Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice

RFC 9700 · RFC9700 · BCP 240

RFC 9700 (January 2025), the IETF's consolidated security guidance for OAuth 2.0: exact-match redirect URIs, no implicit grant, and sender-constrained or short-lived tokens. It is a best current practice, so deployers are expected to follow it.

reference →

In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice would have you leave with.

  1. Microsoft's Defender researchers report phishing campaigns, aimed at government and public-sector organizations, that use the real Entra ID and Google sign-in endpoints as the redirect hop. The attacker creates an app in a tenant it controls, with its redirect URI on a malicious domain, and mails a link to the provider's authorize endpoint (login.microsoftonline.com for Entra ID) with prompt=none, which allows no sign-in screen, and a request built to fail, for example with an invalid scope. The target still has to click. The silent sign-in then fails without issuing a token (Entra returns error 65001), and the provider redirects the browser to the attacker's registered address. Microsoft says the technique "is not limited to those platforms and can be abused with other OAuth-compliant services."

    Phishing links that start at a real Microsoft or Google sign-in address and end at the attacker'sBI-FIND-2026-2391

  2. The IETF datatracker shows that the IESG approved OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining) as a Proposed Standard on 22 June 2026, and that it has been in the RFC Editor's queue since that day. Revision 17, the text we read, was posted on 19 July 2026 during that editing. Its authors are Arndt Schwenkschuster and Pieter Kasselman of Defakto Security, Kelley Burgin of MITRE, Mike Jenkins of NSA-CCSS, Brian Campbell of Ping Identity and Aaron Parecki of Okta. Campbell co-wrote RFC 8693 and RFC 7523, the two RFCs the draft combines, and Parecki co-wrote RFC 9728, one of the ways it names for finding the other domain's authorization server. The working group's write-up for the IESG lists implementations, among them Keycloak 26.5 and Okta's. Two other drafts we have read point to it: the transaction-tokens draft leaves crossing domains to it, and the AI agent authentication draft says cross-domain access SHOULD use identity chaining.

    OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agentBI-FIND-2026-0184

  3. Much of the new text in -01 says how an agent's access ends, in plain prose with no MUST or SHOULD. Section 8 now says a posture check at provisioning "establishes trust at the moment a credential is issued or renewed" and does not by itself show that posture still holds at a later request. It offers two existing remedies: shorter credential lifetimes, so posture is re-assessed at each renewal, or the event mechanisms of Section 11, so a posture change after issuance revokes or down-scopes the agent's credentials and tokens. Deprovisioning becomes a third phase after provisioning and rotation. At a minimum renewal stops and the short-lived credentials lapse; where the change must take effect before expiry, the issuer signals relying parties and the issuers of any derived credentials. A new Section 9.3 bounds a long-lived session or stream by the credential that opened it: the accepting party re-validates when that credential expires, and both sides end or down-scope the session on a revocation or risk signal. A retired agent's identifier must not be reassigned to a different agent.

    WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirementBI-FIND-2026-2029

›Cited in 35 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. Phishing links that start at a real Microsoft or Google sign-in address and end at the attacker's

    Article · · Microsoft Security Blog · Microsoft Defender Security Research Team · Mar 2, 2026

  2. OAuth's draft for crossing trust domains is approved for publication and never says agent

    Draft · · IETF OAuth Working Group · Arndt Schwenkschuster et al. · Jul 19, 2026

  3. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  4. OAuth's URL client ID draft tightens server rules in -03; the client is still whoever controls the URL

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  5. OAuth's draft for token requests that wait on a person now gives the client a link for the user to approve

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Guilherme de Oliveira Niero et al. · Sep 23, 2026

  6. A cross-domain transaction-token grant now names AI agents as a use and keeps the call chain at home

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · George Fletcher et al. · Sep 10, 2026

  7. An OAuth agent profile has the token server block any widening of scope, and leaves revoking the chain optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Sanjeev Kumar, Orchestrum Technologies LLP · Aug 30, 2026

  8. An OAuth profile for AI agents makes every hand-off cut privileges, but a shorter expiry alone counts as a cut

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Angel Cruz · Feb 7, 2026

  9. In Huawei's reworked OAuth draft, evidence signed by the token's subject can narrow access but never widen it

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Cheng-Kang Chu et al. · Sep 1, 2026

