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Explainers · Glossary

Open banking

open banking standards

Regulation-driven standards (such as the Financial-grade API (FAPI) profiles of OAuth) that let a customer grant a third party scoped, time-limited access to bank data and payments.

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In our briefings

The claim each of the newest briefings on Open banking would have you leave with.

  1. The Model Context Protocol specifies OAuth for authorization and leaves it optional, and the people who build identity products say most servers take the option. On this show the head of SecureAuth and the engineer who open-sourced Cedar agree on the mechanism: a software vendor under pressure to ship an MCP server wraps the API it already has, so the fine-grained scopes an agent needs were never there to expose. Their phrase is that it is a big, fat, raw API play. They name no server and give no count. The specification text we read confirms the opening: authorization is optional, and a client that does use it is a plain OAuth client with no delegation.

    MCP made authorization optional, and two identity veterans say most servers took the optionBI-FIND-2026-0276

  2. Hosseyni, Küsters and Würtele show that an OAuth client which signs its own assertions to authenticate (Private Key JWT, or the JWT and SAML bearer profiles) can be made to sign one for an honest authorization server and hand it to an attacker. The attacker runs a second authorization server where the client is registered with the same key, which the authors call common practice and OpenID Federation even codifies, and with the same client ID, which nothing in the standards prevents and some standards require. The first phase also needs the client to send an assertion somewhere other than the token endpoint, such as a pushed authorization request, revocation, introspection or a CIBA request; OpenID Connect used alone avoids it, because its clients authenticate only at the token endpoint. That server's configuration lists the honest server's token endpoint as its own, and the client, which in the authors' words "has no way to externally validate" it, signs that URL as the audience and sends the assertion to the attacker. The attacker replays it at the honest server as the client; in the authors' code-flow example, a user who follows the attacker's re-authorization link then sends the attacker an authorization code. The honest server accepts the assertion because OpenID Connect says the audience SHOULD be the token endpoint URL, and RFC 7521 to 7523 explicitly allow that value.

    A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also usesBI-FIND-2025-0450

  3. Several of RFC 9700's MUSTs are checks an IAM team can run against its own stack. Authorization servers must match redirect URIs by exact string, with only the port of a native app's localhost URI exempt. They must support PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) and refuse a token request that carries a code_verifier when the authorization request had no code_challenge. Public clients must use PKCE, and their refresh tokens must be sender-constrained or rotated. The resource owner password credentials grant must not be used. Two neighbouring rules are softer: the implicit grant gets a SHOULD NOT with an exception, and PKCE for confidential clients is only RECOMMENDED. The authors concede that following the document "may break interoperability" and still recommend upgrading "as soon as feasible".

    RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULDBI-FIND-2025-0351

Cited in 3 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. MCP made authorization optional, and two identity veterans say most servers took the option

    Podcast · · Hybrid Identity Protection Podcast · Agentic AI and the Authorization Gap No One Closed · Jun 9, 2026

  2. A rogue OAuth server can collect a client's signed assertion and replay it at an honest server the client also uses

    Article · · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Pedram Hosseyni et al. · Apr 7, 2025

  3. RFC 9700 bans OAuth's password grant and loose redirect matching; binding access tokens stays a SHOULD

    Article · · IETF (RFC Editor) · Torsten Lodderstedt et al. · Jan 2025