Skip to content
IAM Insights

Explainers · Glossary

WIMSE Workload Proof Token

WPT · Workload Proof Token · draft-ietf-wimse-wpt · Authorization: WPT

By Boston Identity · Explained · 6 min read

The short answer

A short-lived signed token a workload attaches to an HTTP request to prove it holds the private key behind its identity token. It also ties that token, and any transaction token, to the service it is calling.

What it is
A protocol
Defined by
IETF WIMSE WG draft (-02)
Who it's for
Teams securing service-to-service and agent calls
In our briefings
16By month of the source: 2025-12: 0, 2026-01: 0, 2026-02: 0, 2026-03: 0, 2026-04: 0, 2026-05: 0, 2026-06: 1, 2026-07: 5, 2026-08: 1, 2026-09: 2, 2026-10: 4, 2026-11: 22by month, last 12

Where it stands

WG adopted since Nov 4, 2025.

Checked Nov 22, 2026.

01

What is WIMSE Workload Proof Token?

The Workload Proof Token, or WPT, comes from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) working group on Workload Identity in Multi System Environments (WIMSE). It is a draft, not yet a standard: revision -02, published 27 August 2026, lists Standards Track as its intended status.S1 A workload is a piece of software, such as a service or a job, that calls other software.

The problem it solves sits one layer down. WIMSE defines a Workload Identity Token (WIT), a credential that binds a public key to the workload's name. The WIT must not be used as a bearer token, meaning a token that works for whoever holds it.§1 Something has to prove the caller holds the matching private key, and the WPT is that proof of possession (PoP).§1

A WPT is a signed JSON Web Token (JWT), a compact signed set of claims. The authors name simplicity as its primary design goal.§1 The core format is not tied to HTTP, though this draft only details HTTP use; bindings for other protocols are left to future specifications.§1

Not a credential on its own. The WIT says who the workload is; the WPT only proves, for one request, that the sender holds the WIT's key.§1

02

How does WIMSE Workload Proof Token work?

Two workloads take part: a calling workload that holds a WIT and its private key, and a recipient workload that receives the HTTP request. A transaction token, carrying the end user's context, may ride along.

Figure steps
  1. The caller holds a WIT and its key
  2. The caller signs a WPT
  3. The caller binds any context tokens
  4. The caller sends the request
  5. The recipient checks the key and the binding
  6. The recipient rejects a failed proof
Fig. 1

The calling workload signs a fresh proof with the key its WIT names, binds the WIT and any transaction token to it by hash, and the recipient checks each binding before it accepts the call.

Drawn from draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02, section 2

Swipe for the full figure →

  1. The caller holds a WIT and its key

    The calling workload already has a WIT, defined in the companion credentials draft.§1 The WIT's confirmation claim (cnf) carries the workload's public key.§2 The workload keeps the matching private key, which must be kept private and must not be used once the WIT has expired.§3.2

  2. The caller signs a WPT

    To call another workload, the caller builds a JWT typed wpt+jwt and signs it with the private key, using the algorithm the WIT names.§2 Its claims must include an audience (aud), which should be the target URI without query or fragment, and an expiry (exp) that must be short, for example minutes or seconds.§2 It also carries a unique identifier (jti) and a hash of the WIT (wth).§2

  3. The caller binds any context tokens

    If the request carries a transaction token, the WPT must include its hash in the tth claim.§2 Other tokens that convey end-user identity or authorization context are hashed into the oth claim, keyed by header name.§2 This ties the user's context to this one proof.

  4. The caller sends the request

    The WIT travels in the Workload-Identity-Token header, and the WPT goes in the Authorization header under the WPT scheme.§2 A transaction token keeps its own Txn-Token header.§2.2 Because a request has only one Authorization header, it cannot also carry a Bearer or Basic credential.§2.2

  5. The recipient checks the key and the binding

    The recipient must first validate the WIT, then check the WPT.§2 It confirms there is exactly one Authorization header using the WPT scheme, that the algorithm matches the WIT's, and that the signature verifies with the WIT's public key.§2 It then checks that aud matches the target URI, that exp has not passed, and that wth, tth and oth match the tokens in the request.§2 Checking that the jti has not been seen before is recommended, not required.§2 If the oth claim is present, the recipient must reject a WPT whose oth entries it does not understand, and must not use additional tokens the oth claim does not cover to make authorization decisions.§2

  6. The recipient rejects a failed proof

    If validation fails, the recipient returns an error.§2.1 For a failure tied to the WPT it should use HTTP status 401 (Unauthorized), with a WWW-Authenticate: WPT challenge.§2.1 An error unrelated to the credentials can still get 400 (Bad Request).§2.1

03

Why does WIMSE Workload Proof Token matter now?