  10. NIST and CISA advise one-hour tokens, 90-day keys and hardware key storage; AI agents get one paragraph

    Article · · NIST (CSRC) · Ryan Galluzzo et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  11. Coetzee's agent token is good for one declared call, and the hard part is hashing that call the same way twice

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Rudolf Jacobus Coetzee · Jul 19, 2026

  12. Cisco's SD-Card puts an A2A Agent Card in a selective-disclosure token, and leaves its registry out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  13. The browser OAuth draft favors a backend that keeps tokens out of JavaScript

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  14. OAuth 2.1's October draft bans plain PKCE and adds browser-app rules; 2.1-only clients can fail on older servers

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Dick Hardt et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  15. An OAuth client brokering many tools, as agent services do, can let a rogue tool take over a user's other tools

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tim Würtele et al. · Mar 2, 2026

  16. An OAuth draft caps every refresh token at the user's grant, and tells the app when that grant ends

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Nick Watson, Google · Feb 27, 2026

  17. The draft replacing RFC 8725 requires rejecting malformed JWTs but only recommends denial-of-service limits

    Draft · · IETF datatracker · Yaron Sheffer et al. · Jan 12, 2026

  18. Huawei-led OAuth draft lets clients chain narrower tokens offline but leaves revocation delivery out of scope

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Li Ruochen et al. · Oct 20, 2025

  19. One author's OpenID Connect for Agents proposal checks each delegation hop but makes the chain optional

    Paper · · arXiv · Subramanya Nagabhushanaradhya · Sep 30, 2025

  20. Auth0's DPoP explainer leaves out the access-token hash that RFC 9449 requires on every API call

    Article · · Auth0 Blog · Andrea Chiarelli · Aug 25, 2025

  21. An OAuth client that never registers: the July 2025 draft makes its URL the identity and leaves most server checks as SHOULDs

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Aaron Parecki et al. · Jul 23, 2025

  22. OpenID4VP 1.0 makes verifiers re-check what a wallet returns, and cannot show a holder acting for someone else

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Oliver Terbu et al. · Jul 9, 2025

  23. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  24. RFC 9728 tells clients where an API's tokens come from and leaves most of the trust decision to them

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Apr 2025

  25. FAPI 2.0 issues only sender-constrained access tokens and leaves public clients out

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Daniel Fett et al. · Feb 22, 2025

  26. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025

  27. In GNAP (RFC 9635), a client is known by its key, and tokens stay key-bound unless the server flags them bearer

    Article · · RFC Editor · Justin Richer et al. · Oct 1, 2024

  28. In May 2023, Parecki described OAuth 2.1 as consolidation and DPoP as token protection

    Video · · Identiverse - A CRA Resource · Jun 17, 2024

  29. OpenID Connect Core says only issuer plus subject identify a user; email must never be the key

    Article · · OpenID Foundation · Nat Sakimura et al. · Dec 15, 2023

  30. RFC 9207 has OAuth servers name themselves in each response; clients must refuse a missing name only where they expect one

    Article · · RFC Editor · Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen et al. · Mar 1, 2022

  31. RFC 9068 makes resource servers check a JWT access token's type and audience, and warns a client could pose as a user

    Article · · RFC Editor · Vittorio Bertocci, Okta · Oct 1, 2021

  32. Trying to prove OAuth 2.0 secure, a 2016 Trier paper found four attacks, the IdP mix-up among them

    Paper · · arXiv · Daniel Fett et al. · Jan 6, 2016

  33. PKCE's 2015 standard let servers accept clients that skip it and treated an omitted method as the weaker plain

    Article · · RFC Editor · Nat Sakimura et al. · Sep 2015

  34. RFC 6750 tokens work for whoever holds them; RFC 9700 now urges key binding and bars them from query strings

    Article · · RFC Editor · Michael B. Jones et al. · Oct 1, 2012

  35. RFC 6749 admits a server can't tell who presents a token; the fixes arrived in 2020 and 2023

    Article · · RFC Editor · D. Hardt et al. · Oct 2012

Related terms

What appears alongside OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice in the same briefings.

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer IdentificationOAuth 2.0 Authorization Server MetadataPushed Authorization RequestsOAuth Token IntrospectionOAuth 2.0 Token RevocationResource Indicators for OAuth 2.0DPoPRich Authorization Requests