8, 2026

  5. OAuth handles an agent in one company, working while you watch. The OpenID paper says that is where it stops.

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Tobin South et al. · Oct 2025

  6. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  7. Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025

  8. Formal proofs find no new flaws in OpenID4VP over the Digital Credentials API, for a March 2025 draft

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Fabian Hauck et al. · Aug 20, 2025

  9. OpenID4VCI's third interop test: 87% of tested pairs passed, on counts the post does not reconcile

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Gail Hodges · Jul 24, 2025

  10. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  11. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  12. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  13. In draft FAPI, token binding did not make phished tokens useless: the attacker had the bound client spend them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 31, 2019

  14. Ian Glazer's sketch of a 2025 IAM stack: one shared identity data layer, with Shared Signals announcing changes

    Podcast · · Identity at the Center · #325 - Theorycrafting Modern Identity Architecture with Ian Glazer · Jan 13, 2025

Related terms

What appears alongside FAPI in the same briefings.

Pushed Authorization RequestsAudience injection attackCIBAOpenID FederationOpenID FoundationIPSIEAgent Identity Management SystemDigital Credentials API