Workload proofs are showing up in agent work. An agent-authentication draft names the WPT as one application-layer option for agents, a signed JWT bound to one message.1 Its reason is practical: proxies, gateways, service meshes and load balancers often end and restart TLS (Transport Layer Security), which breaks mutual TLS's end-to-end identity.1 A draft on workload attestation also leans on it, using the WPT's jti as the nonce that ties fresh platform evidence to the call.2

The design itself moved this year. Revision -02 put the proof in the Authorization header, so a request authenticated this way cannot also carry a Bearer or Basic credential.3 Workload identity and user context now travel as two tokens in two headers by design.3

We would not plan around shipping code yet. The draft has no implementation status section, while its HTTP-signature sibling lists two.4 The word agent does not appear in it, and it says nothing about delegation chains.4

04

Where does it fit?

Compared withHow WIMSE Workload Proof Token differs
DPoPThe draft's own history calls the WPT the DPoP-inspired option.App. A.10 What the WPT proves is possession of the key named in a workload's WIT.§1
WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP SignaturesThe HTTP-signature sibling signs more of the message and gives better integrity against middleboxes, at more complexity; the proof token is simpler and suits asynchronous systems.5
WIMSE Workload Authentication Using Mutual TLSMutual TLS proves the key at the connection; the WIT and WPT are only used in the application-layer options, not with mutual TLS.§3.1 That matters when a proxy ends the TLS connection.1
Transaction TokensA transaction token carries the end user's context in its own Txn-Token header; the WPT authenticates the calling workload and binds the transaction token through its tth hash.§2.2
05

What goes wrong?

  • Most of the request goes unprotected. The WPT binds the target URI and token hashes, not the method, headers or body.6 The draft says it does not protect major portions of the request and response, and so gives no protection from an actively malicious middle box.§3.3
  • Replay inside the window remains. A captured token and proof may be replayed within the proof's lifetime.§3.1 The jti check is only a SHOULD, and a replay cache may be hard to synchronize across validators.§3.1.4,7
  • The audience can be spoofed by a careless validator. It must take allowed hosts from trusted configuration, never from the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header.§3.1.7
  • Logs leak proofs. Implementations must not log raw WPTs by default, since a harvested one could be replayed.§3.1.5
  • Proofs need a protected channel. The token and proof must be sent over a server-authenticated TLS connection, with the client validating the host name, unless another mechanism provides a secure channel.§3.1.1
  • A WPT may contain private information such as user names.§3.4 In exceptional deployments where a workload or target URI is tied to one user, a disclosed WPT might be used to track that user.§3.4
06

What should a security leader ask?

  1. 01

    Which proxies and gateways sit between our workloads, and do we trust each of them with the body of every call?

  2. 02

    Do our validators keep a replay cache on jti, and is it shared across every instance behind the load balancer?

  3. 03

    Where does each validator get its list of allowed audiences, and does anything read the Host header instead?

  4. 04

    Which of our services still accept a bearer token for workload-to-workload calls?

  5. 05

    If a vendor says it supports WPT, which draft revision does it implement?

