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Explainers · Glossary

Pushed Authorization Requests

RFC 9126 · RFC9126

An OAuth extension (RFC 9126) letting a client submit its authorization request parameters directly to the authorization server over a back channel, with integrity protection, before redirecting the user — instead of exposing them in a browser URL.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on Pushed Authorization Requests would have you leave with.

  1. Richer's draft would add another way to bind an OAuth access token to a client's key, beside DPoP and mutual TLS. Its introduction says the work "complements and builds on experience with" those two, and the draft names no gap in either; when to use which is left to an editor's note, and the security and privacy sections are marked TBD. The authors argued for it on the mailing list during the adoption call that closed on 5 October. Paul Bastian cited DPoP shortcomings he had co-presented at the OAuth Security Workshop and TLS that ends at DDoS-protection or corporate proxies. Richer said HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) is now published and widely deployed. Neil Madden, replying to Bastian's workshop slides, suggested summarising some of their rationale in the draft's introduction. Nine people supported adoption, five of them authors, and four objected: Dick Hardt said the group had already solved key binding with DPoP, and Michael Jones and Brian Campbell, two of DPoP's co-authors, said another method would hurt interoperability. The chairs had posted no decision by 12 October.

    The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacksBI-FIND-2026-0862

  2. Under revision -11 of the bis draft, a JWT that authenticates an OAuth client has exactly one permitted audience. The draft rewrites RFC 7523's rule so that the audience 'MUST use the issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the authorization server as its sole value', 'the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MUST NOT be used as an audience value', and the server 'MUST reject any JWT that does not contain its issuer identifier as its sole audience value'. Unless an application profile says otherwise, the values are compared by Simple String Comparison. The server must have an issuer identifier to use the rule at all, and participants no longer need to agree on audience identifiers for client authentication. Pushed authorization requests (RFC 9126) get the same sole-issuer rule. The draft's reason is that endpoint addresses other than the issuer 'cannot be directly validated' and, sent to a different endpoint, 'can open an attack vector'. It cites the vulnerability University of Stuttgart researchers disclosed to the working group in January 2025, and their paper on audience injection attacks.

    The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpointBI-FIND-2026-0350

  3. A person's approved request is not, by itself, authority an agent can be held to, McGuinness argues, and relatively few deployments perform the step that would make it one. That step converts approved intent into a bounded authority artifact an enforcement point can evaluate. By his account, many systems instead fall into one of five patterns: scope enumeration, app-local mapping, LLM-generated requests, broad standing authority with prompt discipline, or a formal policy language. He says the most common land in the third or fourth, and that where nothing makes the conversion, the agent's own judgment becomes the effective policy engine. This is one author's argument, but two production designs we have read fit it. Uber's agent tokens carry the full chain of who asked through every hop, and Sierra's gateway runs interactive agent work as the user, with that person's permissions. In our reading, neither records what the person approved.

    A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that stepBI-FIND-2026-0202

›Cited in 22 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. The OAuth working group split over a token-binding draft that never says what DPoP lacks

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Justin Richer et al. · Jul 28, 2026

  2. The JWT an agent or other OAuth client signs in with may name only the server's issuer, never the token endpoint

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 28, 2026

  3. A user's approved request is not yet authority an agent can be held to, and most deployments skip that step

    Article · · Control Plane by Karl McGuinness · Karl McGuinness · Mar 17, 2026

  4. An OAuth client gets to name who vouches for it, and removing one waits on server caches

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karl McGuinness · Sep 28, 2026

  5. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  6. Agent URI draft -04 ties an agent's name to a key document and bars OAuth servers from trusting the name alone

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Yaswanth Narvaneni et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  7. An OAuth agent profile has the token server block any widening of scope, and leaves revoking the chain optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sanjeev Kumar, Orchestrum Technologies LLP · Aug 30, 2026

  8. OpenID Federation 1.0 lets each level of a trust chain only tighten the rules, and defines no revocation process

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Roland Hedberg et al. · Feb 17, 2026

  9. An attested OAuth client is one somebody vouched for; revision 12 says to trust its claims only as far as the voucher

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tobias Looker et al. · Oct 13, 2026

  10. TPX replaces an app's embedded AI provider key with a capped, metered grant the user approves at their provider

    Article · · tokenpony.dev · Alex Polvi · Jul 20, 2026

  11. An OAuth draft lets device checks set an app's scopes; a first review found a copied app could reuse the result

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Efe Kahraman, Mekarge · Jun 9, 2026

  12. OAuth 2.1's October draft bans plain PKCE and adds browser-app rules; 2.1-only clients can fail on older servers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  13. An OAuth client brokering many tools, as agent services do, can let a rogue tool take over a user's other tools

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tim Würtele et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  14. OAuth's in-app login draft lets a native app collect the password itself, and leaves each server to vet the app

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  15. An Alibaba and Cisco draft signs what the user was shown, then enforces a policy the agent wrote

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dapeng Liu et al. · Feb 28, 2026

  16. OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and assumes a trusted wallet is an app on a phone

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025

  17. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  18. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  19. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  20. In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Jun 17, 2024

  21. DPoP token binding depends on checks at the resource server

    Article · · RFC Editor · Daniel Fett et al. · Sep 2023

  22. Rich Authorization Requests need API-specific permission rules

    Article · · RFC Editor · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · May 1, 2023

Related terms

What appears alongside Pushed Authorization Requests in the same briefings.

FAPIAudience injection attackOAuth Deferred Token ResponseOAuth Attestation-Based Client AuthenticationOAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer IdentificationOAuth 2.0 Authorization Server MetadataPKCEOAuth Token Introspection