JSON Web Encryption
JWE · RFC 7516
The JOSE (JSON Object Signing and Encryption) format for encrypting a token's payload so only the key holder can read it; an encrypted access token cannot be validated without that key.
In our briefings
What our briefings say about JSON Web Encryption itself, with the most direct claims first.
RFC 7516 requires encrypted content for at least one recipient to validate successfully or the JWE is invalid; applications decide whether more recipients must validate. An incorrect authentication tag requires rejection without emitting decrypted output. Successful decryption does not settle algorithm policy: if the algorithms are unacceptable to the application, it SHOULD consider the JWE invalid.
JWE’s JSON headers can sit outside integrity protectionBI-FIND-2015-0042
The Request Object MUST be signed with JWS, and may then be encrypted with JWE. The server MUST use only the parameters inside it, even when the same parameter also arrives in the query string, and the client_id in both places MUST be identical. The RFC says the source of every request MUST be verified, and in our reading the signature does most of that work. Encrypting to the server's public key authenticates nobody, since anyone can encrypt to a public key. Checking the TLS identity of the host that serves a request_uri is, in the authors' words, "In general, this is not a reliable method." Both kinds of request_uri service it describes MUST validate the signature too. A signature still leaves the request readable, so when it carries a sensitive parameter the client SHOULD also encrypt it with JWE; the RFC notes that query parameters leak through referrers and browser history.
Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by defaultBI-FIND-2021-0011
›Cited in 12 briefings
Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.
- W3C's JOSE and COSE rules for credentials admit there is no standard way yet to fetch a JWK from a DID URL
Article · · W3C · Michael Jones et al. · Oct 13, 2026
- NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph
Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026
- A draft token hides some claims, works with old servers unchanged, and leaves agent delegation claims visible
Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Su-hyeon Forten Lee · Oct 3, 2026
- The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits
Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026
- In January Okta's agent product was in early access; Auth0 and Microsoft made machine-to-machine features GA
Release tracker · · 7 vendors' release notes · Jan 2026
- OpenID's credential issuance standard is OAuth for wallets, and its recommended wallet check is built for native apps
Article · · OpenID Foundation · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Sep 16, 2025
- Signed OAuth requests can be bypassed until the server refuses unsigned ones, and RFC 9101 leaves that off by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Aug 1, 2021
- Under RFC 8417 a security event token reports a fact, not an order, and the receiver decides what to do
Article · · RFC Editor · Phil Hunt et al. · Jul 2018
- JWE’s JSON headers can sit outside integrity protection
Article · · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7519 makes "none" mandatory to implement and leaves refusing an unwanted algorithm as a SHOULD
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7518 (2015) required one JWS signing algorithm, the shared-secret HS256, and barred accepting "none" by default
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
- RFC 7517 makes a JWK agree with its certificate and leaves trusting the certificate to the application
Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones, Microsoft · May 1, 2015
Related terms
What appears alongside JSON Web Encryption in the same briefings.
Security Event Token (SET)JWT