07

Sources

›Evidence: 7 claims from 4 briefings
  1. 1BI-FIND-2026-0180 · Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reachThe draft allows agent authentication at the transport layer, the application layer or both, and says where the transport layer stops being enough. Paired with short-lived workload identities, mutual TLS "provides strong channel binding and cryptographic proof of control over the agent's private key". But proxies, API gateways, service meshes and load balancers often terminate and re-establish TLS, which breaks the end-to-end continuity of that identity. For those cases the draft calls application-layer authentication "a more robust and portable mechanism": a WIMSE Workload Proof Token, a signed JWT bound to one message such as an HTTP request, or an HTTP message signature. Neither has channel binding, so implementations MUST consider relay and replay, which deployments typically limit with short lifetimes, audience limits and nonce checks.
  2. 2BI-FIND-2026-0999 · A June draft moves workload attestation out of TLS into HTTP headers so it survives a TLS-ending proxyReddy and Ritz move workload attestation out of TLS and into HTTP headers so that it reaches a backend behind a TLS-terminating proxy. One new header carries the trusted execution environment's raw Evidence, wrapped for the backend to send to a Verifier; the other carries a Verifier's signed EAT Attestation Result that the caller fetched in advance. The workload's public key ties either one to the WIMSE identity token and proof token: the Evidence or result must name the same key as the identity token, and the proof token's jti serves as the nonce. Their reason is that the SEAT working group's TLS attestation drafts, which Reddy co-writes, bind Evidence to one TLS connection, so when TLS ends at a proxy "the backend workload receives no cryptographic evidence of the original caller's platform and key state."
  3. 3BI-FIND-2026-0379 · The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itselfRevision -02 moved the proof into the Authorization header under a new WPT scheme, and that choice has a consequence the draft spells out: a request authenticated this way cannot also carry a Bearer or Basic credential, and section 2.2 says a recipient 'MUST NOT rely on a bearer token presented in the same request to authenticate the calling workload'. The end user's context is not evicted with it. A transaction token travels in its own Txn-Token header and is bound to the proof through the tth claim, so policy can combine who the workload is with whom it acts for. Workload identity and user context become two tokens in two headers by design, which is the same separation the transaction-token draft draws from its side.
  4. 4BI-FIND-2026-0381 · The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itselfThe proof the draft calls its primary design goal, simplicity, has no implementation status section at all, while the more complex HTTP-signature sibling lists two. The draft's own history explains the shape: revision -00 was cut down from a document that also held the credential formats and the message-signature profile, so the working group now carries four documents where it once had one, and the DPoP-style token is the piece nobody has reported building. The word agent does not appear, and nothing is said about delegation or chains; the abstract's one line on multi-hop call chains refers to combining the proof with other WIMSE protocols.
  5. 5BI-FIND-2026-0385 · The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optionalThe text is moving faster than its listed implementations. Section 4 lists a proof of concept from Cofide and an alpha from an independent developer, both unchanged in -08, so both predate the working-group last-call changes in -07 and the shepherd-review changes in -08; the draft claims no interoperability test. Appendix C compares this profile with the proof token: signatures give 'superior integrity protection, particularly by mitigating message modification by middleboxes' and support signed responses, at more complexity, while the proof token is simpler and suits asynchronous systems. This draft gives no rule for which to use, and the appendix says future versions can decide which parts of message signing become mandatory. AI agents and delegation are not mentioned anywhere in the text.
  6. 6BI-FIND-2026-0378 · The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itselfA Workload Proof Token proves that the caller holds the key in its credential, and that is the limit of what it proves. The signed JWT carries the target URL as audience (query and fragment stripped), a hash of the workload's identity token, and hashes of any transaction token or other token in the request; it does not cover the HTTP method, the path beyond the audience, headers or the body. Section 3.3 states the consequence without softening it: the proof 'does not protect major portions of the request and response and therefore does not provide protection from an actively malicious middle box'. A workload that chooses this proof over the HTTP message-signature profile is trusting every proxy between it and the recipient with the content of the call.
  7. 7BI-FIND-2026-0380 · The IETF's simplest workload proof proves the key and leaves the request unprotected, and the draft says so itselfThe draft's answer to a captured proof is to make it expire before it can be reused, and to recommend rather than require the cache that would catch it. Lifetimes 'MUST be short, e.g., on the order of minutes or seconds'; the audience must come from the recipient's own configuration, never from a Host or X-Forwarded-Host header; TLS is mandatory; raw tokens must not be logged. The replay cache keyed on jti is RECOMMENDED in section 2 and SHOULD in section 3.1.4, with the admission that it is 'difficult to synchronize' across validators. Capture-and-replay inside the window is the residual risk the working group has decided to live with, in this draft and in its HTTP-signature sibling.

›In our briefings

What our briefings say about WIMSE Workload Proof Token itself, with the most direct claims first.

  1. A Workload Proof Token proves that the caller holds the key in its credential, and that is the limit of what it proves. Its audience SHOULD be the target URI without query or fragment, though a deployment may set a deployment-specific value; the signed JWT also carries a hash of the workload's identity token and, when present, hashes of the transaction token and of other tokens that convey end-user identity or authorization context. A recipient must reject a proof whose oth claim contains entries it does not understand, and must not base authorization decisions on extra tokens oth does not cover. No claim covers the HTTP method, other headers or the body. Section 3.3 states the consequence without softening it: the proof 'does not protect major portions of the request and response and therefore does not provide protection from an actively malicious middle box'. A workload that chooses this proof over the HTTP message-signature profile is trusting every intermediary that sees the traffic in the clear between TLS connections not to alter the call.

    The IETF's Workload Proof Token proves the key but leaves major portions of the request unprotected, and the draft says so itselfBI-FIND-2026-0378

  2. Revision -07 leaves the application mechanism open between a Workload Proof Token (WPT), inspired by OAuth Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP), and an HTTP Message Signatures profile. The WPT binds the target, the Workload Identity Token and any included authorization-context tokens. The signatures profile requires the HTTP method and request target to be signed, plus specified headers when present, and requires a Content-Digest for a message body. Responses may be signed; this is optional. The draft warns that the DPoP-inspired alternative does not protect major portions of requests and responses against an actively malicious middlebox. Both application options still require a secure channel.

    WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverageBI-FIND-2025-0493

›Cited in 16 briefings

Every briefing that discusses this term, newest first.

  1. An agent-mandate draft checks who may delegate, and now intends to carry its chain in Asor's format

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Claudiu Hulea, Braincap SRL · Oct 24, 2026

  2. Two WIMSE participants say AI agents are workloads, and existing standards already cover most of the job

    Video · · Identerati Office Hours · Nov 6, 2026

  3. WIMSE's agent draft adds how an agent's access ends and where policy engines fit, without a new requirement

    Draft · · IETF WIMSE Working Group · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Sep 15, 2026

  4. Cisco's SD-Card rewrite pins MCP tools to what a registry signed; its security sections still read TODO

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Suhas Nandakumar et al. · Nov 1, 2026

  5. Sweeney's delegation draft concedes its server is trusted with users' credentials, and drops an interop claim

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Kieran Sweeney · Oct 13, 2026

  6. A 'human approved' field is not evidence, says Schrock's draft; only a bound, signed approval counts

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Jul 3, 2026

  7. WIMSE credentials -03: a valid signature proves trust-domain membership, not which workload is calling

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Jul 2, 2026

  8. The IETF's stronger workload proof is built for the proxy in the middle, and it still leaves replay protection optional

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Oct 20, 2026

  9. An individual IETF draft takes a workload's role and group out of its name and puts them in separate metadata

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Shlomo Zalman Heigh et al. · Oct 16, 2026

  10. Six companies' agent-auth draft, since adopted by the WIMSE group, keeps credentials out of the model's reach

    Draft · · IETF Internet-Draft (individual submission, since adopted by the WIMSE working group) · Pieter Kasselman et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  11. Before an agent pays or changes data, Schrock's last check treats it as untrusted and keeps the record itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Iman Schrock, EMILIA Protocol · Sep 26, 2026

  12. WIMSE mutual TLS -03 ties certificate acceptance to trust-domain anchors

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Joseph A. Salowey et al. · Jul 6, 2026

  13. The IETF's Workload Proof Token proves the key but leaves major portions of the request unprotected, and the draft says so itself

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Aug 27, 2026

  14. A valid delegation chain cannot replace required human approval or proof of key possession

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Karthik Rampalli, Glyphzero Labs · Jul 6, 2026

  15. A June draft moves workload attestation out of TLS into HTTP headers so it survives a TLS-ending proxy

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Tirumaleswar Reddy.K et al. · Jun 7, 2026

  16. WIMSE leaves its application proof choice open, with different integrity coverage

    Draft · · IETF Datatracker · Brian Campbell et al. · Oct 16, 2025

Related terms

What appears alongside WIMSE Workload Proof Token in the same briefings.

WIMSEHTTP Message SignaturesDefaktoWIMSE Workload Authentication Using Mutual TLSTransaction TokensWITMulti-token Container Data StructureDPoP

Was this explainer useful?

Share this explainer

Every finding, forecast and open question on this site has a permanent ID. If we reword one, its ID stays the same, so a citation keeps pointing to the same claim.

Follow us on LinkedInRSS feed

Working on an identity problem that involves WIMSE Workload Proof Token? Talk to Boston Identity